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Abstract
The increased sensing, processing, communication, and control capabilities introduced
by cyber-physical systems bring many potential improvements to the operation of society’s
systems, but also introduce questions as to how one can ensure their efficient and secure
operation. This dissertation investigates three questions related to decision-making under
uncertainty in cyber-physical systems settings.
First, in the context of power systems and electricity markets, how can one design al-
gorithms that guide self-interested agents to a socially optimal and physically feasible out-
come, subject to the fact that agents only possess localized information of the system and
can only react to local signals? The proposed algorithms, investigated in the context of
two distinct models, are iterative in nature and involve the exchange of messages between
agents. The first model consists of a network of interconnected power systems controlled
by a collection of system operators. Each system operator possesses knowledge of its own
localized region and aims to prescribe the cost minimizing set of net injections for its buses.
By using relative voltage angles as messages, system operators iteratively communicate to
reach a social-cost minimizing and physically feasible set of injections for the whole net-
work. The secondmodel consists of amarket operator andmarket participants (distribution,
generation, and transmission companies). Using locational marginal pricing, themarket op-
erator is able to guide the market participants to a competitive equilibrium, which, under
an assumption on the positivity of prices, is shown to be a globally optimal solution to the
non-convex social-welfare maximization problem. Common to both algorithms is the use
of a quadratic power flow approximation that preserves important non-linearities (power
xiii
losses) while maintaining desirable mathematical properties that permit convergence under
natural conditions.
Second, when a system is under attack from a malicious agent, what models are appro-
priate for performing real-time and scalable threat assessment and response selection when
we only have partial information about the attacker’s intent and capabilities? The proposed
model, termed the dynamic security model, is based on a type of attack graph, termed a con-
dition dependency graph, and describes how an attacker can infiltrate a cyber network. By
embedding a state space on the graph, the model is able to quantify the attacker’s progres-
sion. Consideration of multiple attacker types, corresponding to attack strategies, allows
one to model the defender’s uncertainty of the attacker’s true strategy/intent. Using noisy
security alerts, the defender maintains a belief over both the capabilities/progression of
the attacker (via a security state) and its strategy (attacker type). An online, tree-based
search method, termed the online defense algorithm, is developed that takes advantage of
the model’s structure, permitting scalable computation of defense policies.
Finally, in partially observable sequential decision-making environments, specifically
partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), under what conditions do op-
timal policies possess desirable structure? Motivated by the dynamic security model, we
investigate settings where the underlying state space is partially ordered (i.e. settings where
one cannot always say whether one state is better or worse than another state). The con-
tribution lies in the derivation of natural conditions on the problem’s parameters such that
optimal policies aremonotone in the belief for a class of two-action POMDPs. The extension
to the partially ordered setting requires defining a new stochastic order, termed the gener-
alized monotone likelihood ratio, and a corresponding class of order-preserving matrices,
termed generalized totally positive of order .
xiv
C 
Introduction
T echnolog is increasingly finding its way into all aspects of our lives. Beyond oursmartphones and computers, a growing number of devices and systems that we inter-
act with on daily basis are intelligent, capable of gathering information from the real-world
and processing it on-board in order to make real-time decisions and generate feedback.
Examples range from personal voice assistants (e.g. Amazon’s Alexa) and intelligent wear-
ables (e.g. the Apple Watch) to the larger scale settings of autonomous vehicles and smart
building management systems.
The feature of combining information processing with a real-world, physical system is a
representative characteristic of a class of systems termed cyber-physical systems. Specifi-
cally, a cyber-physical system is one in which a physical system or process is “monitored,
coordinated, controlled, and integrated” by a densely connected computation and commu-
nication network [Rajkumar et al., ]. Cyber-physical systems integrate sensing, infor-
mation processing, communication, and control capabilities into all levels of the physical

infrastructure with the aim of collecting a vast amount of information of the underlying
system in order to realize large gains in operational efficiency. This integration has been
made more feasible in recent years due to the shrinking size and cost of sensors and pro-
cessors, a societal shift described by popular terms such as the internet-of-things and the
internet-of-everything.
Society is increasingly recognizing the utility of cyber-physical systems for the design
and efficient operation of critical infrastructure systems. These systems form an integral
part of our modern lives, including the power systems that generate and distribute our
electricity, the transportation networks that enable us to quickly and safely reach our des-
tinations, the distribution networks that supply clean water to our homes, and the cellular
and wireless networks that we all rely upon to remain connected. It is undeniable that lever-
aging the full capabilities of cyber-physical systems in these domains have the potential to
drastically improve their efficiency, functionality, and profitability, resulting in beneficial
effects on our economy and society as a whole. Cyber-physical systems are also expected
to bring improvements to manufacturing, industrial control, factory automation, aerospace,
and defense systems [Khaitan & McCalley, ].
The promised benefits of cyber-physical systems do not comewithout the introduction of
some significant challenges and risks. The inherently distributed sensing, communication,
and control capabilities of cyber-physical systems raise questions as to how one will be able
to take full advantage of this new-found functionality, especially in the time-critical and
large-scale domains present in many real-world applications. Furthermore, while the dense
connectivity innate to cyber-physical systems enables devices to efficiently communicate
information, it also opens up the possibility of malicious agents being able to exploit this
functionality to their advantage and gain access to the system. As these systems grow
and more physical components become instrumented with processing and communication
capabilities, the set of attack pathways that amalicious agent can use to infiltrate the system

(i.e. the attack surface) also unavoidably grows.
Addressing the above concerns involves developing algorithms, models, and theory that
study and exploit the conjunction between processing and communication capabilities and
the physical system. The analysis of cyber-physical systems uses ideas from decentralized
and distributed optimization to address the distributed nature of information and compu-
tation, graph theory to describe the interconnections between system components and de-
pendencies between operating conditions, and (stochastic) control theory and game theory
to capture the uncertain effects of actions on the dynamics of the underlying system and
the feedback of information to the decision-making process.
There are many rich and complex research questions that arise out of cyber-physical
systems settings. This dissertation focuses on the informational aspect of these problems,
specifically, how decisions are made when there is some uncertainty of the underlying
system. This involves analyzing the structure of how information exists in the system and
properties of how it is revealed to decision-makers in order to designmodels and algorithms
that can efficiently translate all of the available information into decisions, while keeping
an eye on tractability in realistic domains.
.. Decision-Making in Cyber Physical Systems under Imperfect
Information
Inherent to problems in cyber-physical systems settings is the requirement to make deci-
sions without necessarily having certainty of the current operating status or the underlying
structure of the system. Often, such decisions must be made under the restriction that the
information necessary for making the optimal decision does not reside in a single location
or with a single agent, that is, there is no centralized, all-knowing entity. Instead, the in-
formation is distributed among multiple, potentially self-interested, decision-makers. Fur-

thermore, due to the physical laws dictating the operation of the system and its inherently
interconnected nature, the decisions of each agent have external, sometimes wide-spread,
effects.
The presence ofmalicious agents adds another layer of uncertainty to the decision-making
process. Malicious agents (termed attackers) have goals of their own, such as gaining access
to sensitive information, commandeering key system components, or, more subtly, inter-
fering with the agents’ abilities to gather information (e.g. by corrupting existing data or
injecting false data), impeding agents’ abilities to perform accurate estimation and infer-
ence. Design of secure systems must go beyond the standard concerns of robustness to
disturbances and random failures, but must also be capable of reasoning about attackers’
abilities to maliciously interfere with the intended operation of the system and be able to
take actions to ensure secure operation in the presence of such behavior.
This dissertation investigates three general questions related to decision-making under
imperfect information in cyber-physical systems settings:
) In the context of power systems and electricity markets, how can one design algo-
rithms that guide self-interested agents to a socially optimal and physically feasible
outcome, subject to the fact that agents only possess localized information of the
system and can only react to local signals?
) When a system is under attack from a malicious agent, what models are appropriate
for performing real-time and scalable threat assessment and response selection when
we only have partial information about the attacker’s intent/strategy and capabilities?
) In partially observable sequential decision-making environments, specifically par-
tially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), under what conditions do
optimal policies (functions mapping the decision-maker’s belief of the system to an
action) possess desirable structure?
Motivation, as well as the specific context, for each of these questions is described in more
detail in the following section. The research contributions are also made explicit.

.. Problem Settings and Contributions
The problems studied in this dissertation focus on the development and analysis of models
for decision-making under uncertainty subject to constraints arising from both physical
considerations and the problem’s information structure. This dissertation investigates this
general theme in two main application areas: decentralized decision-making in the context
of power systems and electricity markets, and sequential decision-making under uncer-
tainty in the context of cyber-physical systems security. A central theme of my work is
investigating how the information structure of the problem can be used to design efficient
algorithms and gain insight into the form of optimal solutions. Along these lines, I have
also investigated a more general question regarding the structure of optimal policies for
POMDPs. The work involves providing conditions on the problem’s parameters in order
to ensure that the optimal policy has specific structure, shedding light on the relationship
between the information pattern of the problem and the form of the optimal policy, as well
as laying the groundwork for the design of efficient policy search algorithms.
... Power Flow Algorithms and Electricity Market Meanisms (Ch.  and )
Deregulation of the electric power industry has resulted in systems that consist of many
self-interested agents. Under this setting, information is decentralized with each agent only
possessing a localized view of the system. As a result, if agents were to make decisions in
isolation, they would be unable to do so in a way that resulted in a feasible, let alone op-
timal, outcome for the system. To complicate matters, power flows through the network
according to rules dictated by the laws of physics, creating system-wide coupling between
variables and causing individual dispatch decisions to generate large and far-reaching ex-
ternalities. Furthermore, the equations dictating power flow are highly nonlinear.
The contribution of Chapters  and  is in the development of provably convergent al-
gorithms for obtaining socially optimal outcomes subject the aforementioned physical and

informational constraints. Chapter  introduces a decentralized algorithm for determining
the optimal net power injections at each bus (node in the network) in a multi-area power
system. Each area is controlled by a system operator who is responsible for determining
the set of net injections for its own region, subject to local feasibility conditions. Through
an iterative message-exchange process (using relative voltage phase angles as messages)
the system operators agree upon a set of power flows between adjacent regions that re-
sult in a socially optimal set of net injections. Chapter  introduces a more general model,
consisting of many decision-makers, termed market participants – generation companies
(GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos) – each
with localized information of the system. Using the price of power at each bus as signals,
themarketmechanism involves themarket participants reporting their surplus-maximizing
outcomes, for a given set of prices, to a market operator, who is then responsible for updat-
ing the prices. The mechanism efficiently guides agents to an agreement, termed a compet-
itive equilibrium, while respecting their informational constraints. Exploiting the structure
of a quadratic approximation of the power flow equations, we are able to show that, under
natural conditions (positivity of edge-wise price sums), the resulting competitive equilib-
rium is a global saddle-point of the Lagrangian and results in a globally optimal solution of
the non-convex social welfare maximization problem.
... Dynamic Security Strategies for Cyber-Physical Systems (Ch. )
Cyber-physical systems promise to greatly improve our quality of life, but will unavoidably
come with the introduction of a myriad of vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to maliciously
interfere with their intended operation. The scale of the attack surfaces in such systems,
especially those of critical infrastructure, necessitates the development of automated de-
fense systems that are capable of efficiently translating large amounts of noisy security
alert information (from an intrusion detection system) into a quantification of the system’s
security status, with the goal of prescribing actions that prevent the attacker from achiev-

ing its goal(s). Models must be able to reason about all possible attack pathways that a
malicious agent can use to infiltrate the system while permitting tractable computation of
security strategies.
The contribution of this chapter is in the development of a partially observable sequen-
tial decision model for real-time threat assessment and response selection in cyber-physical
systems. Sophisticated attacks unfold in a complex manner, involving the exploitation of
vulnerabilities across multiple system components. In order to capture this behavior, the
proposed model explicitly represents all attack pathways via a type of attack graph termed
a condition dependency graph. The dependency graph allows one to reason about the cur-
rent capabilities of the attacker and its proximity to its objectives. In the context of cyber-
physical systems, the attacker’s objectives represent conditions that permit the attacker to
inflict damage to the physical infrastructure. Taking into account the cost of an attacker
achieving its objective, as well as the cost of defense actions, one can cast the problem of
determining optimal security strategies as a POMDP, where the information state (belie) is
the joint distribution over the set of attacker’s current capabilities and strategy. Scalability
is achieved by employing an online, tree-based search method which involves simulating
future possible scenarios, from the current history, in order to gain accurate estimates of
the effectiveness of various defenses. Furthermore, taking advantage of the structure of
observations, we are able to process a high volume of security alerts, enabling efficient
inference in large-scale domains.
... Structural Properties of Optimal Policies for POMDPs (Ch. )
POMDPs have enormous practical value. Unfortunately, solving them (i.e. obtaining an
optimal policy) is typically a very computationally intensive task. Questions investigating
conditions under which optimal policies have desirable structure are helpful for not only
gaining insight into the optimal decision rule, but also allowing for the design of efficient
policy search algorithms, pruning the space in which optimal policies live.

Our contribution lies in the derivation of natural conditions under which the optimal
policy is monotone in the belief when the underlying state-space is partially ordered (i.e.
motivated by the state space of the dynamic security model of Chapter , we investigate
settings in which one cannot always say whether one state is better or worse than another
state). Due to the partial ordering of the state-space, we propose a new stochastic order,
generalizing the monotone likelihood ratio order. The stochastic order has many desirable
properties, allowing us to establish monotonicity properties of the value functions and dy-
namic programming recursion, ensuring monotone optimal policies in a two-action setting.
The work represents a contribution to the existing theory regarding structural properties
of optimal policies for POMDPs.
.. Organization of the Dissertation
This work is divided into two parts. Each part begins with a preliminary chapter that pro-
vides necessary background information and gives context for the chapters that follow. In
the first part, technical preliminaries for problems related to the electrical grid are provided
in Chapter , followed by a decentralized algorithm for the operation of power systems in
Chapter , and a decentralized mechanism for deregulated electricity markets in Chapter .
The focus of these chapters is on determining social-cost minimizing (social welfare max-
imizing) outcomes under the condition that agents in the system only possess localized
information and can only react to local signals. In the second part, Chapter  describes
the issue of cyber-physical systems security in more detail, outlining the key features of
these problems. Chapter  proposes a formal model for real-time threat assessment and
response selection in large-scale cyber physical systems. Chapter  investigates a more
general setting and derives conditions such that optimal policies in POMDPs are monotone
in the belief. Closing remarks and views on future directions are provided in Chapter .

P I
Decentralized Operation of Power
Systems & Markets

C 
Power Systems & Markets
A power system is defined as a network of nodes Nb = f1; : : : ;nb g, termed buses in the
power systems community, connected by transmission lines, denoted by the undirected
edge-set El . Each edge, fn;mg 2 El , has physical parameters described by a line limit
Knm = Kmn > 0 (capturing how much power flow it can sustain) and an admittance Ynm =
Gnm+ iBnm which consists of a conductanceGnm = Gmn > 0 and a susceptance Bnm = Bmn >
0. We setKnm = 0 andYnm = 0+ i0 for any fn;mg < El (i.e. any edge that doesn’t exist in El ).
Buses serve as a connection point for generators and loads to the rest of the network. Each
bus can, in general, have both generators and loads connected to it.* The net injection at
each bus is equal to difference between generation and demand at that bus, that is, the net
injection at bus n is given by In = pn   sn, where pn is the net generation at bus n and sn is
the net load (demand) at bus n. Each bus has two associated variables: a voltage magnitude,
Vn, and a voltage phase angle, θn. The pair of voltage magnitudes and angles for all buses,
*A bus can also have no generators or loads, such a bus is termed a zero-injection bus.

written as (V ;), is termed the operating point of the system. Fig. . shows an example
of a -bus power system.†
Figure 2.1: A 3-bus power system example. Buses 1 and 3 have generators present, with generation levels
given by p1 and p3, respectively. Buses 2 and 3 have loads, with demand levels of s2 and s3. Net injections
at the buses are I1 = p1, I2 =  s2, and I3 = p3   s3. The operating point of the above system is given by
(V ;) = ((V1;V2;V3); (θ1;θ2;θ3)).
The amount of power flowing along a line is given by the AC power flow equations.
Specifically, the (real) power flowing from bus n to busm, denoted by Pnm, is given by (from
[Elgerd, ]).‡
Pnm = GnmV
2
n  GnmVnVm cos(θn  θm) + BnmVnVm sin(θn  θm ): (.)
Due to the nonlinearity of the AC equations, it is common to use approximations. A well-
known approximation, termed the DC approximation, sets all voltages to 1 (per unit, p.u.)
and uses the small-angle approximations sin(θn   θm )  θn   θm and cos(θn   θm)  1, to
obtain an approximate flow expression between two buses, n andm, as PDCnm = Bnm (θn  θm).
†Power systems are usually drawn as a single-line diagram, as seen in Fig. ..
‡Note that we only consider real power in our model.
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While the DC approximation is simple and permits efficient computation, it does have some
drawbacks (details in Appendix A.). We make use of an alternative approximation, which
we term the modified DC approximation, which is described in Section ..
The net injection at each bus, computed as the difference between the net generation and
demand at the bus, must agree with the injections due to the operating point (V ;). This
requirement describes the physical laws of power flow, and is represented by the power
balance equation. First, as stated above, the net injection at each bus due to generation and
demand is given by In = pn   sn. Second, the operating point induces an injection at each
bus n dictated (under the AC power flow equations) by the following equation.
fn (V ;) =
X
m2Nb
GnmV
2
n  GnmVnVm cos(θn  θm ) + BnmVnVm sin(θn  θm):
The power balance equation states that these two injections must agree at each node, and
is thus given by
In = pn   sn = fn (V ;): (.)
The existence of the power balance equation makes power systems a difficult class of net-
works to analyze. The following section elaborates on some of these difficulties.
.. e Nature of Power Flow
The set of net power injections at the buses in the network correspond to a physical op-
erating point, as dictated by the power balance equation, Eq. (.). Modification of the
injection at a single bus will induce a corresponding change in the operating point of the
entire system, in turn, requiring a modification of the injections at other buses in order
to ensure that balance in the network is maintained. In centralized information settings,
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the (single) decision-maker knows the structure and parameters of the network and is able
to completely capture these effects. That is, it is able to specify a set of injections and an
operating point of the system, such that the combination is physically consistent.
One can see how this causes an issue when information is decentralized, that is, when
each decision-maker only possesses knowledge of a localized region of the network. In
this setting, if each decision-maker were to specify a set of injections for its region of the
network, it would not be able to do so in a way that would be physically feasible for the sys-
tem. We argue that, under the decentralized information setting, decision-makers should
not propose power injections at buses, rather they should propose the operating point of
their localized region of the network.§ One can see, by inspecting the power balance equa-
tion, that the injection at bus n is completely characterized by the voltage magnitudes and
angles at, and immediately neighboring (buses with a connected line), bus n. This way,
each decision-maker is able to propose a set of voltage magnitudes and relative angles that
is physically consistent with their localized region of the network. The algorithms proposed
in the first part of this dissertation both take advantage of this idea.
.. Modified DC Approximation
We consider a power flow approximation, similar to that of Chao & Peck [Chao & Peck,
], that represents power flow between two buses as a convex function of the voltage an-
gle difference. To begin the derivation, recall that, by the AC power flow equation, the real
power flowing from busn to busm is Pnm = GnmV 2n  GnmVnVm cos(θn θm )+BnmVnVm sin(θn 
θm ). We set voltage magnitudes to  p.u., Vn = 1 8n 2 Nb , and assume that voltage angle
differences, θn   θm, are small (similar to the DC approximation). However, unlike the DC
approximation, we use second-order small angle approximations, sin(θn θm )  θn θm and
§Inherent to all decentralized decision-making problems is the need to iteratively communicate with other
agents in order to reach an agreement. This communication process relies on the communication ofmessages
or proposals.
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cos(θn  θm)  1  12 (θn  θm )2, writing the expression for the power flow from bus n to bus
m as a convex function of the angle difference, θn  θm. The resulting approximation, which
we term the modified DC approximation, dictates that the flow of power on line (n;m) is
д(θnm) := Bnm (θn   θm ) + 12Gnm (θn   θm )
2 (.)
where θnm = θn   θm. This simple modification of the DC approximation maintains the
asymmetry of the power flow equations, д(θnm) ,  д(θmn), and consequently allows for
power losses to be considered (unlike with the DC power flow approximation). The real
power losses along line fn;mg, Lnm = Pnm + Pmn, are approximated by Lnm  Gnm (θn   θm )2.
For notational convenience, we split Eq. (.) into a DC component, д¯(θnm) := Bnm (θn θm ),
and a (convex) loss component, д˜(θnm) := 12Gnm (θn   θm )2. The accuracy of the above ap-
proximation, Eq. (.), is demonstrated through load flow analyses on multiple test systems
(results in Appendix A.).
.. e Issue of Power Losses
The modified DC approximation allows for power losses to be approximately captured, of-
fering improved accuracy over the loss approximations in the literature. The inclusion of
power losses in optimal power flow problems is crucial for obtaining a realistic dispatch
solution, especially in large and heavily-loaded networks. Furthermore, in the context of
electricity markets, accurate modeling of losses is key for obtaining prices of power across
the grid that are representative of the true operating point. Ideally, one would perform an
optimal power flow analysis using the nonlinear (AC) power flow equations (in a central-
ized setting) in order to obtain the true power losses in the transmission network; however,
in pursuit of simpler and more computationally-friendly methods, multiple attempts at es-
timating the line losses have been developed in the literature. The main approaches for
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estimating power losses involve: ) augmenting load with an a priori estimate of losses, )
representating total system losses as a quadratic function of the net power injection vector
(through the B-coefficient loss expression [Kirchmayer, , Wood & Wollenberg, ],
also known as Kron’s loss formula, and qualitatively similar approach in [Aoki & Satoh,
]), ) including penalty functions in the objective function [Fan & Zhang, , Chen
&Chen, ], and ) providing individual loss expressions for each line [Alguacil &Conejo,
, Motto et al., b, dos Santos & Diniz, , Wood & Wollenberg, ]. First, a pri-
ori estimation of losses is difficult due to physical laws and the nonlinear nature of power
flows, making an accurate estimation of losses a futile task for large networks. The second
approach, of representing losses as quadratic functions of the net injection vector, can pro-
duce reasonable approximations for total system losses; however, due to the fact that the
coefficients in the quadratic expression (the B-coefficients in [Kirchmayer, , Wood &
Wollenberg, ]) are computed for a fixed operating point, the accuracy of themethod can
suffer significantly when the operating point changes. Third, penalty methods represent
transmission losses as penalty terms in the cost functions of generators. These penalties
are determined by computing an incremental transmission loss (ITL) coefficient, a process
that can be difficult and somewhat arbitrary. Lastly, the most accurate of the aforemen-
tioned methods, is via individual loss expressions for each line. Individual loss expressions
represent line losses as a function of the operating point directly. This property, while per-
mitting a very accurate approximation, introduces some difficulties from an operational
perspective. Multiple papers involve methods that address these difficulties. Alguacil and
Conejo [Alguacil & Conejo, ] formulate a multiperiod optimal power flow problem
which uses individual loss expressions. The loss functions are formulated using cosines
leading to a nonlinear optimization problem which is solved via Bender’s decomposition.
Motto et al. [Motto et al., b] form a second-order approximation to the cosine term
in [Alguacil & Conejo, ], much like the modified DC approximation; however, moti-
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vated by computational reasons, they further approximate the quadratic expression by a
piecewise linear function. A similar approach is taken in [dos Santos & Diniz, ] which
offers improved accuracy over [Motto et al., b] by choosing the linearized segments
iteratively.
The approach taken in this dissertation of expressing line losses as a convex function
of the angle difference offers advantages in both accuracy and computational efficiency
over the methods in the literature. For instance, the loss approximation of our work does
not suffer from inaccuracies when the operating point changes, unlike the B-coefficient
method. Additionally, we can avoid the errors introduced via (piecewise) linearization of
the loss expressions in [Motto et al., b, dos Santos & Diniz, ]. Furthermore, our
approach leads to a convex problem, as opposed to the computationally difficult nonlinear
problem found in [Alguacil & Conejo, ].
Many of the approaches taken in the literature either deal with the fully nonlinear flow ex-
pression or attempt to obtain a linearized form. We argue that a reasonable middle ground,
that of convexity, allows for one tomake theoretical guarantees (convergence of algorithms)
while still accurately describing important nonlinearities of the problem.
.. Overview of Part I
The remainder of Part I focuses on the development of models for the decentralized op-
eration of power systems and electricity markets. The model of Chapter  describes an
electrical grid with multiple control areas, each one containing multiple buses and trans-
mission lines, with each area operated by a distinct decision-maker, termed a system oper-
ator (SO). In this system-of-systems setting, we study the problem of how to determine a
cost-minimizing set of net power injections for the buses in each region, subject to the fact
that each system operator only possesses localized information. Since the regions are con-
nected, determining such injections requires each SO to determine the appropriate power
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trades with their adjacent SOs. Using the modified DC approximation, the net injection at
each bus can be fully described using its own voltage angle and the angles of its neighboring
buses. The resulting collection of optimization problems are convex and can efficiently be
solved iteratively using a well-known distributed optimization algorithm (the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM)).
In Chapter , a mechanism for achieving an efficient outcome in deregulated electricity
markets is developed. The model consists of a market operator (MO) and multiple, self-
interested market participants. Each market participant possesses localized information
of the system and can only react to local price signals. Based on the dual decomposition
algorithm, we develop a provably convergent market mechanism that achieves a Pareto
efficient outcome.

C 
A Decentralized Multi-Area
Optimal Power Flow Algorithm
with Power Losses
.. Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a network of interconnected power systems, run by system
operators (SOs), where the goal is to determine a cost-minimizing set of injections subject
to the constraint that each SO does not know the structure of the system outside of its
own localized region. Due to the interconnected nature of the problem, determining these
injections requires that SOs exchange power with adjacent SOs. The proposed algorithm,
based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (see [Boyd et al., ]), dictates that
SOs solve their respective localized-information problem and iteratively communicate the
shared components of their solutions (voltage angles) with adjacent SOs, eventually con-

verging to an agreed-upon set of voltage angles.* The convergent set of angles induce power
trades between SOs and result in a socially-optimal set of net injections for the system.
... Literature Review
Problems related to determining the lowest cost generation that satisfies demand, subject
to the physical constraints of the system, are referred to in the power systems community
as optimal power flow (OPF) problems. OPF problems under centralized information have
been studied extensively since the problem’s inception [Carpentier, ] and the resulting
literature is vast. The literature review in this chapter includes the most relevant works; the
interested reader is referred to [Pandya & Joshi, , Frank et al., a, Frank et al., b]
for more complete reviews. A popular method for obtaining the solution to the OPF prob-
lem under the AC power flow equations (the general AC-OPF problem) involves forming
its semidefinite program (convex) relaxation [Bai et al., , Lavaei & Low, ]. While
an attractive approach (the relaxation allows for a polynomial time solution), it is known
that when the duality gap is non-zero, which can occur in many practical examples, the
resulting solution is not feasible [Molzahn et al., ]. Some additional methods for solv-
ing the OPF problem under centralized information include convex relaxation techniques
[Low, , Farivar & Low, a, Farivar & Low, b] and the holomorphic embedded
load-flow method [Trias, ].
Solutions to the OPF problem under decentralized information have been investigated in
many papers utilizing a wide variety of solution techniques. Many of the approaches use
techniques from distributed optimization to decompose the global optimization problem
into separate components which are then solved iteratively. Examples include approaches
using dual decomposition methods [Baldick et al., , Conejo & Aguado, , Galiana
*It is important to note that we are not proposing direct control of the voltage angles of the buses; rather,
we are using the voltage angles merely as the messages for each SO. Once the SOs reach an agreement, the
convergent angles uniquely specify the lossy net injection (controllable variable) at each bus.
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et al., , Motto et al., a, Biskas & Bakirtzis, ], augmented Lagrangian methods
[Batut & Renaud, , Kim & Baldick, , Baldick et al., , Kim et al., , Bakirtzis
& Biskas, ], and approximate Newton directions [Conejo et al., , Nogales et al.,
, Biskas et al., , Hug-Glanzmann & Andersson, ]. Recently, the ADMM al-
gorithm, a method combining the decomposability properties of the dual decomposition
method and the robustness of augmented Lagrangian methods [Boyd et al., ], has
seen much attention in the power systems community. Applications of the ADMM algo-
rithm to problems of decentralized information in power systems settings include: multi-
area unit commitment [Chung et al., ], decentralized optimal power flow for mesh
networks [Kim & Baldick, , Sun et al., , Kraning et al., , Dall’Anese et al.,
, Mosca, , Erseghe, , Magnusson et al., ] and radial networks [Dall’Anese
et al., , Šulc et al., , Peng & Low, , Christakou et al., ], and distributed
power system state estimation [Kekatos & Giannakis, ].
Convergence of decentralized OPF algorithms is a primary concern. The aforementioned
algorithms are known to converge under convexity; however, many of the papers consider
settings that are inherently non-convex (i.e. the general OPF problem), resulting in authors
demonstrating convergence on a small number of test systems [Batut & Renaud, , Kim
& Baldick, , Conejo & Aguado, , Baldick et al., , Kim & Baldick, , Kim
et al., , Galiana et al., , Motto et al., a]. Some papers investigate sufficient con-
ditions for convergence, but cannot guarantee convergence to a globally optimal solution
[Baldick et al., , Nogales et al., , Hug-Glanzmann & Andersson, ]. Other pa-
pers attempt to apply the ADMM algorithm to the general AC-OPF problem, but can only
guarantee convergence when the duality gap is zero [Erseghe, ] or convergence to local
optima [Sun et al., , Magnusson et al., ]. Other approaches employ the DC approx-
imation and can consequently guarantee convergence [Bakirtzis & Biskas, , Bakirtzis
& Biskas, , Biskas & Bakirtzis, , Biskas et al., , Mosca, ]; however, the con-

vergence guarantee comes at the cost of ignoring important non-linearities in the model,
for example, not being able to consider power losses. The approach by [Kraning et al., ]
involves taking a convex hull of the non-convex constraints, permitting convergence, but
resulting in the solution potentially not being feasible. Desirable convergence properties
are obtained in [Šulc et al., , Peng & Low, , Christakou et al., ] but require one
to restrict attention to radial networks. The ADMM algorithm has also been investigated
in combination with the semidefinite relaxation approach [Dall’Anese et al., ], but as
with the centralized information approach, a zero duality gap solution is required to ensure
feasibility.
... Contribution
As discussed above, existing approaches either deal with the full complexity of the AC-
OPF problem, precluding convergence guarantees, or consider simplified settings, such as
the DC approximation or restricted network topologies, limiting their accuracy and appli-
cability. The approach taken in this chapter offers a simple convex approximation of the
OPF problem that preserves some important non-linearities of the problem (such as power
losses) while permitting convergence in general (mesh) networks.
.. e Multi-Area Power System Model
Throughout the discussion of the model the reader is directed to Fig. ., in Section .,
which represents an instance of an interconnected power system topology. We consider a
network ofnso  2 system operators (SOs), denoted by the setM. Each SOa , a 2 M, contains
a set ofna
b
 1 unique buses, denoted by the setN a
b
. The buses in the network are numbered
sequentially based upon their SO index, that is,N 1
b
:= f1; : : : ;n1
b
g,N 2
b
:= fn1
b
+1; : : : ;n1
b
+n2
b
g,
and so on, up to Nnso
b
:= fn1
b
+    + nnso 1
b
+ 1; : : : ;nb g, where nb := n1b +    + nnsob is the
total number of buses in the system. The set of all buses is denoted by the set Nb . Due

to the physical locations of loads and generators, some buses are a priori specified as net
consumption or net generation buses. Net consumption buses (buses that contain only loads)
are denoted by Nd
b
, whereas net generation buses (buses that contain only generators) are
denoted by Nд
b
. All remaining buses are assumed to contain at least one load and at least
one generator†, which we term hybrid buses, and belong to the set Nb n (Ndb [ N
д
b
). We
assume a set of slack buses (at most one per system, further discussed in assumption  in
Section ..), denoted by N s
b
, which serve only as angle reference buses. We assume that
each slack bus has a generator present, that isN s
b
 Nb n Ndb . For notational convenience,
we introduce the following terminology for edges in the network. We term the network
connecting buses of each SOa as the intra-SOa network with undirected set of edges Eal . We
term the network between buses that connect two SOs, for example SOa1 and SOa2 , as the
inter-SOa1;a2 network, where the set of undirected edges between SOa1 and SOa2 are denoted
by Ea1;a2
l
. Lines in the inter-SOa1;a2 network are also referred to as tie-lines.
We define the set of neighboring buses to bus n by Rn, with n 2 Rn. We denote by
R¯n as the set Rn with index n removed. We denote the set of buses in and immediately
connected to buses in SOa as Ra := Sn2N ab Rn. We define the set of adjacent SOs to SOa
asMa , that is,Ma is the set of SOs that contain at least one bus that is connected to a bus
in N a
b
, with a < Ma . We associate a voltage angle with each bus n, denoted by θn. The
vector  2 Θ  Rn1b++nnsob is the complete set of bus angles across the network where
Θ is the feasible set of angles. We use Rn to represent the set of angles connected to
(and including) bus i , not including any slack indices (since these angles are fixed), that
is Rn := fθm : m 2 Rn n N sb g. We also define Ra as the vector of angles of buses in
and immediately connected to SOa , that is Ra := fθm : m 2 Rn n N sb ;n 2 N ab g, again not
including any slack indices. Notice that there is coupling between variables of two adjacent
SOs a and b, that is, Ra and Rb share some common variables from . As a result, we
†Note that topologies that contain zero injection buses are not permitted in the model of this chapter
(discussed in more detail in assumption  in Section ..).

distinguish between each SO’s copy of the shared variables by denoting elements of Ra
that are shared with another SO by θ (a)n and elements that are not shared simply by θn. The
reader is referred to the caption of Fig. . for an example of the SOs’ decision variables.
... Model Assumptions
We assume that the power flow obeys the modified DC power flow approximation defined
in Section .. Additionally, we make the following three assumptions for this chapter’s
model.
Assumption  (controllability of net injections): The net power injection In at each bus n
is assumed to be controllable within a bus-specific range, [pminn ;pmaxn ]. The bounds pminn
and pmaxn are defined by the feasible ranges of each generator and load. The feasible range
of each generator is defined as its minimum operating generation output to its maximum
generation capacity. With respect to loads, we assume that there are both fixed loads and
flexible loads (the level of demand can be adjusted within some range; this is reasonable
with the advent of widespread demand response capabilities) in the network. Implicit to
assumption  is that each bus contains either a generator or a flexible load (or both). Conse-
quently, zero-injection buses and buses with only fixed loads are not permitted in the model
of this chapter (the model of Ch.  removes this requirement). The ranges of generators
and flexible loads translate into controllability ranges on net injections at each bus. These
constraints take the form
fn (Rn ) =
X
m2Nb
д(θnm )  pmaxn ; (.)
f¯n (Rn ) =
X
m2Nb
д¯(θnm)  pminn (.)
where fn represents the net power injections, and f¯n represents the non-lossy net power

injections at bus n (recall the discussion following Eq. (.) for the definition of д¯(θnm)).
The upper bound is placed on the net injection which ensures that the (upper) production
bounds of the generators are satisfied. The lower bound is placed on the non-lossy injection
in order to maintain convexity of problem.‡
Assumption  (slack buses): Every SO either contains or is immediately connected to exactly
one slack (reference) bus. That is, Ra \ N s
b
contains exactly one element for each a 2 M.
These buses are termed area slack buses. Each SO is assumed to know the location of its
area slack bus. The slack buses serve as reference buses with each voltage angle fixed to a
reference value of zero, θn = 0 for all n 2 N sb . Implicit to this assumption is that SOs agree
upon the same reference value a priori and keep this reference fixed for the duration of the
problem.
Assumption  (cost functions): Each bus n has an associated cost function cn : R ! R
which is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable§, convex, and strictly increasing.
The cost function of a bus, denoted by cn, is the sum of the cost functions of generators
and the (negative) benefit functions of loads at the bus. The interpretation of the each cost
function is the same as the one used in [Wu & Varaiya, ]; if bus n’s net injection In is
positive, then cn (In) represents the generation cost of producing power In, whereas, if busn’s
net injection In is negative, then cn (In ) represents the negative of the benefit from receiving
power In. See [Stott et al., ] for a discussion of the validity of the convexity assumption.
... Knowledge Model
Wenowdescribe the knowledgemodel, that is, what each of the power system entities knows
about the system. Each SO possesses localized knowledge of their own system (control
‡Ideally, these constraints should take the form fn (Rn )  pminn ; however, since fn is a convex function,
constraints of this form generate non-convex sets. It is important to note that, since real power losses are
always positive, constraint (.) implies fn (Rn )  pminn .§For simplicity; the results still hold if the cn ’s are not smooth.

area). Specifically, each SOa possesses private information regarding the cost functions
cn and injection bounds pminn ;pmaxn for all buses in their system n 2 N ab . Each SOa also
knows the admittances Ynm, line limits Knm, and stability bounds θnm, θnm, of its localized
region fn;mg 2 Ea
l
[Sb2Ma Eabl (note that this includes information regarding the tie-lines).
Additionally, SOa knows the location of its area slack bus (as described in assumption  in
Section ..).
.. e Multi-Area Optimal Power Flow Problem
The goal of themulti-area optimal power flow problem is to determine the net injections that
induce the optimal tie-line flows among the interconnected power systems while satisfying
the physical and informational constraints. The optimal tie-line flows are defined as the
flows that are induced by the social-cost-minimizing set of injections. First, in Section
.., we formulate the centralized information problem, termed Problem (PC ), where we
assume that there is an entity that has complete system knowledge. The solution to the
centralized information problem defines the optimal social cost. Second, in Section ..,
we consider an alternate formulation of Problem (PC ), termed the decentralized information
problem, Problem (PD), by introducing both local variables and a common global variable.
Later, in Section ., we present a message exchange process that results in the optimal cost
(the solution of the centralized information problem) while obeying the assumptions of the
knowledge model (see Section ..).
... Centralized Information Problem Formulation
We now formulate the centralized information problem assuming that there is an entity
that has complete knowledge of the network topology and system parameters. Recall that
every bus has an associated cost function; a cost for generating power, or a negative benefit
for receiving power. The social cost is defined to be the sum of all buses’ costs across the

system. As mentioned earlier, the optimal tie-line flows are those that are induced by the
net injections that achieve the minimum social cost.
The centralized information problem (PC ) aims to determine the set of net power injec-
tions, I = (I1; : : : ; Inb ), such that the total social cost is minimized subject to the physical
constraints.
minimize
I=fIn gn2Nb
X
n2Nb
cn (In) (PC )
subject to I = f () (PC-)
 2 Θ (PC-)
where I represents the net injection vector and f () = ( f1(R1 ); : : : ; fnb (Rnb )) represents
the injection induced by the operating point . Let us denote the optimal solution of Prob-
lem (PC ) by IC with corresponding objective value cC . Under the modified DC approxima-
tion, the operating point is defined as the set of voltage angles, denoted by . Constraint
(PC-) thus represents the power balance equation under the modified DC approximation.
Constraint (PC-),  2 Θ, imposes the physical constraints of the system, and is defined as
Θ :=
(
(R1; : : : ;Rnso ) 2 ΘR1      ΘRnso : θ (a)n = θ (a
0)
n ; i 2 Ra \ Ra0;a;a0 2 M
)

where each SOa’s feasible set, ΘRa , is
ΘRa :=
(
Ra θn 2 [ pi ;pi ];n 2 Ra n N sb ; (.)
θn = 0;n = Ra \ N sb ; (.)
fn (Rn )  pmaxn ; n 2 N ab ; (.)
f¯n (Rn )  pminn ; n 2 N ab ; (.)
θnm  θnm  θnm;m 2 Rn;n 2 N ab ; (.)
д(θnm )  Knm;д(θmn)  Kmn;m 2 Rn;n 2 N ab
)
: (.)
The first set of constraints (.-.) are the linear voltage angle constraints; trivial bounds
are placed on all non-slack bus angles, with indicesRa nN s
b
, whereas the angle of SOa’s area
slack bus is fixed to zero. The maximum injection constraints, (.), place an upper bound
on lossy net injections, and minimum injection constraints, (.), place a lower bound on
non-lossy net injections at each bus, as discussed in assumption . Voltage angle stability
constraints, (.), θnm  θnm  θnm for all fn;mg 2 El , are in place to maintain synchronism
throughout the system. Quantities θnm;θnm are the maximum allowable angle differences
in order to maintain stability of the system. The maximum theoretical stability bounds,
θnm, θnm, are pi=2 radians (for lossless lines); however, the precise stability bounds depend
upon installed equipment, its configuration, as well as transient stability considerations
throughout the network [Cain et al., ]. The remaining set of constraints, (.), termed
line limit constraints, specify that power flow must be within the limits of each line. Since
ΘRa  RjRa j 1 consists of linear equalities, linear inequalities, and convex inequalities, it is
a convex and compact set, implying that Θ is compact. We assume that Θ is non-empty.
Problem (PC ) can be transformed into an equivalent problem that is expressed solely in
terms of voltage angles. This is done bymoving constraint (PC-) into the objective function,

resulting in the optimization problem (P 0C ),
minimize
2Θ
X
a2M
Ca (Ra ) (P 0C )
The objective function, C () = Pa2M Ca (Ra ), termed the social cost function, is expressed
in terms of functions Ca : RjRa j 1 ! R, where each Ca is termed SOa’s aggregated cost
function, given by
Ca (Ra ) =
X
n2N ab
cn
 
fn (Rn )

: (.)
The following lemma regarding the convexity of the each SO’s aggregated cost function
will be useful in later demonstrating convergence properties of the proposed algorithm.
Lemma ... Each SOa’s aggregated cost function, Ca (Ra ), is strongly convex on ΘRa , a 2
M.
Proof: See Appendix A..
Consequently, the social cost functionC () is also strongly convex in . The solution of
Problem (P 0C ) uniquely defines the optimal net power injections (control variables) for each
bus and thus solves Problem (PC ).
... Decentralized Information Problem Formulation
We wish to determine the feasible net injections that minimize the social cost under the
informational constraints imposed by the problem structure (see Section ..). As in the
discussion of the centralized problem, we can express the problem of finding the optimal
net injections (those that minimize Pn cn (pn) subject to constraints (PC-) and (PC-)) as
a problem of finding the voltage angles that induce the injections. Instead of having one
decision variable, the variable  in Problem (P 0C ), we introduce local variables for each SOa ,

a 2 M, denoted by Ra , and a global variable z. This modified problem, which we term the
decentralized information problem, denoted by Problem (PD), is defined as
minimize
R1 ;:::;Rnso ;z
X
a2M
Ca (Ra ) (PD)
subject to Ra 2 ΘRa ; a 2 M; (PD-)
z 2 Θ; (PD-)
Ra   zRa = 0;a 2 M : (PD-)
The decision variables of Problem (PD) are the voltage angles of all SOs, R1; : : : ;Rnso , and
the global voltage angle variable, z 2 Rnb . Each SOa’s decision variables are restricted to
lie within the local constraint setΘRa , by constraint (PD-), and z 2 Θ, by constraint (PD-).
We impose the coupling constraints (PD-), Ra   zRa = 0 for each SOa , which states SOa’s
proposal must agree with the relevant components from the global variable, denoted by
zRa .
.. Solution Methodology
The proposed solution method for Problem (PD) consists of an iterative message exchange
process which makes use of the ADMM algorithm (see [Boyd et al., ], original work
[Glowinski & Marroco, , Gabay & Mercier, , Gabay, ]). Due to the structure
of our problem, the conditions for convergence of the message exchange process are natu-
rally met. Furthermore, under the assumption that cn’s are strictly increasing (assumption
), we are able to ensure convergence of the optimizers of Problem (PD) to those of the
centralized information problem, Problem (P 0C ), and consequently, obtain the set of optimal
net injections, IC , for the centralized problem (PC ).

... Message Exange Process
Wefirst form the partial augmented Lagrangian corresponding to Problem (PD) by dualizing
the coupling constraints (PD-) as
Lµ (R1; : : : ;Rnso ; z; y) =
X
a2M

Ca (Ra ) + y>Ra (Ra   zRa ) +
µ
2
j jRa   zRa j j22

where µ is termed the penalty parameter. By the ADMM algorithm, primal variables are
updated in parallel, by each SO, via
t+1Ra = argmin
Ra 2ΘRa
Lµ (R1; : : : ;Rnso ; zt ; yt )
= argmin
Ra 2ΘRa

Ca (Ra ) + yt>RaRa +
µ
2
Ra   ztRa 22
followed by
zt+1 = argmin
z2Θ
Lµ (t+1R1 ; : : : ;t+1Rnso ; z; yt )
= argmin
z2Θ
X
a2M

 yt>RazRa +
µ
2
t+1Ra   zRa 22 :
Lastly, the dual variables for eachm 2 M are updated as
yt+1Ra = y
t
Ra + µ

t+1Ra   zt+1Ra

: (.)
It can be shown [Boyd et al., ] that the dual variables have a zero sum after the first
iteration resulting in the z update reducing to an averaging of the elements of the elements
of t+1Ra . Each SO does this averaging locally and thus does not require a centralized entity
(details found in Algorithm ). Due to the convexity of the feasible sets ΘRa for all a 2 M
and the fact that adjacent SOs, a and b, share common information of the line limits of their

inter-SOab network, the averaged vector zRa also lies within ΘRa .
Algorithm Message Exchange Process
Initialize t = 0, choose 0Ra , y0Ra for a 2 M, z0, and µ > 0
while :( j jp (t )r j j2 < εprimal and j jd (t )r j j2 < εdual) do
for ( do (parallel optimization and broadcast))a 2 M
SOa solves:
t+1Ra = argmin
Ra 2ΘRa

Ca (Ra ) + yt>RaRa +
µ
2
Ra   ztRa 22
Broadcast θ (a);t+1n to SOa0 for all n 2 Ra \ Ra0 , a0 2 Ma .
end for
for ( do(parallel average and dual variable update))a 2 M
Average:
zt+1n =
1
jMa j + 1
 
θ (a);t+1n +
X
a02Ma
θ (a
0);t+1
n
!
for all n 2 Ra \ Ra0 for all a0 2 Ma and sets zt+1n = θ t+1n for all non-shared buses.
Update: yt+1Ra = ytRa + µ (t+1Ra   zt+1Ra )end for
Update residuals: compute p (t+1)r , d (t+1)r via Eq.’s (.), (.)
Update counter: t  t + 1
end while
... Algorithm Convergence
In order to establish convergence of the algorithm, we need to ensure that the unaugmented
Lagrangian, L0, has a saddle point. First, we assume that Problem (PD) satisfies Slater’s
condition, that is, the feasible set ΘR1      ΘRnso  Θ has a nonempty interior (this
assumption is reasonable in practical problems; the constraint set can be trivially modified
to have a nonempty interior). As a result, by Cor. .. of [Rockafellar, ] (p.), the
unaugmented Lagrangian, L0, has a saddle point. Furthermore, since each SO’s aggregated
cost function is convex by construction and closed (since eachΘRa is compact), our problem
is convex and satisfies the conditions required for the ADMM to converge ([Boyd et al.,
], p.).

The convergence result of [Boyd et al., ] ensures that the ADMM results in conver-
gence of the primal residuals to zero (solution approaches feasibility), the objective function
to the optimal value, and the dual variables to the optimal dual point. It does not, in general,
ensure convergence of the primal variables to their optimal values. However, by Lemma
.., each SO’s aggregated cost functionCa is strongly convex, ensuring that the sequence(
(tR1; : : : ;
t
Rnso ; z
t )
)
generated by Algorithm  converges to an optimal solution, as sum-
marized by the following corollary.
Corollary ... e sequence fzt g generated by Algorithm  converges to the unique optimal
solution of Problem (P 0C).
Using the sequence of angles fzt g generated by Algorithm , we define the correspond-
ing sequence of net power injections, denoted fItD g, where each term is defined as ItD =
f1(ztR1 ); : : : ; fnb (z
t
Rnb
)

, and state the following corollary.
Corollary ... e sequence of net injections fItD g converges to IC , the unique optimal solu-
tion of Problem (PC), and achieves the same optimal social cost, cC .
Generators and loads at each bus are then required to meet their respective buses’ pre-
scribed optimal net injection. The resulting set of injections induce tie-line flows which are
consistent with the social-cost-minimizing solution under the modified DC approximation.
.. Numerical Examples
For purposes of simulation, we compute the primal and dual residual, which serve as op-
timality measures, and compare their norms to a fixed threshold to determine when to

terminate the algorithm. The primal and dual residuals are defined respectively as
d (t )r := (
t
R1   ztR1; : : : ;tRnso   ztRnso ); (.)
p (t )r :=  µ (ztR1   zt 1R1 ; : : : ; ztRnso   zt 1Rnso ): (.)
For specified thresholds, εprimal; εdual > 0, we terminate the algorithmwhen j jd (t )r j j2 < εprimal
and j jp (t )r j j2 < εdual.
We now demonstrate the performance of Algorithm  on two systems: () A  bus,
-region system illustrated in Fig. .; () A  bus, -region system (IEEE RTS- sys-
tem). For the  bus system, buses are classified as Nд
b
= f4; 8; 9; 12g, Nd
b
= f1; 6; 7; 10g,
with remaining buses of hybrid type. Slack bus indices are N s
b
= f3; 5g. Injection bounds
are pminn = 0MW for all n 2 Nдb , pmaxn = 300MW for all n 2 N
д
b
and hybrid buses;
pmax2 =  200MW, pmax6 =  300MW, pmax7 =  100MW (these buses must receive at least
pmaxn ); pmin2 =  400MW (bus 2 cannot receive more than 400MW); and pminn =  1 for all
remaining consumption and hybrid buses. Stability bounds θnm and θnm are set at pi=2
and line limits are denoted by the parenthesized values on the lines in Fig. .. Algorithm
parameters are set as follows: initial conditions 0Ra = 0, y0Ra = 0 for a 2 M, z0 = 0;
penalty parameter µ = -; and stopping thresholds εprimal = - and εdual = -.
Fig. . and Table . present the convergent flows and injections, respectively, for the 
bus system. Algorithm parameters the  bus system are: 0Ra = 0, y0Ra = 0 for a 2 M,
z0 = 0, µ = 25, εprimal = -, and εdual = -. Fig. . shows convergence results
for both the  bus and  bus systems. Cost functions for both systems take the form
cn (pn) = an exp(pn + bn) + cn, where an > 0.

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Figure 3.1: 12 bus example; SO’s decision variables are R1 = fθ1;θ (1)2 ;θ (1)4 ;θ (1)12 g, R2 =
fθ (2)2 ;θ (2)4 ;θ6;θ (2)7 ;θ (2)8 ;θ (2)9 ;θ (2)10 g, and R3 = fθ (3)7 ;θ (3)8 ;θ (3)9 ;θ (3)10 ;θ11;θ (3)12 g; buses with double-encircled genera-tors symbolize slack buses.
.. Discussion & Conclusion
As seen in Table ., the convergent injections satisfy the injection constraints defined in
Section .. For example, the convergent net injection at bus 4 binds the upper bound
constraint of pmax4 = 300MW. Notice that this constraint is on the lossy net injection; this
can be seen by observing the power flowing out of bus 4 in Fig. .. Also notice that, due
to losses, the power leaving from bus i to bus j is higher than the power received at bus j
from bus i , and consequently, the line limit is on the loss-included flow (for example, in Fig.
., the line limit on line f7; 9g limits the power flowing from bus 9 to bus 7 to 300MW).

Bus Injection Bus Injection Bus Injection
1 -. 5 . 9 .
2 -. 6 -. 10 .
3 . 7 - 11 -.
4 . 8 . 12 .
Table 3.1: Convergent injections (in MW) for the 12 bus system.
The algorithm has been shown to converge quickly to the centralized optimum. Conver-
gence to the specified tolerances was achieved in a relatively small number of iterations; 
iterations for the  bus system and  iterations in the  bus system.¶ As discussed in
[Boyd et al., ] the ADMM behaves much like a first-order method, in the sense that it
can be slow to converge to high-accuracy; however, moderate accuracy can be obtained in
the order of tens of iterations. This behavior was confirmed by the simulations performed
on the test systems. The strong convexity of each SO’s cost function was found to prevent
oscillation between optimal solutions, resulting in faster convergence (observed through
simulation results). Empirically, we have observed that the speed of convergence is heavily
influenced by the choice of penalty parameter µ; poorly chosen values of µ can result in
slow convergence.
In summary, the proposed algorithm obtains a cost-minimizing solution which satisfies
the physical constraints of the system while obeying the informational constraints of the
SOs. The process involves SOs exchanging voltage angle messages with their neighbors,
eventually reaching an agreed-upon set of angles. The convergent angles define power
flows between SOs and a corresponding set of cost-minimizing net injections for the system.
¶Small loads were placed at the zero injection buses in the  bus test system.

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(a) -bus example
 P
rim
al
 re
s.
 n
or
m
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
 Primal
 Dual
 S
oc
ia
l c
os
t (
10
-2
) 
7.25
7.3
7.35
7.4
7.45
7.5
7.55
7.6
 Centralized cost
 Decentralized cost sum
Iterations, n 
1 10 20 30
 A
ng
le
 m
is
m
at
ch
 
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
 D
ua
l r
es
. n
or
m
 
 Primal
 Dual
 S
oc
ia
l c
os
t 
315
320
325
330
335
340
345
 Centralized cost
 Decentralized cost sum
Iterations, n 
1 20 40 60 80 100
 A
ng
le
 m
is
m
at
ch
 
-0.5
-0.25
0
0.25
0.5
.
1
.
0
P
rim
al
 re
s.
 n
or
m
7.5
5
2.5
0
D
ua
l r
es
. n
or
m
 ( 
   
   
)
10
-5
1.5
1
0.5
0
P
rim
al
 re
s.
 n
or
m
7.5
5
2.5
0
D
ua
l r
es
. n
or
m
(a) (b)
3
2
1
0
0.45
0.3
0.15
0
D
ua
l r
es
. n
or
m
7 5
5
2 5 P
rim
al
 re
s.
 n
or
m
(b) -bus example
Figure 3.2: Convergence plots for (a) the 12 bus (first column) and (b) the 73 bus (second column) systems;
primal and dual residual norms (top), see Eq.’s (4.6) and (4.7); centralized and decentralized cost sum (middle);
and angle mismatch, θ n   ztn , i 2 N , between the centralized optimal  and zt (bottom), as functions, n.

C 
A Decentralized Meanism for
Computing Competitive Equilibria in
Deregulated Electricity Markets
Thee ae ome daback of he appoach aken in Chape  ha moiae the
development of a more realistic model. In Chapter , the requirement to have a convex
problem (in order to ensure convergence of the ADMM algorithm), results in some unreal-
istic assumptions, such as placing a lower bound on the non-lossy injection and not being
able to consider zero-injection buses. The approach of Chapter  does not require convexity
in order to ensure convergence, permitting a more realistic model.

.. Introduction
From the introduction of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in  to
the establishment of the Energy Policy Act in , the deregulation of electricity markets
in the United States has grown continuously, primarily under the appeal of increased tech-
nological competition and innovation. Today, despite cases of market manipulation (such
as the California electricity crisis in -), many large electricity markets are, at least
in some capacity, deregulated. This transition has been centered around the formation of
specialized firms for generation, transmission, and distribution, to name a few, with mar-
kets typically consisting of the following companies [Christie & Bose, ] (termed mar-
ket participants): generation companies (GenCos) who produce and sell power, transmission
companies (TransCos) who own the transmission assets and are responsible for transmit-
ting power across the grid, and distribution companies (DistCos) who own the distribution
networks and are tasked with buying power from GenCos and distributing it to consumers.
The primary goal in an electricity market is determining an outcome that is not only eco-
nomically optimal (that is, it is Pareto efficient [Mas-Colell et al., , Kirschen & Strbac,
]) but also satisfies the physical constraints of the system.
Centralized market mechanisms are traditionally the approach used for determining the
optimal, feasible outcome of the market [Stoft, ]. Under these approaches a centralized
market operator receives bids from the market participants, in the form of cost/benefit func-
tions and technical constraints, and solves a large-scale centralized optimization problem to
determine the market clearing outcome. This outcome consists of a physically feasible oper-
ating point as well as a vector of bus-specific power prices termed locational marginal prices
(LMPs). Unfortunately, centralized mechanisms suffer from some drawbacks. First, report-
ing cost and technical information raises privacy concerns for market participants. Also, as
systems grow in size, the centralized optimization problem can become prohibitively large.

This issue is made worse by the recent surge in distributed generation and demand side par-
ticipation [Papadaskalopoulos & Strbac, ], further increasing the dimensionality and
complexity of the problem and potentially making centralized mechanisms computation-
ally intractable.
In hopes of avoiding these drawbacks, we introduce a decentralized market mechanism
which achieves the economically optimal outcome, honoring the informational asymme-
tries of the problem and considering important nonlinearities of the system (such as power
losses and limits on transmission lines). The electricity market model consists of multiple
market participants, DistCos, GenCos, and TransCos, and a single market operator. Our
model allows for the consumption centers of each DistCo and the production centers of
each GenCo to be distributed across the network. For example, a given GenCo could own
generators at multiple buses in the network (a portfolio of plants). Additionally, our model
allows for the ownership of transmission lines in the system to be partitioned among multi-
ple TransCos. The market operator is responsible for obtaining a market clearing outcome.
The process of achieving this market clearing outcome, termed a decentralized market mech-
anism, is based on principles from Lagrangian duality theory, specifically making use of the
dual decompositionmethod [Bertsekas, ]. Themechanism, which we refer to as the pric-
ing process, consists of an iterative price response and price update procedure. All market
participants are assumed to act in a self-optimizing manner, that is, given the current LMPs
they adjust their decision variables in order to maximize their financial surplus subject to
their own local physical and operational constraints. This allows, for instance, for DistCos
to exercise flexible demand participation for the elastic component of their total demand
and for GenCos to self-dispatch. DistCos and GenCos optimize independently, reporting
their surplus-maximizing consumption and production profiles, respectively. TransCos par-
take in a cooperative message exchange process to reach an operating point that induces
power flows that maximize their surpluses for transmitting power along their respective

lines. The optimizers are sent to the market operator who is responsible for updating the
LMPs in such a way that the self-interested behavior of market participants leads to an
outcome that is physically feasible. This outcome, when coupled with the associated set of
LMPs, forms a competitive equilibrium [Mas-Colell et al., , Motto et al., a], which
we show is Pareto efficient. Under relatively weak conditions (a convex DC approximation
and edge-wise positive sums of LMPs), the market participants’ optimization problems are
convex and the pricing process converges. The pricing process avoids the need for market
participants to reveal sensitive information, and additionally, the mechanism scales much
more effectively than its centralized counterpart.
... Literature Review
We focus on papers from the literature that are most similar to ours, primarily including
works that develop decentralized market mechanisms (under perfect competition) using
Lagrangian duality techniques. Duality theory allows one to solve the computationally
simpler dual problem; however, this can result in a non-zero duality gap in general. The
authors of [Motto et al., a, Galiana et al., ] construct a market model consisting of
GenCos, DistCos, and a single TransCo, considering a fully nonlinear AC power flowmodel.
Their decentralized mechanism, based on a dual approach, is conjectured to converge to a
zero duality gap solution under profit optimality and a convexifyingmarket rule (a restriction
of market participants’ behavior). Lavaei and Sojoudi [Lavaei & Sojoudi, ] consider a
competitive energy market setting with GenCos, DistCos, and an ISO under the AC power
flow model (using an SDP reformulation). Assuming positive LMPs, the authors are able to
show convergence to a zero duality gap solution under the assumption of either: a radial
network, or, in the case of a mesh network, the existence of a phase-shier for each network
cycle. In the absence of phase-shifters, a zero duality gap can be ensured if loads are allowed
to be over-satisfied (discarding extra power). Similar mechanisms have been applied in

the context of the unit commitment problem (e.g. [Zhuang & Galiana, ], [Bard, ],
[Ongsakul & Petcharaks, ]) and demand response exchangemarkets (see [Nguyen et al.,
] and [Papadaskalopoulos & Strbac, ]).
... Contribution
The contributions of this chapter are twofold:
)Modeling generality: Our model allows for the ownership of power system assets to be
partitioned among the market participants. This allows for each DistCo and GenCo to own
multiple units that are distributed across the network (existing literature assumes that each
participant owns a single unit [Motto et al., a, Galiana et al., , Lavaei & Sojoudi,
]). Our model also allows for ownership of lines to be partitioned among multiple
TransCos ([Motto et al., a, Galiana et al., ] consider a single TransCo).
) Convergence to a zero duality gap solution: Existing models contain nonlinearities
that either preclude convergence guarantees [Motto et al., a, Galiana et al., ] or
require strong sufficient conditions [Lavaei & Sojoudi, ]. Ourmodel allows us to ensure
convergence (under natural conditions) while preserving important nonlinearities of the
problem, such as power losses.
.. Energy Market Model
In addition to the market operator (MO), the market model of this chapter contains three
types of agents (market participants): DistCos, denoted by the set DC = f1; : : : ;Dc g; Gen-
Cos, denoted by GC = f1; : : : ;Gc g; and TransCos, denoted by TC = f1; : : : ;Tc g. Each
DistCo i 2 DC owns consumption units, consisting of elastic loads at buses N iDCd  N
and inelastic loads at buses N iDCs  N . The elastic and inelastic load profiles of DistCo
i 2 DC are di =
(
din
)
n2N iDCd
and si =
(
sin
)
n2N iDCs
, respectively, where din 2 [din; d¯in] is the
elastic demand and sin  0 is the (given) inelastic demand of DistCo i’s consumption unit

at bus n. Each GenCo i 2 GC owns generation units at buses N iGC  N . The real power
injection profile of GenCo i 2 GC is pi =
(
pin
)
n2N iGC
where pin 2 [pin; p¯
i
n] is the injection of
GenCo i’s generation unit at bus n. For convenience, let pin = 0 if GenCo i does not own
a generation unit at bus n (similarly for din, sin of DistCo i at bus n). Lastly, each TransCo
i 2 TC owns a set of transmission lines Ei
l
with ownership of lines in the system partitioned
among TransCos, that is, E1
l
[    [ ETc
l
= El and Eil \ E jl = ?, i , j. Each edge-set Eil has
an associated set of buses N iTC defined as the endpoints of the edges in Eil . The associated
voltage angle profile of TransCo i 2 TC is i =
(
θn
)
n2N iTC
. For later convenience, we also
define N i;jTC := N iTC \ N jTC as the set of shared buses between two TransCos’ edge-sets
Ei
l
and E j
l
and TCn := fi 2 TC j n 2 N iTC g as the set of TransCos that own lines that are
connected to bus n. A sample network can be seen in Fig. ..
Figure 4.1: A sample 5-bus network. GenCo i = 1 owns generator units at busesN 1GC = f1; 4g corresponding
to an injection vector p1 = (p11;p14 ). GenCo i = 2 has generator units at buses N 2GC = f1; 2g, p2 = (p21;p22 );
DistCo i = 1 has elastic loads at buses 4 and 5, d1 = (d14 ;d15 ), and an inelastic load at bus 2, s1 = s12 , thusN 1DCd =
f4; 5g,N 1DCs = f2g; and lastly, DistCo i = 2 has both an elastic and inelastic load at busN 2DCd = N 2DCs = f5g,
thus d2 = d25 , s2 = s25 . Bus 3 is a zero-injection bus. TransCo i = 1 owns lines E1l = ff1; 2g; f1; 4g; f2; 3gg thusN 1TC = f1; 2; 3; 4g and TransCo i = 2 owns lines E2l = ff3; 4g; f4; 5gg so N 2TC = f3; 4; 5g.
The load and generation profiles of DistCos and GenCos have associated utilities and
costs, respectively. For an elastic load profile di the aggregate utility (benefit) function of

DistCo i is defined as ui

di

:=
P
n2N iDCd
uin

din

, whereuin (din) is the benefit associated with
elastic demand level din. Similarly, GenCo i’s aggregate cost function (total generation cost)
is ci

pi

:=
P
n2N iGC c
i
n

pin

where cin (pin) represents the cost for producing real power pin.
... Model Assumptions
In addition to the convex power flow approximation, introduced in Section ., we impose
the following four modeling assumptions for this chapter.
Assumption  (slack buses): Denote the set of slack buses by N s
b
. We require that each
TransCo has exactly one slack bus, that is, N iTC \ N sb contains one element for all i 2 TC.
Slack buses serve solely as angle references, that is, θn = 0 for all n 2 N sb .
Assumption  (strong convexity): We require that all DistCo utility functionsuin are strongly
concave and all GenCo cost functions cin are strongly convex (this condition is equivalent
to strict convexity if the functions are quadratic).
Assumption  (positive edge-wise sums of prices): We require that all edge-wise sums of
locational marginal prices are positive. That is, λn + λm > 0 for all fn;mg 2 El .* Note that
this allows λn < 0 for some n.
Assumption  (price-taking behavior): We assume that the agents (market participants) are
price-taking, that is, they assume that the price will remain unchanged if they change their
response. This requires that agents are non-strategic, that is, they obey the rules of the
mechanism and do not need to be incentivized to participate.
... Knowledge Model
We now describe the assumptions regarding information in our problem. Each DistCo
i 2 DC possesses private information regarding their utility functions fuingn2N iDCd and any
*Note: We are not enforcing this as a constraint in our problem, rather we are only considering topologies
where this assumption is naturally satisfied.

bounds on the elastic load level di = fdingn2N iDCd ; d¯
i = fd¯ingn2N iDCd . Each GenCo i 2 GC pos-
sesses private information regarding their cost functions fcingn2N iGC and production bounds
pi = fpi
n
gn2N iGC ; p¯i = fp¯ingn2N iGC . Each TransCo i 2 TC knows the connectivity of their re-
gion of the network, (N iTC; Eil ), as well as the admittances of the corresponding lines, Ynm
for fn;mg 2 Ei
l
. TransCos also possess private information of the line limits of their trans-
mission lines, Knm, fn;mg 2 Eil . Each DistCo i 2 DC knows the inelastic demands at its
buses, fsingn2N iDC , whereas the MO is assumed to know all inelastic demand levels. Further-
more, the MO knows the location of all DistCo and GenCo units, the network connectivity,
and the admittances of all transmission lines in the network.
.. Maximizing Social Welfare
We are interested in determining the set of variables, consisting of DistCo elastic demand
levels fdi gi2DC , GenCo real power injection levels fpi gi2GC , and an operating point , such
that the social welfare is maximized, subject to physical and operational constraints. It is
known from microeconomic theory that maximizing the social welfare results in a Pareto
efficient outcome [Mas-Colell et al., ]. The single time-period problem can be formally
stated as Problem (P) below.

max
x=(fdi gi 2DC ;fpi gi 2GC ;)
W (x) :=
X
i2DC
ui

di

 
X
i2GC
ci

pi

(P)
s.t. p   (d + s) = f



(P.i)
pi  pi  p¯i ; i 2 GC (P.ii)
di  di  d¯i ; i 2 DC (P.iii)
д

θnm

 Knm;д

θmn

 Kmn; fn;mg 2 El (P.iv)
θnm  θnm  θnm; fn;mg 2 El (P.v)
θn = 0;n 2 N sb (P.vi)
θn 2 [ pi ;pi ];n 2 Nb (P.vii)
The objective function of Problem (P),W (x), represents the social welfare and can be written
as the total utility to DistCos minus the total cost to GenCos.†
The constraints of problem (P) arise from both physical laws and the operational require-
ments of the power system and the agents. The first constraint (P.i), termed the power
balance equation, takes the form
p   (d + s) = f () (.)
where p = (p1; : : : ;pnb ), withpn =
P
i2GC pin, is the net generation vector and (d+s) is the net
demand vector consisting of two components, the elastic demand vector d = (d1; : : : ;dnb )
†The reason for this form is as follows. The social welfare is defined as the sum of agents’ surplus
functions, that is (using the notation of Section ..), W (x) = Pi 2DC ΨiDC (di ;) + Pi 2GC ΨiGC (pi ;) +P
i 2TC ΨiTC (
i ;) =
P
i 2DC ΨiDC (d
i ;) +
P
i 2GC ΨiGC (p
i ;) + ΨTC (;). After substitution and rear-
rangement,W (x) = Pi 2DC Pn2N iDCd fuin din    λndin g  Pn2N iDCsλnsin + Pi 2GC Pn2N iGC fλnpin   cin pin g  P
n2Nb λn fn () =
P
i 2DC ui

di

 Pi 2GC ci pi  + λn (pn   (dn + sn )   fn ()). Applying the power balance
equation, constraint (P.i), results in the desired expression.

and the (fixed) inelastic demand vector s = (s1; : : : ; snb ) (with dn =
P
i2DC din and sn =P
i2DC sin). The vector f () =

f1(); : : : ; fnb ()

denotes the power injections induced
by the operating point , where the injection at bus n is defined by the convex function
fn () =
P
m2Nb д(θnm), where д(θnm ) represents the power flow from bus n tom defined in
Eq. (.); notice that д(θnm) is zero if fn;mg < El . Constraint (P.i) simply states that the
injections due to physical laws, f (), must agree with the net generation and demand at
every bus. Constraints (P.ii) and (P.iii) reflect the fact that GenCos/DistCos have bounds on
the amount of power they are able to produce/consume. Transmission constraints on the
amount of power flowing on each line, constraint (P.iv), stability constraints on the voltage
angle difference, (P.v), and slack references, (P.vi), are also imposed. The last constraint,
(P.vii), is a technical condition that ensures that the voltage angles are well-defined. We
group constraints (P.ii)-(vii) into a set denoted by X. It is clear that X is convex since it is
the intersection of half-spaces and convex inequality constraints. Lastly, we assume that
Problem (P) is feasible.
There are some fundamental difficulties in obtaining a solution to Problem (P). First, the
problem is nonconvex due the presence of the nonlinear power balance equation. Further-
more, by the discussion in Section .., no single entity in the system has the information
required to obtain a solution to Problem (P). The remainder of the chapter will focus on
obtaining a solution to Problem (P).
.. Surpluses & Competitive Equilibria
The notion of a competitive equilibrium will be of central importance in obtaining a solu-
tion to Problem (P). Before we formally define a competitive equilibrium in the context of
our problem, we need to discuss some aspects related to the Lagrangian dual function of
Problem (P).
A partial Lagrangian of Problem (P) is formed by dualizing the power balance equa-

tion through the vector of dual variables, , where each component λn represents the
locational marginal price of power at bus n. Denoting the vector of variables by x =
(fdi gi2DC; fpi gi2GC;), and defining h(x) := f ()   p + d + s, the Lagrangian is
L

x;

: =W (x)   >h(x)
=
X
i2DC
ui

di

 
X
i2GC
ci

pi

  >(f ()   p + d + s)
=
X
i2DC
X
n2N iDCd
uin

din

 
X
i2GC
X
n2N iGC
cin

pin

 
X
n2Nb
λn
*.,fn ()  
X
i2GC
pin +
X
i2DC

din + s
i
n
+/-
=
X
i2DC
*..,
X
n2N iDCd
f
uin

din

  λndin
g
 
X
n2N iDCs
λns
i
n
+//-
+
X
i2GC
*..,
X
n2N iGC
f
λnp
i
n   cin

pin
g+//-  
X
n2Nb
λn fn (): (.)
Due to the structure of the Lagrangian, Eq. (.), the evaluation the dual function, defined
as φ () = maxx2X
(
L

x;
)
, is greatly simplified via separable optimizations.
φ () = max
x2X
(
L

x;
)
=
X
i2DC
max
di2Di
( X
n2N iDCd
f
uin

din

  λndin
g
 
X
n2N iDCs
λns
i
n
)
+
X
i2GC
max
pi2Pi
( X
n2N iGC
f
λnp
i
n   cin

pin
g )
+max
2Θ
(
 
X
n2Nb
λn fn ()
)
(.)
where the constraint sets are Di = fdi jdi  di  d¯i g, Pi = fpi jpi  pi  p¯i g, and Θ =
f(1; : : : ;Tc ) 2 Θ1      ΘTc : θ in = θ jn;n 2 N i;jTC; i; j 2 TCg with each TransCo’s feasible

set defined as
Θi :=
(
i д(θnm)  Knm;дθmn  Kmn; fn;mg 2 Eil ;
θnm  θnm  θnm; fn;mg 2 Eil ;
θn = 0;n 2 N iTC \ N sb ;θn 2 [ pi ;pi ];n 2 N iTC
)
:
For later reference, the dual problem of Problem (P) is simply
min

φ (): (D)
... Agent Surplus Functions
The arguments of the maximizations in Eq. (.) represent surplus functions of the agents.
This follows from the fact that the dual variables,, of the power balance equation represent
locational marginal prices. The surplus for DistCo i 2 DC for a given demand profile (di ; si )
at price  is equal to the utility obtained from di minus the cost of total demand (sum of
elastic and inelastic demand), defined as
ΨiDC (d
i ;) :=
X
n2N iDCd
f
uin

din

  λndin
g
 
X
n2N iDCs
λns
i
n :
The surplus of each GenCo i 2 GC is equal to the payment it receives for producing power
minus the generation cost,
ΨiGC (p
i ;) :=
X
n2N iGC
f
λnp
i
n   cin

pin
g
:
TransCos receive a surplus for facilitating power flow across the network. Congestion and
losses in transmission lines creates different valuations for power across the network (repre-

sented by LMPs) and results in a discrepancy between the payments received from DistCos
and the payments made to GenCos. This creates a surplus (possibly negative) for transmit-
ting power from GenCos to DistCos, termed the merchandizing surplus. Under the convex
DC approximation, the total merchandizing surplus (argument of the last maximization
term in Eq. (.)) can be shown to be
ΨTC (;) =  
X
n2Nb
λn fn ()
=  
X
(n;m)2~El
λnд(θnm)
=
1
2
X
(n;m)2~El

(λm   λn )д¯(θnm )   (λn + λm )д˜(θnm )

(.)
where ~El is the directed edge-set and is defined as the set that contains the pair (n;m)
and (m;n) for every edge fn;mg 2 El . The quantity

λm   λn

д¯(θnm )  

λn + λm

д˜(θnm) is
the merchandizing surplus for enabling flow between buses n andm at the price vector .
Notice that the first term,

λm  λn

д¯(θnm), is the familiar expression for the merchandizing
surplus under the DC approximation [Wu et al., ]. The second term,  

λn +λm

д˜(θnm ),
arises from the fact that we are considering losses in our model.
Since the ownership of transmission lines is partitioned among TransCoswe can separate
the total merchandizing surplus into each TransCo’s merchandizing surplus as
ΨiTC (
i ;) =
1
2
X
(n;m)2~Eil

(λm   λn)д¯(θnm)   (λn + λm)д˜(θnm)

: (.)
We show that, via a message exchange process described in Section .., TransCos com-
municate to obtain the angle profile which maximizes ΨTC (;) over  2 Θ at price .

... Competitive Equilibria in Energy Markets
We can now define the concept of a competitive equilibrium in the context of our energy
market model. The definition builds upon the one found in [Motto et al., a].
Definition .. (Competitive Equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium is defined as the tuple
(fdˆi gi2DC; fpˆi gi2GC; ˆ; ˆ) such that
(i) fn (ˆ)   pˆn + dˆn + sn < ε for all n 2 Nb , ε > 0
(ii) dˆi (ˆ) maximizes ΨiDC (di ; ˆ) s.t. di 2 Di , 8 i 2 DC
pˆi (ˆ) maximizes ΨiGC (pi ; ˆ) s.t. pi 2 Pi , 8 i 2 GC
ˆi (ˆ) maximizes ΨiTC (i ; ˆ) s.t. i 2 Θi , 8 i 2 TC
Theabove definition states that a competitive equilibriummust not only satisfy the power
balance equation (condition (i)) but also result in maximum surplus for all DistCos, GenCos,
and TransCos (condition (ii)).
.. Solution Methodology
Throughout the remainder of the chapter we describe a procedure in which the MO and
agents interact in order to obtain a globally optimal solution x to the nonconvex primal
problem (P).The procedure is based on the dual decomposition method; an iterative method
that first involves the evaluation of the dual function for a given set of dual variables (prices),
followed by an update of the dual variables.
In the context of the electricity market model in this chapter, the evaluation of the dual
function is performed in a distributed fashion by the agents. In fact, maximization of sur-
pluses by the agents corresponds exactly to the evaluation of the dual function. DistCos

and GenCos maximize in parallel to obtain the optimal profiles for the current price t ,
denoted by fdi (t )gi2DC and fpi (t )gi2GC , respectively. TransCos partake in a message
exchange process (due to coupling of merchandizing surplus functions) in order to obtain
the operating point which maximizes the total merchandizing surplus at the current price,
denoted by (t ). The MO uses these maximizers to update the price in such a way as to
enforce feasibility (condition (i) of Def. ..). A block diagram outlining the method can
be seen in Fig. ..
MO 
Price 
Update
TransCos
GenCos
DistCos
Figure 4.2: Outline of the pricing process. Given the current price vector t , DistCo’s and GenCo’s update
the respective components of the consumption profiles fdi (t )gi 2DC and generation profile fpi (t )gi 2GC , in
parallel. TransCo’s participate in a message exchange process to reach an angle profile agreement (t ). The
MO then updates the price tot+1 using the responses x(t ) = (fdi (t )gi 2DC; fpi (t )gi 2GC;(t )) (outlined
in Section 4.5.2).

... Price Response
The first step of the pricing process involves evaluation of the dual function for the current
price vector t . This is achieved via the following agent surplus maximizations.
DistCo Optimizations
Each DistCo, i 2 DC, wishes to specify the elastic demand level di in order to maximize its
surplus from buying power (both elastic and inelastic) at the current price t . Each DistCo
i 2 DC solves
di (t ) = argmax
di2Di
ΨiDC (d
i ;t ): (P iDC)
By assumption , eachuin is strictly concave and therefore the maximizer di (t ) of Problem
(P iDC) is unique for each i .
GenCo Optimizations
Each GenCo, i 2 GC, wishes to specify the injection levels pi in order to maximize its
surplus from selling power at t . Each GenCo i 2 GC solves
pi (t ) = argmax
pi2Pi
ΨiGC (p
i ;t ): (P iGC)
Again, by assumption , the maximizer pi (t ) of Problem (P iGC) is unique for each i 2 GC.
TransCo Optimizations
Each TransCo, i 2 TC, aims to specify their voltage angle profile i 2 Θi such that the
induced flows maximize their merchandizing surplus at the current price, ΨiTC (i ;t ). Do-

ing so is complicated by the fact that there exist buses that are shared between one or more
TransCos, that is, N i;jTC , ? for neighboring i; j 2 TC. The presence of these shared buses
creates coupling between the merchandizing surplus functions of distinct TransCos.
As a result, all neighboring TransCosmust negotiate the angle value of their shared buses.
Arriving at a system-wide agreement for the shared buses, with each TransCo maximizing
their own merchandizing surplus, results in a maximization of the total merchandizing
surplus (achieving the value of the last term in Eq. (.)). The angle profile agreement is
achieved via a message exchange process that is based on the ADMM algorithm [Boyd et al.,
] in which neighboring TransCos iteratively exchange the voltage angle values of their
shared buses.
To make use of the ADMM algorithm, it is necessary to write the problem of maximizing
the total merchandizing surplus, max2Θ ΨTC (;), as the equivalent problem
max
fi gi 2TC ;z
ΨTC (;t ) =
X
i2TC
ΨiTC (
i ;t ) (PTC)
subject to i 2 Θi ; i 2 TC
i   zi = 0; i 2 TC
where z 2 RN is the global variable representing the system-wide angle profile  and zi =
fzngn2N iTC is the relevant component of z corresponding to TransCo i’s angle profile. We
associate a set of dual variables, yi = fyngn2N iTC , with each of the consensus constraints
i   zi = 0, i 2 TC. The consensus constraints enforce the angle profiles of TransCos to
agree. Defining primal and dual residual norms [Boyd et al., ] as
p (k )r :=

1;(k )   z1;(k ); : : : ;Tc ;(k )   zTc ;(k )

(.)
d (k )r :=  µ

z1;(k )   z1;(k 1); : : : ; zTc ;(k )   zTc ;(k 1)

(.)

the TransCo message exchange process is given by Alg. .
Algorithm  TransCo Message Exchange Process
Initialize k = 0, yi; (0) = 0 for all i 2 TC, z(0) = 0, µ > 0
while :( j jp (k )r j j2 < εprimal and j jd (k )r j j2 < εdual) do
for ( do (parallel optimization and broadcast)) i 2 TC
TransCo i solves:
i; (k+1) (t ) = argmax
i 2Θi
(
ΨiTC (
i ;t )  

yi; (k )
>
(i   zi; (k ) )  µ
2
i   zi; (k ) 2)
Broadcast fθ i; (k+1)n gn2N i; jTC to neighboring j 2 TC;end for
for ( do(parallel average and dual variable update)) i 2 TC
Average: z (k+1)n = 1jTCn j
X
j 2TCn
θ j; (k+1)n , 8n 2 N iTC
Update: yi; (k+1) = yi; (k ) + µ (i; (k+1)   zi; (k+1) )
end for
Update residuals: compute p (k+1)r , d (k+1)r via Eq.’s (.), (.)
Update counter: k  k + 1
end while
By assumption , each TransCo i has a slack bus in its set of busesN iTC , and the following
lemma holds.
Lemma ... emerchandizing surplus function ΨiTC (i ;) is strongly concave in i for all
i 2 TC.
Proof: See Appendix B.. 
Lemma .. and the convergence result of the ADMM in [Boyd et al., ] (p.) lead to
the following corollary.
Corollary ... Alg.  generates iterates fz(k ) g that converge to the unique solution (t ) of
max2Θ ΨTC (;t ).
All of the maximizers for the current price t are then broadcast to the MO, as in Fig. .,
and the price is updated.

... Price Update
The MO receives the maximizers from the agents for the current price t , denoted by
x(t ) = (fdi (t )gi2DC; fpi (t )gi2GC;(t )), and uses them to compute an updated price
t+1. The price is updated in such a way as to iteratively enforce the power balance equa-
tion (see condition (i) of Def. ..). Before defining the price update, we state the following
result.
Lemma ... Under assumption , the Hessian of the Lagrangian is negative definite, that is,
r2xxL (x;)  0 for all x:
Proof: See Appendix B.. 
As a consequence of the strong concavity of the Lagrangian, the dual function, Eq. (.),
is unique and its derivative exists. The gradient of the dual function is (see Thm. .. of
[Bazaraa et al., ])
rφ () = h(x())> (.)
where h(x) was defined at the beginning of Section .. As a result, solving the power
balance equation is equivalent to finding where the gradient of the dual function vanishes.
The price is updated via a gradient descent algorithm. Specifically,
t+1 = t   αtrφ (t )
= t   αth(x(t ))
= t   αt

f

(t )

  p(t ) + d(t ) + s

(.)
with step-size αt , net generation profile p(t ) = (p1(t ); : : : ;pnb (t )), with net injection
pn (
t ) =
P
i2GC pin (t ), and net elastic demand profile d(t ) = (d1(t ); : : : ;dnb (t )), with

net demand dn (t ) = Pi2DC din (t ). The injection term f  (t ) is computed from the
angle profile (t ) (from Sec. ..).
The above recursion is guaranteed to converge to a stationary point of the dual func-
tion. To show this, we first demonstrate that the dual function is Lipschitz continuous
(this follows from the fact that a function with a bounded derivative is Lipschitz). By
Eq. (.), the gradient of the dual function satisfies rφ () = h(x())>. Noting that
kh(x())k = kf (())   p() + d() + sk and the fact that f (()), p(), and d()
are all bounded, there exists someM < 1 such that krφ ()k = kh(x())k  M . Thus the
dual function is Lipschitz continuous. Furthermore, notice that the dual function φ () is a
convex function of . It can be shown through standard arguments that, for a sufficiently
small step-size, gradient descent applied to a convex function generates iterates satisfying
φ (t )   φ  k
0   k2 +Pts=0 α2s krφ (s )k2
2
Pt
s=0 αs
where φ denotes a minimum of φ. In order to ensure convergence, one must choose αt
such that P1s=0 α2s < 1 and P1s=0 αs = 1. Noting that krφ (s )k  M for all s , we have
φ (t ) ! φ. Selecting a step-size of the form αt = β=t , β > 0, ensures that the pricing
process converges to a minimizer  of the dual function φ (), solving the dual problem
(D).‡ Since the dual problem is unconstrained, rφ () j= = 0, and, again by Eq. (.),
h(x()) = 0.
The convergent dual solution of pricing process results in a zero duality gapwith Problem
(P) as described by Theorem .. below.
eorem ... e pricing process generates a competitive equilibrium (x;), where x =
x() is a globally optimal solution to Problem (P).
‡Prices must satisfy assumption  at each iteration t in order to ensure the TransCo subproblems are
convex. This can simply be achieved through choice of a sufficiently positive 0.

Proof. See Appendix B.. 
In summary, the pricing process is guaranteed to generate the competitive equilibrium
(x;), resulting in a globally optimal solution x to the (nonconvex) social welfare maxi-
mization problem (P). Consequently, x is a Pareto efficient outcome.
.. Numerical Example
We demonstrate the performance of the pricing process on a modified version of the IEEE
 bus test system. The ownership of generators in the modified system is split among
three GenCos with p1 = (p11;p12 ), p2 = (p23;p26 ), and p3 = (p38 ). The network also consists
of seven DistCos with d1 = (d12;d13 ), d2 = (d23;d24 ), d3 = (d35 ), d4 = (d46;d411;d412), d5 =
(d59;d
5
10), d6 = (d612;d613), d7 = (d714) and inelastic demands (in MW) s12 = 15, s35 = 10,
s412 = 15, s510 = 10, s614 = 15. The ownership of lines is split among two TransCos, E1l =
ff1;2g;f1;5g;f2;3g;f2;4g;f2;5g;f3;4g;f4;5g;f4;7g;f5;6gg, E2
l
= ff4;9g;f6;11g;f6;12g;f6;13g;f7;8g;
f7;9g;f9;10g;f9;14g;f10;11g;f12;13g;f13;14gg with slack bus N s
b
= f6g. Parameters for the
TransCo message exchange process (Alg. ) are µ = 0:21, εprimal = -, εdual = -. Fig.
. demonstrates the convergence of the pricing process.
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(b) Pricing process iterations, t
Figure 4.3: Convergence of pricing process: (a) TransCos reach an angle agreement for each price vector
t via Alg. 1 (each negotiation cycle corresponds to a price vector); (b) The power mismatch at each bus n,
hn (x(t )) = fn ((t ))   pn (t ) + dn (t ) + sn , converges to zero.

It is evident from Fig. .(b) that the pricing process generates a solution where the
power balance equation is satisfied (condition (i) of Def. ..). At the corresponding prices,
agents report their surplus-maximizing responses, satisfying condition (ii) of Def. ... By
Theorem .., the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
.. Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented a mechanism that, through iterative price-response and price-updating,
guides the system to a socially optimal outcome. Interestingly, while giving the TransCos
the freedom to maximize their merchandizing surplus corresponds to them attempting to
congest their lines (since a larger power flow results in a higher merchandizing surplus),
this behavior is required for ensuring convergence to an efficient outcome. Furthermore, it
is important to note that giving the TransCos this freedom does not necessarily mean that
the resulting operating point will result in congested lines.
In summary, this chapter discussed the development of an electricity market model and
an associated decentralized market mechanism that, under natural assumptions, ensures
convergence to a Pareto efficient market (competitive) equilibrium. The market model in-
cludes multiple DistCos, GenCos, and (cooperative) TransCos all of which are assumed to
be surplus-maximizing given the current set of LMPs. A market operator updates LMPs via
a gradient method in order to achieve an operating point that satisfies the power balance
equations and consequently clears the market.

P II
Dynamic Security of
Cyber-Physical Systems under
Partial Information

C 
Cyber-Physical Systems Security
It won’t be difficult for society to adjust to the conveniences brought on by cyber-physical
systems. Unfortunately, our high reliance upon these systems, combined with their wide-
spread integration into nearly every aspect of our lives, will make us very sensitive to their
failures.
Recent events have demonstrated the scale of the disruption when cyber-physical sys-
tems fail, especially those related to critical infrastructure. A prime example is the blackout
of  that spanned the midwest and northeast regions of the United States as well as parts
of Canada [Abraham & Efford, ]. The failure was triggered by a sagging transmission
line coming into contact with foliage, causing it to trip and go offline. Due to a malfunction
in an alarm notification system (resulting from a software bug in General Electric’s XA/21TM
energy management system [Poulsen, ]), the loss of the transmission line went unno-
ticed. Making matters worse, the region’s state estimation system was not fully functional
(due to human error), resulting in an incomplete view of the system’s current operating sta-

tus. These issues resulted in a sequence of cascading failures that operators were unable to
recognize in time to resolve. When the cascade eventually came to an end,  generators
were offline leaving more than  million people without power.
Another example of a wide-spread failure event is the power outage that impacted Delta
airlines in . Due to a malfunction in a power control module at Delta’s headquarters in
Atlanta, a transformer overloaded and took many of the airline’s servers offline. According
to an interview with Delta’s CEO Ed Bastian [Yamanouchi, ], “ of [Delta] airline’s
 servers were not wired to backup power.” This oversight caused a system-wide crash,
resulting in more than  flight cancellations world-wide, displacing large numbers of
customers, crew, and aircraft.
The above examples highlight the disruptions that critical infrastructure failures can have
on society. Fortunately, the likelihood that a catastrophic sequence of (essentially random)
events will occur is quite low and helps to explain why events of this scale are relatively
rare. That said, a particularly concerning realization is the wide-spread damage that could
result if events were triggered by an agent with malicious intent. While rare, we have
already started to see such intelligent, targeted attacks on critical infrastructure systems.
Due to our increased reliance on these systems, attacks of this nature have the potential to
significantly disrupt our everyday life, necessitating the study of how they unfold and the
design of defense systems that prevent them from succeeding.
.. An Emerging Class of Attas
Attacks on cyber-physical systems have started to emerge that exploit the deep connectivity
of the cyber layer with the physical infrastructure. The ability to control a physical process
from the cyber infrastructure, coupled with the growing connectivity of our societal sys-
tems, has introduced multiple attack pathways for malicious agents, allowing them to influ-
ence and potentially permanently damage the physical infrastructure. The two case-studies

described below, Stuxnet and the Ukrainian power grid attack, illustrate the complexity of
such attacks.
... Stuxnet
Stuxnet is one of the most sophisticated attacks ever seen. First detected in , the at-
tack was targeted at Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLCs) with the intention of
interfering with centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz fuel enrichment plant [Cherry, , Albright
et al., , Falliere et al., ]. The complexity of Stuxnet was unprecedented, involving
extensive use of insider information and many stages of exploits. The attack evolved in four
steps: spread, discovery of target computers, disruption of physical processes, and evasion
of detection [Falliere et al., ]. Stuxnet spread through the local network using com-
binations of both exploits (including zero-days) and infected removable drives. The use
of removable drives allowed Stuxnet to cross the airgap and reach computers capable of
(re)programming the PLCs responsible for centrifuge control [Falliere et al., ]. Before
injecting malicious code into the PLC, Stuxnet measured the operation of the controller for
a period of time, checking if a “specific program [was] running on the PLC” [Cherry, ],
in turn allowing it to conclude that the PLC was indeed controlling a centrifuge. At this
point, Stuxnet injected malicious code to modify the frequency set-points of the centrifuge
rotors. In order to evade detection, Stuxnet fed back (the previously measured) normal
behavior to the monitoring systems, fooling operators and evading automated anomaly de-
tection systems. Furthermore, it also made use of stolen authenticity certificates to evade
antivirus software. According to a  report published by the Institute for Science and
International Security [Albright et al., ], “It is increasingly accepted that, in late 
or early , Stuxnet destroyed about , IR- centrifuges out of about , deployed
at the site.” Stuxnet represents the first case where physical infrastructure was damaged by
malicious code.
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... Ukrainian Power Grid Atta
In December of , the computer systems controlling the western region of the Ukrainian
power grid were hacked. Investigations revealed that the attack was initiated nearly a year
prior, with hackers carrying out spear-phishing attacks (malicious emails) on the workers’
computers [Zetter, ]. These attacks involved the use of malware, termed BlackEnergy,
which served to open a backdoor on the substation’s systems [Assante, , Pultarova,
]. Using this backdoor, the hackers spent the next few months performing reconnais-
sance, obtaining worker’s VPN credentials and permitting remote access to the system. The
hackers used these credentials to modify critical elements of the system, such as corrupt-
ing the uninterruptible power supply, resulting in a loss of back-up power to the control
centers, and injecting malware, termed KillDisk, preventing workers from being able to
remotely control the system [Pultarova, , Assante, , Zetter, ]. When the at-
tack was launched on December , , the hackers were able to remotely open multiple
substations’ breakers, disconnecting them from the grid and cutting the power to large re-
gions of the country, all while the workers were unable to do much to stop it. Furthermore,
hackers launched a denial-of-service attack on the phone systems, preventing customers
from being able to report outages [Pultarova, ]. While the attack did not do any per-
manent damage to physical infrastructure, it did disconnect  people from the grid.
The event represents the first time that an attack on critical infrastructure has impacted a
civilian population [Cherepanov & Lipovsky, ].
.. Key Features in Cyber-Physical Systems Security
Analyzing the nature of failure events, of both non-malicious and malicious origin, is help-
ful for identifying the key features that should be considered when designing secure cyber-
physical systems.

() Successful attas involve multiple levels of exploits across numerous atta vec-
tors. In the above attack examples, a chain of multiple exploits needs to be successful
in order for the attacker to fulfill its objective. These exploits take advantage of vul-
nerabilities across multiple system components, giving the attacker access to various
attack pathways into the system. Thorough analysis of the Stuxnet attack [Langner,
] revealed that there were two distinct attack vectors that could have resulted in
centrifuge damage: the rotor overspeed attack outlined in Section .., as well as a
more advanced overpressure attack. As systems grow in complexity, one must rea-
son about a large number of possible attack vectors in the system in order to possess
an accurate view of its security and to guide appropriate defense decisions.
() Defense decisions must be made in real-time and subject to partial/noisy infor-
mation. Attackers take extensive measures to remain stealthy and evade detection,
resulting in one having only partial information of their current capabilities and
strategy/intent. Defense decisions must be made in the presence of this uncertainty.
Specifically, defense systems must be able to efficiently translate the information pro-
vided by noisy security alerts (subject to both missed detections and false alarms) into
defense decisions. Efficient processing of security alerts is especially important in the
context of cyber-physical systems, where myopically reacting to false alarms could
have catastrophic consequences on the availability of the underlying system, e.g. in-
terfering with the operation of a flight control system.
() e severity of the atta and subsequent failure depends on the status of the un-
derlying physical system. One of the factors that contributed to the large scale of
the  blackout was the fact that the system was stressed at the time of the initial
trigger event. In principle, an intelligent attacker could maliciously trigger a physical
failure such that the resulting cascade does maximal damage to the system, e.g. by
opening a breaker on a heavily-loaded transmission line. Maintaining the security
of the system should thus involve reasoning about the attacker’s capabilities in the
context of the current operating status of the physical system.
() A given atta can unfold on a wide range of time-scales. Investigations into both
Stuxnet and the Ukrainian power grid attack revealed that the attacks took place
over many days and months. Stuxnet was programmed to be patient, lying dormant
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for up to  days between successive frequency modifications [Falliere et al., ].
This had the effect of reducing its visibility to system operators and automated de-
tection systems. In the Ukrainian power grid attack, hackers stole workers’ creden-
tials which allowed them to perform reconnaissance and corrupt system components
many months before the power outage attack occurred. At the other end of the spec-
trum, we’ve witnessed attacks that unfold very quickly, as was the case with the
WannaCry malware attack [Security Response Team, ]. As a result, in order to
accurately infer the capabilities and intent of the attacker, one must be able to piece
together evidence from drastically different time-scales.
() e target system may not recognize becoming infected or suffering a loss of con-
trol. A particularly concerning feature of sophisticated attacks is that the attacker
and/or malicious code can spread among a large number of hosts without being de-
tected. Furthermore, the malicious code can modify the operation of the physical
system without the target system recognizing this loss of control. For example, as
of September , , Stuxnet was present among approximately  hosts span-
ning many countries [Falliere et al., ]. Once on the target machines, Stuxnet
was able to modify their operation without the operators’ knowledge. This raises
concerns that sophisticated malware could spread among many millions of devices
around the world, either modifying their operation covertly or lying dormant and
waiting for a trigger event, all without our knowledge.
.. Overview of Part II
Developing models that are able to capture all of the above features is a difficult task. The
objective of the model developed in Chapter  is to describe what pathways an attacker
can take to infiltrate a system (feature ()) while enabling real-time threat assessment and
response selection subject to uncertainty (feature ()). The model is built upon the notion
of an attack graph, which serves to describe the causal dependencies between security con-
ditions (attacker capabilities) and exploits. The graph allows one to model the dynamics of
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the attacker, i.e. how the attacker may use its capabilities to perform exploits and gain fur-
ther capabilities, and provides a basis for quantifying the system’s security (via a security
state). Through consideration of multiple attacker types, the model is able to capture a wide
range of attacker strategies (behavior). Using noisy security alerts, generated as the attacker
progresses through the network, the defender constructs a belief over the attacker’s capa-
bilities and true strategy. The belief provides context for efficiently processing subsequent
security alerts, especially in settings where the false-alarm rate is high. A sampling-based
algorithm allows for online prescription of effective defense actions. A discussion of how
the proposed model is useful for addressing feature (), in the context of the electrical grid,
is also presented. Features () and () are not considered in this work.
The requirement to make decisions over time under imperfect information (sequential
decision-making under uncertainty) is fundamental to problems related to security. Ob-
taining the solution to these problems, i.e. determining an optimal policy, poses significant
theoretical and computational challenges. Chapter  investigates conditions under which
a specific class of sequential-decision problems, POMDPs, possess optimal policies that are
monotone in the belief. Motivated by the model of Chapter , specifically the fact that we
cannot always say whether one security state is safer than another, the model of Chapter 
studies settings where the underlying state space is partially ordered. The partial ordering
of the state space requires the development of a new stochastic order. This stochastic or-
der has many desirable properties, allowing one to establish monotonicity properties of the
value functions and dynamic programming recursion, and resulting in monotone optimal
policies in a two-action setting.

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A POMDP Approa to the
Dynamic Defense of Large-Scale
Cyber-Physical Systems
.. Introduction
The high connectivity of modern cyber networks and devices has brought with it many im-
provements to the functionality and efficiency of our networked systems. Unfortunately,
these benefits have come with the introduction of many new entry points for attackers,
making our systems much more vulnerable to intrusions. Recent events, such as infor-
mation leakage and theft [Finkle & Skariachan, ], car hacking [Greenberg, ], and
denial-of-service attacks [Etherington & Conger, ], have highlighted this vulnerabil-
ity. Particularly concerning is that the operation of critical infrastructure is becoming in-
creasingly reliant upon (potentially insecure) networked systems, generating significant
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vulnerabilities in many areas of society. As reported by the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), attacks on
critical infrastructure sectors (such as manufacturing, energy, communication, water, and
transportation systems) have remained persistent over the past few years, with  in ,
 in , and  in  [Department of Homeland Security, ]. Unfortunately, due
to the increased reliance of these systems on cyber networks, coupled with an escalation
in the sophistication of cyber attacks, many of the recent intrusions have had the potential
to inflict severe and widespread damage (an increasing number of attacks have reached the
control system layer of the system [Department of Homeland Security, ].) It is impera-
tive that methods are developed to detect and mitigate these attacks in order to ensure the
secure operation of society’s critical systems.
One approach to mitigating attacks is, upon discovery of a vulnerability, to develop and
release a patch to remove the vulnerability. Unfortunately, the period between discovery
of a vulnerability and the application of a patch (termed the vulnerability exposure window)
is long, often lasting on the order of five months or more [Gorenc & Sands, ]. This
significant delay results in many cyber networks being operational while multiple known
vulnerabilities are present, resulting in significant risks to society. This concern necessi-
tates the development of an active defense system that is capable of taking into account
information in real-time, inferring the security status of the system, and translating this
information into appropriate defense decisions that are able to immediately respond to and
mitigate the progression of the attacker through the system.
The development of such a defense system is complicated by the fact that sophisticated
and targeted cyber attacks, especially those carried out by nation-states, rarely consist
solely of an exploitation of a single vulnerability. Rather, these attacks usually consist
of a complex sequence of exploits, combining many vulnerabilities across multiple system
elements, enabling the intruder to infiltrate deep within the cyber network. In an attempt
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to address these concerns, researchers in the security community have developed theoreti-
cal tools (predominantly graphical approaches) to model the complex interactions between
vulnerabilities. Attack trees/graphs are a popular formalism for modeling such interac-
tions. First introduced by [Schneier, ], attack trees model the dependencies between
exploits and system states* in a cyber network, allowing one to construct the specific attack
paths that intruders can take to enter a network. Unfortunately, attack trees and graphs
can be enormously large even for modestly-sized systems [Sheyner et al., ], restrict-
ing their applicability to realistically-sized cyber networks. In order to improve scalability,
researchers proposed an assumption on the attacker’s behavior, termedmonotonicity [Am-
mann et al., ], which states that the success of a previous exploit will not interfere
with the success of a future exploit. Monotonicity enables one to restrict attention to de-
pendencies between exploits and security conditions (system attributes), in what is termed
a dependency graph, avoiding the need to enumerate over all system states. This enables a
more compact representation, allowing one to significantly reduce the amount of informa-
tion required to describe attacks.
Knowledge of how an attacker can infiltrate a system offers a useful starting point for
defining appropriate defenses; however, efficiently processing the available information
and translating it into the prescription of an effective defense decision is still a difficult task.
One difficulty arises fromhow to quantify the security status of the system at any given time.
The security status is constantly changing as a function of both the attacker’s progression
through the system and the defender’s actions. Furthermore, the defender does not know
the true strategy of the attacker and is unable to perfectly observe the attacker’s actions,
resulting in a lack of certainty of the security status of the system at any given time. The
defender only has access to a stream of noisy security information generated in real-time
*System states represent an assignment of values to system aributes such as: active services (and the
associated vulnerabilities), network connectivity, trust relationships between hosts, and attacker privileges
on hosts [Sheyner et al., ].
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(for example, security alerts generated via intrusion detection systems). Oftentimes, this
information suffers from a high-rate of false alarms, that is, alarms being triggered when
nothing of concern has actually occurred. Furthermore, the defender’s choice of a defense
action is complicated by its uncertain effects on the security status of the system (due to
the defender’s uncertainty regarding the true security state) as well as the need to strike a
trade-off between enforcing security and maintaining the availability of network resources
to trusted users.
In this chapter, we propose a formal model, based on the theory of stochastic control,
for selecting defense actions in real-time in order to mitigate the progression of an attacker
through the system while minimizing the negative impact to availability. We use a condi-
tion dependency graph to model how the attacker progresses through the cyber network
over time. We represent the dependency graph as a hypergraph, where nodes represent
possible security conditions and directed hyperedges (edges that connect a pair of sets of
nodes) represent exploits, relating preconditions, the security conditions that must be true
in order for the exploit to be attempted, to postconditions, the security conditions that be-
come true if the exploit is successfully carried out. Each security condition can either be
enabled or disabled, where an enabled condition is interpreted as the attacker possessing a
particular capability. We define a security state to be the set of currently enabled security
conditions. In this sense, the security state at any given time represents the current capa-
bilities of the attacker. For a given security state, the attacker uses its current capabilities
(the set of enabled security conditions) to attempt exploits, with the goal of reaching one
or more goal conditions. The specific strategy that the attacker employs is its own private
information and is assumed to dynamically adjust according to the deployed defense deci-
sion. In order to model the defender’s uncertainty of the attacker’s strategy, we consider
the attacker to be one of a finite set of aacker types. Consideration of many types allows
one to capture a wide-range of potential attacker behavior. Each type characterizes the na-
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ture of both the security state dynamics (how the attacker progresses through the system,
via probabilities of aack and success for each exploit) as well as the observation dynamics
(the nature of how the intrusion detection system generates security alerts as a function
of the attacker’s progression, via probabilities of detection for exploit attempts and proba-
bilities of false alarm for alerts). The defender is able to interfere with the progression of
the attacker by performing system modifications that have the effect of blocking exploits
from succeeding. The defender possesses uncertainty over both the current capabilities
and the true strategy of the attacker and must make its defense decisions based on its belief
matrix, that is, the joint distribution over security states and attacker types. This belief,
constructed such that it is consistent with the defender’s available information (the history
of security alerts and previously deployed defense actions), summarizes all of the necessary
information for making an optimal decision. Through appropriate assignment of costs to
both security states and defense actions, we are able to quantify the tradeoff between main-
taining security and preserving availability of the system. The resulting defense problem is
a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), the solution of which is a defense
policy that maps the current belief (of the security state and attacker strategy) to a defense
action.
Due to the high dimensionality of the defense problem, scalability of the solution ap-
proach is a primary concern. We employ an online algorithm, based on the partially ob-
servable Monte-Carlo planning (POMCP) algorithm [Silver & Veness, ], that simulates
future possible state trajectories from the current belief in order to evaluate the effective-
ness of various defense decisions, enabling the defender to make a selection in real-time.
While forming the basis for our algorithm, the standard POMCP algorithm is not directly
suitable for application to our problem. In particular, the belief update procedure does not
scale to large observation spaces. As a result, using the context provided by the (belief over
the) security state, we take advantage of the structure of the observation process in order to
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design an efficient belief update procedure that effectively scales to high-dimensional set-
tings. The proposed online defense algorithm enables us to compute good quality defense
policies for large instances of the defense problem, overcoming an important obstacle to
deployment in realistic cyber network settings.
... Literature Review
Systems that select defense actions in response to security alerts are referred to as intrusion
response systems (IRSs) in the cybersecurity literature. Early IRSs took the form of passive
systems, logging security information and notifying human operators in order for man-
ual response actions to be selected. Unfortunately, this process is slow and has proven to
be inadequate for defending networks against sophisticated modern-day attacks.† Conse-
quently, researchers have turned to the development of active systems that are capable of
automatically responding to intrusions without the need for a human operator to intervene.
Such systems are referred to as automated IRSs in the literature.
The past two decades have seen an increasing amount of research in automated IRSs.
For literature reviews of the area, the reader is directed to the surveys by [Foo et al., ],
[Shameli-Sendi et al., ], and [Inayat et al., ]. Automated IRSs can largely be catego-
rized into two groups: static and dynamic. Static IRSs focus on designing an attack-response
map that is capable of executing preprogrammed responses upon detection of attacks (see
for example, the work by [Ryutov et al., ]). Static approaches, as the name suggests,
use a fixed mapping (look-up table) from detected attacks to responses, and consequently,
as stated by [Lewandowski et al., ], select responses that can be potentially predicted
and exploited by an attacker. Furthermore, static IRSs do not take into account the poten-
tially negative side-effects of deploying defense actions and can thus unintentionally inflict
further damage to the system. Due to these concerns, researchers began to develop dy-
†As stated by [Balepin et al., ], “some of the most intense intrusions are automated.”
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namic IRSs. Dynamic IRSs are capable of factoring in additional information, such as the
effectiveness of previously deployed defense actions, e.g. [Ragsdale et al., , Foo et al.,
], or the cost of defenses, e.g. [Lee et al., , Toth & Kruegel, , Kheir et al., ],
in order prescribe a situation-dependent response to mitigate the attack. The ability of dy-
namic IRSs to modify their response based on new intrusion information raises the bar for
the adversary, proving to be much more difficult to circumvent than static IRSs.
One class of dynamic IRSs, termed state-based approaches, has received an increasing
amount of attention in recent years [Lewandowski et al., , Kreidl & Frazier, ,
Zonouz et al., , Miehling et al., , Iannucci et al., , Iannucci & Abdelwahed,
]. State-based IRSs aim to quantify the security status of a network via the assignment
of a security state and enable one to study how this state evolves as a function of both the
attacker’s and defender’s actions. As argued by [Iannucci et al., , Iannucci & Abdelwa-
hed, ], a state-based approach allows one to cast the problem of designing an automated
IRS as a problem of choosing defense actions that ensure the security state remains in a de-
sirable region of the state space. State-based approaches also allow one to avoid the issue
of crafting individual response actions for each attack, since a single defense action may
modify the dynamics of the security state’s evolution in such a way as to prevent many
attacks from being successfully carried out. One of the first to develop a state-based IRS
was [Lewandowski et al., ]. The authors proposed a state-based approach in order to
enable “global situational awareness,” ensuring that the selection of a defense action bene-
fits the entire system and not just a localized region. While significant in its contribution,
the approach taken in [Lewandowski et al., ] does not leverage any formal theory.
The nature of state-based IRSs make them a good fit for the application of formal tools. A
well-designed IRS must be able to quickly select defense actions over time when provided
with noisy security alert information (including false negatives and false positives) and eval-
uate the effectiveness of previous defense decisions, all while balancing inherent tradeoffs

in the system, such as the conflicting objectives of security and availability. The tools found
in control and game theory are well-suited for addressing these requirements, a fact that has
been recognized by some in the security community, [Kreidl & Frazier, , Zonouz et al.,
, Miehling et al., , Iannucci et al., , Iannucci & Abdelwahed, ]. One of the
first to apply formal theory, namely stochastic control theory, to the design of an automated
IRS was [Kreidl & Frazier, ] in the development of their system αLADS (ALPHATECH
Lightweight Autonomic Defense System). The authors proposed a host-based IRS that re-
ceives alerts (as inputs) from an anomaly sensor in order to calculate the probability that
the host is in an attack state. The approach uses a POMDP to select countermeasures in
order to interfere with the progression of the attacker while attempting to minimize the
negative impact to the normal operation of the system. [Zonouz et al., ] formulate
an automated, network-based IRS as a two-player, sequential Stackelberg stochastic game,
termed the Response and Recovery Engine (RRE). The proposed scheme decomposes the
problem into a hierarchical structure of local engines (hosts) and a global engine. Local
engines contain graphs, termed aack-response trees (ARTs), that serve to quantify the se-
curity of the hosts based on noisy security alerts. The security information of each host is
sent to the global engine which is responsible for computing defense actions. The defense
actions are chosen using a (heuristic) fuzzy logic control-based technique under the behav-
ioral assumption that the attacker will attempt to inflict maximum damage to the system. In
previous work, [Miehling et al., ], we developed a defense scheme that used Bayesian
attack graphs (see [Liu & Man, ] for the definition) to model the progression of the at-
tacker and quantify the security state. Using noisy security alert information, the defender
maintains a belief over the current progression of the attacker. The resulting problem of
choosing defense actions over time as a function of the belief is cast as a POMDP. More
recently, [Iannucci et al., , Iannucci & Abdelwahed, ] proposed an autonomic IRS
that uses aMarkov Decision Process (MDP) to specify a sequence of defense actions to drive
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the system back to a normal operating state. They also offer a performance evaluation of
their proposed solution method.
The IRS proposed in this chapter differs from existing state-based approaches in multiple
ways. First, in the host-based IRS developed by [Kreidl & Frazier, ], only the state of
the host is taken into consideration when determining the security status of the system. In
our model, embedding a state space on the dependency graph allows for the security of
the entire network to be taken into account. Furthermore, due to the coarse-grained, small
state space in [Kreidl & Frazier, ], the scalability problem is not addressed. Second,
while the network-based IRS introduced by [Zonouz et al., ] addresses the scalability
problem via a hierarchical decomposition, our model presents an alternate approach that
addresses scalability by employing a Monte-Carlo sampling approach. Additionally, our
model uses an expected cost criterion, a less conservative objective than the worst-case cost
found in [Zonouz et al., ]. Third, compared to our previous work, our current model is
more expressive than the model we proposed in [Miehling et al., ], allowing for one to
consider more complex dependencies between exploits (the model allows for exploits that
have multiple postconditions), a more realistic observation model (alerts are triggered by
exploit activity and are subject to false alarms), and private attacker strategies. Further-
more, we directly address the scalability concerns in this chapter. Lastly, while [Iannucci
et al., , Iannucci & Abdelwahed, ] address the state space explosion problem, their
work assumes complete observability of the underlying state, whereas our model allows
for imperfect observations.
... Contribution
The formalism in this chapter offers a quantitative model for the computation and analysis
of defense policies under a wide-range of attacker strategies. The specific contributions are
as follows:

)Quantification of security: The model of this chapter is the first to embed a state space
on a dependency graph for the purposes of designing a dynamic IRS. Such an approach
allows one to accurately quantify the progression of the attacker along (a combinatorial
number o) attack pathways, and provides valuable information for selecting defense ac-
tions that optimally mitigate the attacker’s progression while minimizing the impact to
availability. Furthermore, allowing the defender to possess uncertainty over the true un-
derlying (dynamic) attack strategy leads to a more realistic model of attacker-defender in-
teractions, permitting a more accurate quantification of the system’s security status.
) Management of false alarms: The security state provides context for which exploits
the attacker has already performed, and which exploits it needs to carry out in order to
achieve its goals. Such information is valuable for efficiently processing security alerts, al-
lowing the defender to weigh new security alert information by the likelihood of states in
the current belief. That is, the belief is informative for assessing probabilistically whether
the given alerts were generated by valid exploit attempts or were simply false alarms. This
feature of our model, described in more detail in Section .., is particularly useful in set-
tings where there is a high-rate of false alarms, a characteristic of many modern IDSs.
) Scalability: Even though the number of security states can be very large for some in-
stances of our model, the online defense algorithm (discussed in Section ..) does not re-
quire one to construct the entire state space. Instead, the algorithm samples regions of the
state space relevant to the current defense decision, allowing one to avoid the state space ex-
plosion problem. This feature, combined with some problem-specific modifications (taking
advantage of the structure of the observation process) allows for computation of defense
policies in realistically sized domains.

.. e Dynamic Security Model
Theproposed dynamic security model provides a formal basis for how a defender can detect
and mitigate the infiltration of an attacker in a cyber network. Throughout the description
of themodel, the diagram of Fig. .will be useful. In particular, the remainder of Section .
will describe the model for the attacker’s progression through the cyber network (Section
..), the defender’s quantification of this progression via a security state (Section ..),
the evolution of the security state as a function of the interactions between the attacker and
defender (Section ..), the defender’s information and its formation of consistent beliefs
(Section ..), and finally the formulation of the defender’s problem (Section ..).
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Figure 6.1: The dynamic security model. The attacker progresses through the cyber network by
performing exploits, triggering security alerts via an intrusion detection system. The defender uses
this intrusion information to construct a belief of the attacker’s capabilities and strategy, which is
then used to prescribe a defense action.
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... e Condition Dependency Graph
Researchers and cybersecurity analysts have long been interested in how to represent the
steps that intruders take when compromising a system. The concept of attack trees and
graphs were developed with this goal in mind, allowing one to study all possible sequences
of exploits that an intruder can take to infiltrate a network and reach its goal(s). An at-
tack graph consists of system states (nodes) and transition relations (edges), which relate
system states to each other via exploits. The construction of an attack graph requires one
to enumerate over all system states, a process which generates graphs that quickly grow in
dimension.
Making assumptions regarding the attacker’s behavior allows us to greatly simplify at-
tack graphs and reduce the amount of information required to describe an attack. One
such assumption, termed monotonicity [Ammann et al., ], states that the success of
an exploit does not render the precondition of any other exploit invalid. In simpler terms,
the success of one exploit does not interfere with the attacker’s ability to carry out a fu-
ture exploit.‡ Under monotonicity, one does not need to enumerate all system states in an
attack graph, but can rather construct a dependency graph describing how exploits relate
to security conditions [Ammann et al., , Noel & Jajodia, ]. The appeal of the de-
pendency graph representation is that the graph can more easily be constructed for large
networks, proving to be especially useful in cases where the corresponding attack graph
would be intractably large to generate. In the approach taken by [Ammann et al., ],
the authors construct such a graph where nodes represent security conditions and edges
represent exploits in what is termed a condition dependency graph.§ Security conditions are
atomic facts (they can either be true or false) that can reflect any of the aforementioned
‡See Section  of [Ammann et al., ] for an explanation of how the majority of non-monotonic attacks
can be modeled as monotonic under reasonable assumptions on the attacker’s behavior.
§This graph has a dual representation termed an exploit dependency graph [Noel & Jajodia, , Jajodia
et al., ].
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system attributes.¶ Exploits relate security conditions via preconditions and postconditions.
We adopt an approach similar to that of [Ammann et al., ] for modeling attack path-
ways, using a condition dependency graph to represent the dependencies between security
conditions and exploits. As discussed by [Ammann et al., ], the edges in a condition
dependency graph relate the security conditions “in a complex way,” where a given exploit
can have “both multiple preconditions and multiple postconditions.” We formalize this no-
tion by recognizing that such edges are in fact directed hyperedges (an “edge” that connects
two sets of nodes rather than simply a pair of nodes). For simplicity, we adopt a slightly
modified definition for the security conditions from the one found in [Ammann et al., ].
The security conditions in [Ammann et al., ] represent a mix of attributes that are true
under the normal network configuration (termed initial conditions, such as default network
connectivity and active services) and attributes that can be maliciously made true during
an attack (which we term aack conditions, such as attacker privileges or unintended trust
relationships between hosts). We do not include the conditions representing the normal
network configuration (the initial conditions) explicitly in the dependency graph, but in-
stead assume that the set of security conditions consists solely of attack conditions. This
modification is purely for convenience; under the modified definition, the condition depen-
dency graph for a network that has not yet been subject to an attack has all of its conditions
set to false.
Formally, we represent a condition dependency graph as a directed acyclic hypergraph
H = (N ; E), where N = fc1; : : : ; cnc g is the set of security conditions (nodes) and E =
fe1; : : : ; ene g is the set of exploits (hyperedges). The acyclic nature of the graph follows
from the monotonicity assumption. As discussed earlier, each security condition ci 2 N in
the hypergraph can either be true or false. The truth value of each condition is interpreted
¶The important distinction between a system state in an attack graph and a security condition in a depen-
dency graph is that, in attack graphs, each node represents a state, where each state is an assignment of values
for all of the attributes, whereas in the condition dependency graph, each node represents a single attribute.
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as follows: a true (enabled) condition means that the attacker possesses condition ci , and
a false (disabled) condition means that the attacker does not possess ci , where an enabled
condition is interpreted as the attacker having a particular capability. For example, an
enabled condition could mean that the attacker has maliciously enabled a trust relationship
between two hosts or has user access on a specific host (where a different privilege level on
the same machine would be represented by a distinct condition). Some of the conditions in
the hypergraph, when enabled, designate that an attacker has reached a goal. Such nodes
are termed goal conditions and are denoted by the subset Nд  N . Goal conditions are
defined by the defender and correspond to something that it wants to protect. For example,
a goal condition could represent the attacker possessing root access on a critical host or
access to a server that contains sensitive information. It is assumed that the attacker is
attempting to enable one of these goal conditions; however, we (as the defender) do not
know which one(s). Each hyperedge ei 2 E represents an exploit and takes the form of
an ordered pair of sets, ei = (N  i ;N +i ), where N  i  N represents ei ’s preconditions and
N +i  N represents ei ’s postconditions. It is assumed that the attacker is able to attempt
exploit ei only if all preconditions j 2 N  i are enabled. This is without loss of generality
since for cases where multiple sets of conditions allow for an exploit to be attempted (a
disjunction over preconditions), we simply duplicate the exploit for each of its sufficient
sets of preconditions. There exist some exploits ei 2 E with N  i = ?, that is, an exploit
with an empty set of preconditions. These exploits, termed initial exploits and denoted by
E0, represent entry points for the attacker and reflect the fact that they can be performed
without the attacker needing any prior (maliciously enabled) capabilities. If an attempted
exploit is successful, all postconditions j 2 N +i become enabled, increasing the attacker’s
set of capabilities, allowing it to perform additional exploits and penetrate further into the
system. A pictorial representation of a condition dependency graph is provided in Fig. ..
We will use this example graph throughout the chapter to aid in the explanation of the
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model and the results.
a!acker’s progression
Figure 6.2: A sample condition dependency graph. The above dependency graph H = (N ;E) con-
sists of nc = 12 security conditions and ne = 13 exploits (in the form of hyperedges). Initial exploits,
E0 = fe1; e2; e3; e11g, where e1 = (?; fc1g), e2 = (?; fc2g), e3 = (?; fc3; c4g), e11 = (?; fc10g) and
exploits e4 = (fc1; c2g; fc5g), e5 = (fc2; c3g; fc6g), e6 = (fc3g; fc7g), e7 = (fc4g; fc7g), e8 = (fc5g; fc8g),
e9 = (fc6g; fc8g), e10 = (fc6; c7g; fc9g), e12 = (fc8; c9g; fc11g), e13 = (fc9; c10g; fc12g). We represent the
graph in a layered structure in which preconditions are drawn above postconditions, e.g. exploit
e4 has preconditions fc1; c2g and a single postcondition fc5g. Goal conditions, N д = fc11; c12g, are
represented by double-encircled nodes.
We assume that the dependency graph has already been constructed for the system (us-
ing vulnerability analysis tools such as the TVA tool of [Jajodia et al., ]) and instead
focus on the formulation and solution of a real-time (dynamic) defense problem, using the
dependency graph to describe the progression of the attacker.
... e Notion of a Security State
A primary objective of our dynamic security model is to quantify the level of security of
the system over time. To this end, we define a security state to represent the current level
of progression of the attacker in the system. The current security state, denoted by st  N ,
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is defined to be the set of currently enabled security conditions. Since an enabled condition
is interpreted as the attacker having a particular capability, the current security state, st ,
describes the set of capabilities of the attacker.
The monotonicity assumption on the attacker’s behavior implies a notion of feasibility
for the security states, defined formally below.
Definition .. (Feasible Security State). A security state, s  N , is called a feasible security
state if for every condition cj 2 s , there exists at least one exploit ei = (N  i ;N +i ) 2 E such
that cj 2 N +i and N  i ;N +i  s .
That is, in order for a security state to be feasible, every enabled condition must have
been enabled through an exploit and all preconditions and postconditions of the associated
exploit must also be enabled. An implicit assumption behind the feasibility condition is
that our model for exploits is complete, in the sense that our model is not missing any
exploits that would allow the attacker to enable security conditions.‖ Fig. . illustrates a
few feasible security states.
The state space of the dynamic security model consists of all feasible security states, de-
noted by S = fs1; : : : ; sns g. We do not have a closed-form expression for the number of
feasible states ns ; however, as discussed in Section ., the proposed online defense algo-
rithm does not require one to construct the entire state space.
... Evolution of the Security State
The security state evolves probabilistically as a function of both the defender’s and at-
tacker’s actions. In a given iteration of our problem, the defender is assumed to act first,
taking actions that interfere with the attacker’s progression through the system by dynam-
‖Relaxing this assumption amounts to including nodes in s that are not associated with any hyperedge
in E, meaning that they can become enabled via an unknown influence. The inclusion of these leaky nodes
greatly increases the state space and is not considered in this work.
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Figure 6.3: A collection of feasible security states for the graph H = (N ; E) of Fig. 6.2. Enabled
security conditions are represented by shaded nodes. Notice that for each feasible security state,
there is a path of exploits in E from enabled root condition(s) to each enabled (non-root) condition
such that all preconditions and postconditions of the respective exploits are enabled.
ically modifying the aack surface (the collection of various pathways that the attacker can
use to infiltrate the system). The attacker then uses its set of current capabilities to attempt
exploits, the dynamics of which are dictated by its (private) attack strategy. Finally, the
attempted exploits that end up succeeding determine the transition to the next security
state.
Defender’s Actions
The defender is assumed to select actions that have the effect of restricting the normal
network configuration (such as the network connectivity or active services). Performing
such systemmodifications has the effect of blocking the exploits that depend on the network
elements that weremodified. As a simple example, some exploits depend on the existence of
a connection between hosts via a specific port. By blocking this port between the hosts, we
are able to block the corresponding exploits that depend on the port being open, preventing
the attacker from using these exploits to progress through the system.
In reality, the defender is not able to block individual exploits at will. The system mod-
ifications involved in blocking one exploit will, in general, block multiple exploits in the
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system (e.g. blocking a port or disabling a service). On the other hand, some exploits may
not be able to be blocked by any of the defender’s available system changes (e.g. an exploit
of a local software vulnerability that results in the escalation of attacker’s privilege on a
specific host). This coarseness in the ability to block exploits translates into the defender
having limited control over the attacker’s progression through the system, a characteristic
which is captured in our definition of the defender’s set of actions (described below).
Formally, the defender is assumed to have access to nu + 1 defense actions, represented
by the set U = fu0;u1; : : : ;unu g. The defense action u0 represents the null action and cor-
responds to the defender not blocking any exploits, allowing the system (and attacker) to
operate uninterrupted. Each of the nu remaining defense actions, ui , i = 1; : : : ;nu , corre-
sponds to a set of systemmodifications that restrict the normal network configuration, such
as restricting the network connectivity (e.g. by blocking a port between some hosts) or the
set of active services, and can be associated with blocking a specific set of exploits, denoted
by B (ui )  E. Notice that the defender does not, in general, have the ability to block indi-
vidual exploits, instead it must select a defense action u 2 U which in turn induces a set of
blocked exploits B (u)  E.
Each defense action u 2 U induces system modifications that interfere with the progres-
sion of the attacker but also, unavoidably, limit the availability of the system to trusted
users. It is the goal of the defense scheme to optimally balance this tradeoff. As described
in Section .., a cost is assigned to each defense action u in order to capture its impact
to availability. Combined with the assignment of costs for undesirable security states, the
defender is able to specify actions that limit the attacker while minimizing the negative
impact to availability.

reat Model
It is assumed that there is a single attacker attempting to infiltrate the system. At any
given time-step, the attacker attempts to enable security conditions by performing exploits,
in hopes of increasing its set of capabilities and allowing it to progress through the system.
The specific nature of the attacker’s progression is given by its (private) strategy, dictated by
one of a finite set of attacker types. As will be described in the remainder of Section ., the
attacker type dictates the dynamics of both the security state and observation processes.
Lastly, the attacker is assumed to be monotone. As discussed earlier, the monotonicity
assumption states that the success of a previous exploit will not interfere with the success
of a future exploit. In the context of the proposed model, this implies that once the attacker
enables a security condition, it remains enabled.
Formally, for a given security state st , the set of exploits that the attacker can attempt,
termed the available exploits, is described by the set E (st ). This set represents the complete
set of exploits that are available from state st . The attacker does not necessarily know all of
the elements in this set; E (st ) simply representswhat can be attempted using the capabilities
described by st . The set of available exploits is given by
E (st = s ) =
(
ei = (N  i ;N +i ) 2 E j N  i  s;N +i * s
)
: (.)
In order for an exploit ei = (N  i ;N +i ) to be available to the attacker, it must satisfy two
requirements. The first requirement, N  i  s , states that all of the exploit’s preconditions
must be satisfied in the current security state. The second requirement,N +i * s , states that
the exploit’s postconditions must not all be satisfied. This latter requirement arises from
the assumption that the attacker will not perform redundant exploits. This assumption is
reasonable since the attacker will not gain any new capabilities by performing such exploits
and will only increase its chances of being detected (discussed further in Section ..). The
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caption of Fig. . describes the set of available exploits, for a given security state st , in the
example condition dependency graphH of Fig. ..
The specific strategy that the attacker employs is dictated by its type. The attacker is
assumed to be one of na types, represented by the set Φ = (ϕ1; : : : ;ϕna ). Each type ϕi 2
Φ corresponds to a set of conditional aack probabilities over the exploits, α (ϕi ; st ;ut ) =
αe1 (ϕi ; st ;ut ); : : : ;αene (ϕi ; st ;ut )

, specifying the likelihood that the attacker will attempt
each of the available exploits from the current security state st under defense actionut . The
conditional attack probability for a given exploit ej is given by
αej (ϕi ; st ;ut ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
αej (ϕi ) if ej 2 E (st ) n B (ut )
αej (ϕi ) if ej 2 E (st ) \ B (ut )
0 if ej < E (st )
: (.)
By partitioning the set of available exploits into two components, the threatmodel describes
how an attacker may modify its strategy based on the defender’s action. Specifically, avail-
able exploits that are not blocked by the current defense action, E (st ) nB (ut ), are attempted
with probability αej (ϕi ), whereas exploits that are blocked by the current defense action,
E (st ) \ B (ut ), are attempted with probability αej (ϕi ). Exploits that are not available in the
current security state are not attempted.
Constructing the threat model in such a way allows one to encode various levels of at-
tacker knowledge. For example, if an attacker of typeϕi is not able to recognize that exploit
ej is blocked under a give defense action ut = u, then αej (ϕi ) = αej (ϕi ), reflecting the fact
that the attacker is unable to modify its attack probability based on the defender’s action.
On the other hand, if the attacker knows with certainty that exploit ej has been blocked by
the defender, then setting αej (ϕi ) = 0 reflects that the attacker would not attempt it. The
threat model can also capture intermediate cases where the attacker has partial informa-
tion and may attempt exploits that it believes are not blocked with a higher probability, i.e.
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αej (ϕi )  αej (ϕi ).
Security State Dynamics
For any given iteration, the defender first chooses a defense action, ut = u 2 U , in turn
blocking a set of exploits, B (u)  E. Next, given the current security state st 2 S and
defense action ut = u, the attacker attempts a collection of available exploits according
to its own private strategy, α (ϕi ; st ;ut ). Each of the attempted exploits succeeds with a
conditional probability of success. The probability of success models the fact that attacks
do not succeed with certainty (potentially due to the inherent difficulty in carrying out
the attack or the existence of defenses already in place). The probabilities are assumed to
depend upon the attacker’s type; this dependency arises from the fact that some attackers
may possess greater knowledge of the exploit or be able to expend more resources. The
set of conditional success probabilities is given by β (ϕi ;ut ) =

βe1 (ϕi ;ut ); : : : ; βene (ϕi ;ut )

,
where the probability of success for a given exploit ej is given by
βej (ϕi ;ut ) =
8>><>>:
βej (ϕi ) if ej < B (ut )
0 if ej 2 B (ut )
: (.)
Exploits that are blocked by the defender do not succeed. The exploit attempts that are
successful enable the corresponding set of postconditions, forming the updated security
state st+1 2 S. Fig. .(b) illustrates a possible successor state st+1 for a given state st , type
ϕt , and defense action ut .
In summary, the security state dynamics can be described by a controlled Markov chain,
where the control is the defense action. The transition matrix of the Markov chain, for a
given defense action u and attacker type ϕl , is Pu (ϕl ) with elements puijl = P (St+1 = sj j St =
si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u) (the analytical expression for this probability is given by Eq. (C.) in the
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(a) Current security state (b) Possible successor state
Figure 6.4: Sample evolution of the security state for a given state-type-action triple (st ;ϕt ;ut ): (a)
Consider the security state st = fc1; c2; c3; c4; c5g and defense action ut = u such that B (u) = fe5; e8g
(blocked exploits are shown by shaded hyperedges). By Eq. (6.1), the set of available exploits is
E (st ) = fe5; e6; e7; e8g; (b) The attacker attempts each exploit in ei 2 E (st ) with a probability of
attack αei (ϕt ; st ;ut ) as described in Eq. (6.2). Each attempted exploit ei that does not lie within the
set of blocked exploits, B (ut )  E, succeeds with a probability of success βej (ϕi ) as described in Eq.
(6.3). In this example, only exploit e6 succeeded and thus st+1 = st [ N +6 = st [ fc7g .
appendix).** Note that defense actions only influence the attacker’s progression. Blocking
an exploit that already has all of its postconditions enabled does not disable any of the
exploit’s postconditions. An analogy to the physical security domain is useful: Consider
an intruder attempting to break into a building to access a safe. If the intruder has already
successfully broken through the front door, then barricading the door will have no effect
on the attacker’s ability to access the safe. However, securing the door before the attacker
reaches it will prevent the attacker from using that entry point, forcing it to use another
path, in turn increasing the attacker’s effort and decreasing the likelihood of the safe being
compromised.
**The proposed security model also allows for the underlying type to vary in time according to a Markov
chain (with transition matrix Q); however, for simplicity we consider a fixed (albeit unknown) underlying
attacker type.
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... e Defender’s Information
The defender lacks certainty of both the current security state and the underlying strategy
of the attacker and must infer/learn both using a stream of noisy security information. The
security information comes in the form of a sequence of security alerts generated by an in-
trusion detection system (IDS) as the attacker attempts exploits and progresses through the
system (see Fig. .). These security alerts are noisy, suffering from both missed detections
(the IDS not seeing an exploit attempt) and false alarms (the IDS generating alerts when no
attempt has occurred, e.g., alerts generated by legitimate network traffic).
LetZ = fz1; z2; : : : ; znz g represent the finite set of security alerts that may be generated
by the IDS. Each exploit ei 2 E, if attempted, has an associated set of alerts that can be
generated, given by the set Z (ei ) = fzAi (1); zAi (2); : : : ; zAi (ai ) g 2 P (Z), where Ai is the
set of ai alert indices from the set A = f1; 2; : : : ;nz g andP (Z) is the power set of Z. In
general, more than one exploit can generate the same alert, that isZ (ei ) \ Z (ej ) , ? for
ei , ej . Also, some exploits may not generate any alerts, that is,Z (ei ) = ? for some ei 2 E
(such exploits are termed stealthy).
The IDS generates the security alerts probabilistically, based on detected exploit activity
and false alarms, the statistics of which depend upon the underlying strategy of the attacker.
Advanced attackers may be able to craft their attacks such that they are less likely to trigger
security alerts or, alternatively, influence the false alarm rate of specific alerts to mask their
true progression through the system. To capture this dependency, the securitymodel allows
for the probabilities of detection (the likelihood of seeing an alert given an exploit attempt)
and the probabilities of false alarm (the likelihood of seeing an alert in the absence of an
exploit attempt) to depend on the attacker’s type. For an attacker of type ϕl , an attempt
of exploit ei will generate the alertsZ (ei ) = fzAi (1); zAi (2); : : : ; zAi (ai ) g with corresponding
probabilities of detection δij (ϕl ), j 2 Ai . Similarly, the probability of false alarm for each
alert zi 2 Z, under type ϕl , is dictated by ζi (ϕl ). The vector of security alerts received by
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the defender at time t + 1, denoted by yt+1 2 Y = f0; 1gnz , consists of all security alerts
triggered during the given iteration.
Using the received security alerts the defender constructs a belief, denoted by pit , that
summarizes its uncertainty over both the security state and the attacker type. This belief
(or information state [Åström, , Kumar & Varaiya, ]) is constructed using all of
the defender’s available information at time t : the (distribution over the) initial security
state and attacker type, the history of all defense actions from time 0 to time t   1, and all
observations (security alerts) from time 0 to t , denoted by ht = (pi0;u0;y0; : : : ;ut 1;yt ). The
belief represents the joint probability distribution over security states and attacker types,
and takes the form of a matrix, defined as
pit =
266666666666664
pi 1;1t pi
1;2
t    pi 1;nat
pi 2;1t pi
2;2
t    pi 2;nat
:::
:::
: : :
:::
pins ;1t pi
ns ;2
t    pins ;nat
377777777777775
2 ∆(S  Φ)
where pi ilt = P (St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Ht = ht ) is the likelihood that si is the true security state and
ϕl is the true type given the realized information ht . The space ∆(S  Φ) is the probability
simplex over the state-type space S  Φ. Notice that pit is a doubly-stochastic matrix for
each t ; each row represents a probability mass function over the type space for a given state
and each column represents a probability mass function over the space of security states
for a given type.
The defender maintains the belief matrix over time, updating it as new information,
consisting of the current defense action ut and new observation yt+1, is revealed. For a
given defense action ut = u and observation yt+1 = yk , the belief matrix update is de-
fined as pit+1 = [τjm

pit ;u;yk

]ϕm2Φ;sj2S where the (j;m)’th update function, τjm

pit ;u;yk

=

P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Yt+1 = yk ;Πt = pit ), is given by
pi jmt+1 = τjm

pit ;u;yk

=
pujm (pit )r
u
jk
(pit )
σ (pit ;u;yk )
: (.)
The above terms are defined as follows
pujm (pit ) = P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
pi ilt p
u
ijlqlm (.)
rujk (pit ) = P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
pi ilt r
u
ijkl (.)
σ (pit ;u;yk ) = P (Yt+1 = yk j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
sj2S;ϕm2Φ
rujk (pit )p
u
jm (pit ) (.)
where pu
ijl
is the probability of transitioning from state si to sj under defense action u and
attacker type ϕl , qlm is the probability of transitioning between types (note that we assume
that qlm = 1 if l = m, zero otherwise, as mentioned in Section ..), and ruijkl = P (Yt+1 =
yk j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u) is the probability that the IDS generates observation
yk given a transition from state si to sj under defense action u and attacker type ϕl . Addi-
tional details regarding the derivation of the belief update equations, as well as analytical
expressions for pu
ijl
and ru
ijkl
, can be found in the appendix.
The belief at any given time represents the defender’s view of the aacker’s current capa-
bilities and true strategy. The trajectory of beliefs, (pi0;pi1;pi2; : : :), describes how this view
changes over time. As evidenced by Eq. (.), the trajectory of beliefs (given an initial be-
lie) is defined by the sequence of defense actions and observations (security alerts). Since
security alerts are triggered probabilistically by exploit attempts and background events,
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the presence of an alert does not necessarily mean that the attacker is progressing through
the system. That is, an exploit attempt may have triggered an alert but may not have suc-
ceeded, or an alert may have been triggered via a false alarm. Similarly, the absence of
an alert may mean that an exploit was in fact attempted (and successful), but didn’t trig-
ger an alert (due to a missed detection or a stealthy exploit). Since the current belief pit
assigns mass to security states (and attacker types) that are consistent with the available
information, the belief trajectory may assign mass to worsening security states even in the
cases where the underlying security state is unchanging or no alerts are generated. This
characteristic highlights the importance of information in our model, reflecting that the de-
fender’s imperfect observations of the security state and attacker type contribute to a more
pessimistic view of the system’s security over time.
... Assignment of Costs
In many systems, the cyber network needs to remain (at least partially) operational while
subject to an attack. The defender thus has two objectives: i) maintaining the availability of
the system, and ii) keeping the attacker away from goal conditions. These two factors are
largely in opposition of each other. If the defender were only concerned with maintaining
the availability of the system, it would not perform any system modifications, leaving the
system to run uninterrupted and in turn not interfering with the progression of the attacker.
On the other hand, if the defender were just concerned with preventing the attacker from
reaching goal conditions, it would immediately execute aggressive system changes in order
to block as many exploits as possible and maximally disrupt the attacker’s progression
through the system. Unfortunately, this latter option is clearly very costly to the availability
of the system. It is evident that one must strike a trade-off between these two extremes of
availability and security.
In order to quantify this trade-off, we construct a cost function that takes into account

both the quality of the current security state and the negative impact to availability of each
defense action. Specifically, we assign a security cost, cs : S  Φ ! R, to capture the cost
of the system being in various security states s 2 S under different attacker types as well
as an availability cost, cu : U ! R, for each defense action that is deployed. Using the
definition of a goal condition at the end of Section .., we can define the notion of a goal
state.
Definition .. (Goal state). A goal state is defined as a security state s 2 S that contains
one or more goal conditions, that is, there exists some j 2 s such that j 2 Nд.
We denote the space of all goal states by Sд  S. Goal states are undesirable from the
perspective of the defender and are thus assigned a higher cost than non-goal states, that
is, 0  cs (s0;ϕ)  cs (s00;ϕ) < 1 for s0 < Sд, s00 2 Sд, ϕ 2 Φ. Although not a requirement,
we can impose the additional property that for any two security states s0; s00 2 S where
s0  s00, we have c (s0;ϕ)  c (s00;ϕ), reflecting the fact that if the attacker has enabled
more conditions, it should be more costly for the defender. To model the availability factor,
we assign an availability cost for each defense action, denoted by cu (u0). Recall that each
defense actionu0 2 U is a collection of systemmodifications. Some combinations of system
modifications may have little to no impact to availability while other combinations may
render important elements of the underlying system unavailable. The assignment of the
costs cu (u0), for each u0 2 U , allows one to incorporate such information (combinations of
system modifications that severely impact availability should be assigned a very high cost).
We assume that 0  cu (u0) < 1 for every u0 2 U . The cost for taking defense action ut in
security state st under attacker type ϕt is defined as
c (st ;ϕt ;ut ) = wcs (st ;ϕt ) + (1  w )cu (ut ) (.)
where 0  w  1 is a weighting term that allows the defender to specify which factor is

more important, wherew = 0 (w = 1) corresponds to only being concernedwith availability
(resp. security).
... Defender’s Problem
The defender wishes to determine an optimal defense action to deploy for any belief that it
may encounter. The decision rule determining this action is termed a defense policy and is
represented by the function γ : ∆(S Φ) !U , mapping a belief matrix pi 2 ∆(S Φ) to a
defense action u 2 U . The problem of determining γ can be cast as a POMDP, represented
by problem (P) below.
min
γ2Γ E
γ
8><>:
1X
t=0
ρtc (Πt ;Ut ) j Π0 = pi0
9>=>; (P)
subject toUt = γ (Πt ) (P-)
Πt+1 = τ (Πt ;Ut ;Yt+1) (P-)
where Γ is the space of admissible defense policies and 0 < ρ < 1 is the discount factor.
The function c (pit ;ϕt ;ut ) represents the expected cost for being in belief state Πt = pit when
defense actionUt = ut is selected and is defined as c (pit ;ut ) = Psi2S;ϕl 2Φ pi ilt c (si ;ϕl ;ut ) where
c (s;ϕ;u) is the state-action cost function defined in Eq. (.). The current actionUt must be
generated according to the defense policy γ , as demonstrated by constraint (P-), and the
next belief Πt+1 must obey the update τ (Πt ;Ut ;Yt+1), constraint (P-).
The solution to problem (P) is an optimal defense policy, denoted by γ  2 Γ, which
specifies an optimal defense action for every possible belief pi 2 ∆(SΦ) that the defender
can possess. Following the optimal policy results in the minimum expected discounted
cost over the infinite time-horizon, t = 0; 1; : : :. In other words, taking into account all
uncertainty in the problem, the defense policyγ  generates actions that achieve the desired
tradeoff as dictated by the cost function in Section ...

.. Computation of Defense Policies
While the embedding of a state space on the dependency graph allows for one to accurately
quantify the level of progression of the attacker, the high dimensionality of the resulting
defense problem leads to significant scalability concerns. One approach to solving the de-
fense problem is to adopt an offline POMDP solver. Such solvers aim to explicitly solve the
problem by computing the optimal action for every belief that can be encountered, prior to
runtime. In spite of the fact that significant improvements have been made in the efficiency
of offline solvers in recent years, e.g. [Kurniawati et al., ], the requirement to specify
an action for every possible encountered scenario often leads to an intractable problem.
Online solvers represent an alternate paradigm in which one only considers the possible
future scenarios from the current belief, constructing a local policy during runtime. Online
methods interleave the computation and execution (runtime) phases of a policy [Ross et al.,
], yielding a much more scalable approach than offline methods, making them a more
natural fit for obtaining a solution to the defense problem.
The proposed algorithm for computing defense policies, which we term the online defense
algorithm, is based on an existing online solver developed by Silver & Veness [Silver &
Veness, ], termed the Partially Observable Monte-Carlo Planning (POMCP) algorithm.
While no existing algorithm is immediately applicable for computing defense policies, the
POMCP algorithm requires the fewest modifications to achieve efficient computation.
... e Online Defense Algorithm
Theonline defense algorithm is a heuristic search algorithm for determining defense actions
in real-time as the attacker progresses through the system and security alerts are generated.
The algorithm consists of two main stages: an action selection step and a belief update step.
The action selection step of the online defense algorithm is similar to that of the standard
POMCP algorithm (details pertaining to the specific operation of POMCP, as well as pseu-

docode for the algorithm, can be found in [Silver & Veness, ]). The belief update step
has been modified by taking advantage of the structure of the observation process, enabling
computation in large-scale domains.
The action selection stage of the online defense algorithm operates by performingMonte-
Carlo simulations from the current belief in order to estimate the quality of various defense
actions. Each simulation consists of a call to a generative model, shown in Fig. .. Specifi-
cally, a simulation begins by sampling a state-type pair, (s;ϕ), from the current belief matrix
(approximated by a finite collection of state-type pairs, described in more detail in the fol-
lowing paragraph), and coupled with a given defense action, generates a successor state and
type, as well as an observation and cost, (s0;ϕ0;y; c )  G (s;ϕ;u). Through successive sam-
sample
sample
sample
sample
,
Figure 6.5: The generative model for the dynamic security model. For a given state-type-action triple
(s;ϕ;u), the generative model first determines the set of available exploits, E (s ), then, taking into
account the effect of the defender’s action and attacker type, samples the probability distributions
of the problem (probabilities of attack and success for exploits, and probabilities of detection and
false alarm for observations) in order to generate a next state st+1 = s 0, updated type ϕt+1 = ϕ 0, an
observation yt+1 = y, and a cost c .
pling from the current belief and calls to the generative model, a search tree of histories is
constructed, as shown in Fig. .. Due to the partial observability of the underlying process,

the search tree consists of nodes representing histories, where branches of the tree originat-
ing from the current history represent future possible histories. Each branch begins with
the selection of a defense action, which is selectively sampled using a multi-armed bandit
rule, termed UCB [Auer et al., ], in order to optimally balance exploitation and explo-
ration. That is, selecting presumably promising actions in order to decrease their estimation
error must be balanced with checking other actions in order to rule out better alternatives.
The error associated with each defense action’s quality estimate decreases as the number of
simulations (and the size of the search tree) grows. The online defense algorithm continues
to perform simulations for the given history node, progressively expanding the tree, until
a maximum number of simulations, nsim, has been reached. The defense action that has
the lowest estimated cost is then taken, termed the real-world action, denoted by ur , and a
real-world observation, denoted byyr , is recorded. The relevant branches of the search tree
are identified (shown by the blue/shaded path to node h0 in Fig. .), the remaining tree is
pruned, and a new root node is specified as the current history.
Once an updated history h0 is realized, the defender’s belief must be updated. Due to
the computational complexity associated with updating the belief matrix analytically (see
Eq. (.) and the appendix), the defender maintains a belief approximation, denoted by
Bt , consisting of nk state-type pairs, termed particles. The update of the belief approxima-
tion under the standard POMCP algorithm involves making multiple calls to the generative
model in order to obtain samples (s0;y) wherey exactly matches the real-world observation
yr , at which point s0 is accepted into the updated belief set Bt+1 (repeating until nk particles
have been added). Instances of the security model with large observation spaces allow for
scenarios where the sampled observation rarely matches the real-world observation, pre-
venting the belief from being updated. To address this issue, we propose a modified belief
update that takes advantage of the structure of the observations, that is, how security alerts
are generated as a function of the security state and type. Instead of checking if the sample

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: 
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current history
Figure 6.6: A search tree of histories. Each node in the search tree represents a history. The root
node represents the current history from which simulations begin. Each descendant of the root
node represents a possible future history, for example, a possible realized history for htutyt+1ut+1
is htu0yju1. After a real-world action is taken, e.g. ur = u0, and a real-world observation is received,
e.g. yr = yj , the history is updated to h0 (represented by the blue/shaded path).
observation matches the real-world observation for every alert zi 2 Z, the proposed belief
update only checks if the alerts agree over a security state dependent subset of elements
zi 2 Z (s ) = [e2E (s )Z (e ) and probabilistically accepts the particle if this modified condi-
tion is satisfied. The set Z (s ) represents the set of alerts that can be generated by exploit
attempts; alerts not in Z (s ), i.e. any alert in Z¯ (s ) = Z n Z (s ), cannot be generated by
the attempt of any exploit available in state s , as dictated by Eq. (.). The rationale for
restricting the comparison to the elements Z (s ) is due to the fact that these are the only
alerts that are informative for a change in the underlying state. The remaining alerts Z¯ (s )
must have been triggered by false alarms under the current state s . Observations that pass
the modified test are accepted into the updated belief with a probability of acceptance that
depends on the security state and attacker type, pa (s;ϕ). The probability of acceptance is
dictated by the likelihood that the state-type pair (s;ϕ) could have generated the real-world

observation and is defined as pa (s;ϕ) = p¯a (s;ϕ)=d where
p¯a (s;ϕ) =
 Y
i2I (yZ¯ (s )r =1)
ζi (ϕ)
!  Y
i2I (yZ¯ (s )r =0)
(1   ζi (ϕ))
!
and d = max(s;ϕ)2Bt p¯a (s;ϕ) is a normalization term. The set I (yZ¯ (s )r = 1) represents the
indices of the alerts zi 2 Z¯ (s ) where yir = 1 is true (analogously for I (yZ¯ (s )r = 0)). The
normalized probability of acceptance, pa (s;ϕ), ensures that particles are accepted into the
updated belief more frequently than the standard POMCP belief update while ensuring that
the relative mass under the modified belief procedure agrees with what would be achieved
under the standard belief update. The pseudo code for the modified belief update is given
in Algorithm  below.
Algorithm  – Modified Belief Update
Initialize: nk , Bt+1 = ?, numAdded = 0;
: procedureModifiedBeliefUpdae(Bt ,ur ,yr )
: while numAdded < nk do
: (s;ϕ)  Bt
: (s 0;ϕ 0;y; )  G (s;ϕ;ur )
: if yZ (s ) = yZ (s )r then . If alertsZ (s ) match
: Bt+1  Bt+1 [ fs 0;ϕ 0g with probability pa (s;ϕ)
: numAdded numAdded + 1
: end if
: end while
: end procedure
In addition to the modified belief update procedure, a heuristic cost assignment can fur-
ther improve the scalability of the online defense algorithm. A key bottleneck for tree-based
heuristic search algorithms in large-scale domains is the rate at which the search tree grows
as a function of the depth from the root node, termed the branching factor. Problem in-
stances with many actions and observations result in search trees with large branching
factors, preventing the search algorithm from being able to search beyond a small depth,

resulting in a poor quality, myopic policy. To avoid this, we can assign non-zero costs to
security states that are close to goal states. A simple procedure for such a cost assignment
is to assign higher costs to states that require fewer successful exploits to reach a goal state.
Such a heuristic cost assignment makes simulations more informative, decreasing the re-
quired search depth (and simulations) and resulting in more effective defense policies.
Using the above ideas, we are able to effectively scale the online defense algorithm to
large instances of our dynamic security model. Defense policies were successfully com-
puted for a graph consisting of 134 conditions (nodes), 143 exploits (hyperedges), 64 de-
fense actions, and 30 security alerts (resulting in over 109 possible observation vectors).
The resulting number of security states exceeded 100 million.
... An Illustrative Example
We investigate an illustrative example of the defense problem using the sample dependency
graph of Fig. .. We assumena = 3 attacker types of varying aggression (described by their
probabilities of attack and success, dictating the rate of movement through the system),
knowledge (described by the separation between αej (ϕi ) and αej (ϕi ) terms in Eq. (.)), and
stealthiness (described by the probabilities of detection and false alarm). Specifically, the
three attack types Φ = fϕ1;ϕ2;ϕ3g capture the following behavior.
aggression knowledge stealthiness
ϕ1 low low low
ϕ2 moderate high high
ϕ3 high moderate moderate
The problem parameters that capture the above behavior are now defined. Probabilities

of attack for each exploit under each attacker type ϕi 2 Φ are

αej (ϕ1);αej (ϕ1)

= (0:5; 0:5) for all ej 2 E0
αej (ϕ1);αej (ϕ1)

= (0:3; 0:3) for all ej 2 E n E0
αej (ϕ2);αej (ϕ2)

= (0:8; 0:1) for ej 2 E0
αej (ϕ2);αej (ϕ2)

= (0:7; 0:3) for ej 2 fe4; e5; e10; e12; e13g
αej (ϕ2);αej (ϕ2)

= (0:6; 0:4) for ej 2 fe6; e7; e8; e9g
αej (ϕ3);αej (ϕ3)

= (0:7; 0:4) for ej 2 E0
αej (ϕ3);αej (ϕ3)

= (0:6; 0:4) for ej 2 fe4; e5; e10; e12; e13g
αej (ϕ3);αej (ϕ3)

= (0:6; 0:5) for ej 2 fe6; e7; e8; e9g:
Notice the separation between αej (ϕi ) and αej (ϕi ) for attacker types ϕ2 and ϕ3, reflecting a
higher level of assumed knowledge than type ϕ1. Similarly, probabilities of success are
βej (ϕ1) = 0:5 for all ej 2 E0
βej (ϕ1) = 0:4 for all ej 2 E n E0
βej (ϕ2) = 0:6 for all ej 2 E0
βej (ϕ2) = 0:5 for all ej 2 E n E0
βej (ϕ3) = 0:7 for all ej 2 E0
βej (ϕ3) = 0:6 for all ej 2 E n E0:
Probabilities of detection are provided in Table .. Notice that increased stealthiness is
represented by a lower probability of detection. Lastly, the probability of false alarm for
each alert zi under each type is ζi (ϕ1) = 0:4, ζi (ϕ2) = 0:5, and ζi (ϕ3) = 0:6. The space

e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13
z1
0:8 0:1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:4 0 0
0:3 0:4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:3 0 0
0:5 0:6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:3 0 0
z2
0 0:6 0:8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:6 0 0
0 0 0:4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:2 0 0
0 0:4 0:5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:5 0 0
z3
0 0 0 0:5 0 0:6 0:1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0:4 0 0:4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0:5 0 0:5 0:4 0 0 0 0 0 0
z4
0 0 0 0 0:7 0 0:7 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0:3 0 0:5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0:4 0 0:6 0 0 0 0 0 0
z5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:7 0:6 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:4 0:3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:5 0:4 0 0 0 0
z6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:4 0:7 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:2 0:5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:3 0:6 0 0 0
z7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:7 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:6 0
z8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:6
Table 6.1: Table of probabilities of detection for each attacker type. Columns represent attempted
exploits wheres rows represent the triggered alert. Each entry represents the probability of detection,
for a given exploit ei (column) and alert zj (row), for each type (from top to bottom), δi j (ϕ1), δi j (ϕ2),
and δi j (ϕ3):
of defense actions is constructed as the powerset of a set of binary defense actions, that
is U = P (fu1;u2;u3;u4g), resulting in a total of jU j = 24 = 16 defense actions. Each
binary defense action induces a set of blocked exploits, defined as B (u1) = fe1; e2; e3; e4g,
B (u2) = fe5; e7; e11g, B (u3) = fe8; e9; e10g, and B (u4) = fe12; e13g. The set of exploits that
a defense action ut 2 U blocks is equal to the union of the blocked exploits of the binary
defense actions that it contains, that is, B (ut ) = Sui2ut B (ui ). Security states are assigned
a cost of 1 for each goal condition, Nд = fc11; c12g, that is contained in the state. The cost
of each binary defense action is cu (ui ) = 0:25, for all i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g. The cost weight in

Eq. (.) is set to w = 0:5 and the discount factor is ρ = 0:95. There are ns = 215 security
states (computed offline) and nz = 8 security alerts leading to jY j = 28 = 256 observation
vectors. All simulations for the example use nk = 1200 particles to approximate the belief.
The problem is assumed to start from the empty (safe) security state s0 = ?. The defender
is initially completely uncertain of the true attacker type, reflected by a uniform belief over
all attacker types. A sample evolution of the defense problem is illustrated in Fig. ..
Figure 6.7: Sample evolution of the defense problem. The current (true) security state st is repre-
sented by the tagged nodes. The true attacker type is represented by the tagged node in the panel to
the left of each graph; the true type for the above simulation is ϕ2. The defender’s (marginal) proba-
bility for both the security state and true type is represented as a heat-map (representing values via
colors), computed from the current belief state pit , where a darker shade represents a higher proba-
bility. Blocked exploits B (ut ), represented by shaded hyperedges, and the observation vector yt+1
are displayed beneath each graph. The above sample evolution was performed using nsim = 5000
simulations.

The computed defense policy is intuitive. Initially, in order to save on availability costs,
the defense policy does not block any exploits. During this period of inaction, the defender’s
belief gradually assigns mass to worsening security states based on the received security
alerts. The belief over the true attacker type (represented by the panel to the left of each
graph in Fig. .) is also updated as a function of the received alerts. Eventually the defense
policy begins to deploy defense actions, blocking exploits that it believes are available to
the attacker, as dictated by Eq. (.). The defense actions serve two purposes. First, the
actions slow down the progression of the attacker through the system in the event that any
of the blocked exploits are attempted. Second, the actions (along with the received obser-
vations) help the defender to gather information, serving to reduce its uncertainty of the
true security state and attacker type. In order to lessen the negative impact to availability,
the defense policy may prescribe the null action in some time-steps, as seen in t = 17; 18.
In these cases, the defender will briefly wait for the attacker to progress before blocking
exploits further downstream (as discussed at the end of Section .., only blocking not yet
successful exploits will impede the attacker’s progression). This idle behavior only occurs
in the early stages of the attack when the attacker is believed to be far from reaching a goal
condition. When the defender’s belief reflects that the attacker is close to reaching a goal
condition,†† the defense policy has no option but to block the exploit(s) that would allow
the attacker to reach its goal(s), e.g. exploits e12 and e13 in time-steps t = 40 – 42 of Fig.
.. This defense action is persistent, resulting in the corresponding exploits being blocked
for all subsequent time-steps. In summary, the defense policy initially behaves passively,
placing priority on preserving availability, only deploying defense actions to slow the at-
tacker and gain information. As the defender becomes more certain of the security state
over time, it identifies and persistently blocks the exploits that would allow the attacker to
††In the event that the attacker has gained many conditions in a short period of time and the defender does
not yet have a good estimate of the security state or attacker type, the defense policy will be more aggressive,
blocking many exploits, until the defender’s uncertainty is reduced.

reach a goal condition.
The defender’s belief over the true attacker type exhibits more uncertainty than its belief
over the security state. This is expected since the observed security alerts are more infor-
mative for the current progression of the attacker, i.e. the security state, than they are for
inferring the true attacker type. In other words, the observed security alerts are largely
consistent with the range of attacker behavior specified by the type space Φ. Nevertheless,
the defender eventually becomes confident of the true attacker type (see time-steps t = 40
– 42 in Fig. .), and even under the lack of complete certainty, is able to prescribe defense
decisions that prevent the attacker from reaching the goal conditions.
The performance of the online defense algorithm improves as the number of simulation
iterations nsim increases, as shown by the plots in Fig. .. For low simulation counts, e.g.
nsim = 500, the defense policy makes selections based on poor-quality estimates of the
actions. This causes the defense policy to be overly aggressive initially, prescribing to block
exploits from time-step t = 0 and unnecessarily restricting availability. Furthermore, due
to the poor-quality estimates, the resulting defense policy also allows the attacker to reach
a goal condition in many of the sample runs. As the number of simulations increases, more
possible future histories are taken into account, resulting in higher quality estimates of
actions and a better performing defense policy (as evidenced by the remaining plots in Fig.
.). The number of times that the attacker reaches a goal state decreases as the number of
simulations increases. For nsim = 5000, the attacker failed to reach any goal in all of the 
sample runs.
... A Remark on the Processing of Security Alerts
A particularly desirable feature of our state-based dynamic security model is in regard to
how security alerts are processed, specifically false alarms. Existing approaches, such as the
CSM (cooperating securitymanagers) system of [White et al., ] or the EMERALD (event

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Figure 6.8: Discounted costs of sample paths for various simulation counts. The behavior of the
defense policy (for the example system of Fig. 6.2) is demonstrated for simulation counts nsim =
500; 1000; 2000; 3000; 4000; 5000. The simulations for each value of nsim are initiated by randomly
assigning a true attacker type uniformly fromΦ = fϕ1;ϕ2;ϕ3g. For each value ofnsim, the discounted
cost is plotted (versus the time-step) for 20 sample paths. Trajectories that terminate in a marker
represent sample paths where the attacker reached a goal state.
monitoring enabling response to anomalous live disturbances) system developed by [Porras
&Neumann, ], attempt to deal with false alarms by definingmetrics that reflect both the
severity of an attack and the confidence that it is a real intrusion. In the presence of a high-
rate of false alarms, these metric-based approaches can incorrectly classify benign security
alerts as real intrusions. The state-based approach of our model avoids this drawback. Since
the security state precisely describes what exploits are available to the attacker, via the set
E (s ) in Eq. (.), the defender is able to use the likelihood of the individual security states
in its belief to weigh new security information. To see this, consider the following example:

Consider belief matrices pi ;pi 0 2 ∆(S  Φ) such that for some security state si 2 S and
type ϕl 2 Φ, pi il > 0 and pi 0il = 0. Let there be a single available exploit in state si , that is,
E (si ) = feg and assume that if exploit e is attempted, it generates the unique alert z (that
is, no other exploit attempt can trigger alert z). If the defender possesses belief pi and sees
alert z, then the belief update allows for the possibility of the alert being generated by an
attempt of exploit e . On the other hand, if pi 0 is the current belief and alert z is received, the
defender can say with certainty that the alert was a false alarm. In general, the likelihood of
the individual security states in the current belief influence how security alert information
is processed. In our simulations, we have observed that even in situations where the false-
alarm rate is high, the defender is able to accurately track the true security state over time.
.. Conclusion
Thecomplex nature of sophisticated cyber attacks necessitates the development of a defense
system that is capable of prescribing defense actions in real-time that both mitigate the at-
tack and preserve availability, all while enabling a solution that scales to realistically-sized
cyber networks. Furthermore, the defense scheme must be able to operate under uncer-
tainty of the attacker’s strategy, the inherently noisy security alert information generated
by the intrusion detection system, as well as use the evaluated effectiveness of previously
deployed defense actions to influence future defense decisions. The state-based model in-
troduced in this chapter addresses all of the above mentioned concerns. Specifically, using
ideas from stochastic control theory, we can precisely model how the security status of the
system evolves as a function of both the attacker’s and defender’s actions and formulate
how the defender can use its imperfect information to specify optimal defense actions over
time. Scalability is achieved via a sample-based, online defense algorithm that takes advan-
tage of the structure of the security model to enable computation in large-scale domains.

C 
On Monotonicity Properties of
Optimal Policies for POMDPs on
Partially Ordered Spaces
Man deciion poblem possess state-spaces where not all states are comparable. For
example, in security settings we cannot always say whether one security state is safer than
another state. Similarly, the observation signals that we receive from the environment are
also not comparable. In this chapter, we investigate such settings in the context of POMDPS
and aim to derive conditions to ensure that the optimal policy is monotone in the belief.
While an intuitive property, the result is non-trivial to show, requiring us to propose a new
stochastic order and a corresponding class of order-preserving matrices.

.. Introduction
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) model settings in which deci-
sions must be made over time subject to imperfect information of the underlying status
of the system. They have found applications in a multitude of practical settings includ-
ing scheduling, optimal stopping, learning theory, threat and failure response, spoken di-
alogue systems, robot navigation, and many more. Unfortunately, obtaining a solution to
the POMDP, that is, solving for an optimal decision rule (termed an optimal policy), is a
computationally difficult process, particularly for the high-dimensional problems found in
realistic decision environments.
Structural results for POMDPs investigate conditions under which optimal policies pos-
sess desirable properties. For example, one such structural result involves determining con-
ditions under which the optimal policy is increasing in the information/belief state, termed
amonotone policy. Establishing such structure not only simplifies the search for an optimal
policy (often a set of numbers is sufficient for characterizing monotone policies; [Lovejoy,
]), but also provides insight into the problem, quantifying the relationship between
optimal policy structure and the information pattern of the problem.
... Literature Review
Questions concerning the structure of optimal policies are fundamental to decision analy-
sis, spanning back to the seminal works of [Girshick & Rubin, ] and [Bellman, ].
Early work in the area, such as that of [Derman & Sacks, ] and [Derman, ], fo-
cused on completely observable settings with the goal of determining the optimal time to
replace a system that is probabilistically degrading over time, so-called replacement rules. In
particular, [Derman, ] studied replacement rules for a completely-observable problem
on a totally-ordered state-space and derived “monotonicity-preserving” conditions on the
transition matrix (i.e. increasing failure rate or IFR) ensuring that the optimal decision rule

takes a control-limit form.
Investigating structural properties in problems of imperfect information represent a sig-
nificant complication, primarily due to the requirement to (partially) order beliefs. The
work of [Ross, ], one of the first to investigate such properties under imperfect informa-
tion (in the context of POMDPs), largely avoids this requirement by considering a two-state
core process, resulting in a total order among beliefs. In his work, Ross introduced an addi-
tional action, inspect, serving to reveal the true state of the system, and derived conditions
that ensured the optimal policy takes an at-most-four-region (AMR) structure.* [Albright,
] considered a two-state process similar to that of [Ross, ], but restricted attention
to actions that transition the system to improved states, rather than reveal information. In-
stead, information is revealed to the decision-maker via a finite set of observations, gener-
ated probabilistically via an observation matrix as a function of the underlying state. Under
monotonicity conditions on the transition matrix and reward functions, as well as the as-
sumption that the observation matrix is totally positive of order  (TP2), see [Karlin, ],
the optimal policy is monotone in the belief. Albright illustrates the difficulties associated
with considering more than two core states, demonstrating that one loses important mono-
tonicity properties of the belief update when first-order stochastic dominance is used to
order beliefs. Nevertheless, building upon the structural results of [Porteus, ], [White,
] managed to derive sufficient conditions to ensure that optimal replacement policies
are monotone under first-order stochastic dominance (complementing the completely ob-
servable and unobservable cases studied in [White, ]). While a significant contribution
to the field, White’s conditions are fairly restrictive, requiring an upper bound on the dis-
count factor in addition to monotonicity conditions on the model parameters. [Lovejoy,
] derived less strict conditions by ordering beliefs using the monotone likelihood ratio
*[Rosenfield, a, Rosenfield, b] also derived conditions to ensure the AMR property under a
slightly different paradigm in which the state consists of the pair (i;k ), representing that it has been k time-
steps since the state was known to be in state i .

order, a stronger partial order than first-order stochastic dominance. In his work, Lovejoy
presents natural sufficient conditions (monotonicity conditions and TP2 transitionmatrices)
that ensure monotone optimal replacement policies, avoiding the requirement to bound the
discount factor.
The strength of the partial order used to compare beliefs is intimately related to the re-
strictiveness of the conditions involved for establishing the structural result. The conditions
of [White, ] involve comparing beliefs in a first-order stochastic dominance sense, re-
sulting in more restrictive conditions than those obtained when beliefs are compared using
the stronger monotone likelihood ratio of [Lovejoy, ]. The reason for this disparity
arises directly from the fact that the monotone likelihood ratio, unlike first-order stochas-
tic dominance, is preserved under conditioning on new information, as demonstrated in
[Lovejoy, ]. This property illustrates that the monotone likelihood ratio order is a
more fitting stochastic order than first-order stochastic dominance for problems of imper-
fect information.
... Contribution
In this chapter, we extend the results of [Lovejoy, ] to problems where the underly-
ing state-space is partially ordered. With the exception of [White, ], the majority of
existing work considers settings where the underlying state-space is totally ordered. The
motivation for considering a partially ordered state-space is largely a practical one; many
problems have state-spaces where one cannot necessarily label every state as beer orworse
than other states. Our model also considers observations that are partially ordered, mod-
eling the fact that the quality of signals received from the environment is not always com-
parable. Under this setting, we investigate a similar topic as that of [White, , Lovejoy,
], namely the structure of optimal replacement policies. Specifically, we consider two
actions, one that lets the system operate uninterrupted and another that transitions the

system to the best state with certainty (a problem that is often referred to as the machine
replacement problem) and investigate conditions that ensure the optimal replacement policy
is monotone in the belief.
Themodel of this chapter ismotivated by a stylized version of the dynamic securitymodel
of Chapter . Consider a setting in which the attacker is progressively moving through the
cyber network toward its goal(s) and the defender, using noisy security alerts, constructs
a belief of the attacker’s progression and attempts to determine when to reset the system
to the initial (empty) security state. Under the natural subset order, the space of security
states is partially ordered. A primary objective of the present chapter is to investigate if
optimal policies for problems of this type exhibit any structure.
Due to the partial ordering of the underlying state-space, the standard monotone likeli-
hood ratio definition does not apply. We propose a generalized definition of the monotone
likelihood ratio, termed the generalized monotone likelihood ratio, along with a class of ma-
trices, termed generalized totally positive of order , that preserve this order. Our proposed
stochastic order possesses many desirable properties, permitting natural sufficient condi-
tions to guarantee monotone optimal policies. The conditions we obtain are qualitatively
similar to those of [Lovejoy, ], with the addition of a condition (on the observation
probabilities) directly arising from the fact that the state and observation spaces are only
partially ordered.
.. e Partially Observable Sequential Decision Model
Consider a finite time-horizon of lengthT . At each time t , the state of the system takes on
one of finitely many states from the set S = fs1; : : : ; sng, where s1 is termed the best state
and sn the worst state. The controller has access to two actions,U = fu0;u1g, where u0 lets
the system evolve uninterrupted and u1 transitions the system to state s1 with certainty.
Actions are costly – for a given state-action pair, an instantaneous cost c (st ;ut ) is incurred.

Let c (st ) denote the cost at the terminal stage, t = T . Given the current state st = si and
current action ut = u, the system evolves probabilistically as dictated by the conditional
transition probability matrices Pu , u 2 U , with elements puij = P (St+1 = sj j St = si ;Ut = u).
The controller does not observe the underlying state st perfectly, instead it receives an
observationyk 2 Y = fy1; : : : ;ymg, at each time t , as dictated by the conditional observation
(emission) matrix R, with elements rjk = P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ). Notice for our model
that, without loss of generality, the conditional observation probabilities are assumed to
be independent of the control action. For a given iteration, events unfold in the following
order:
) A control action, ut = u 2 U , is specified.
) A state-dependent cost, c (st ;ut ), is incurred.
) The state transitions to st+1 2 S as dictated by the transition probabilities
puij = P (St+1 = sj j St = si ;Ut = u).
) An observation yt+1 2 Y is received as dictated by the conditional observation prob-
abilities rjk = P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ).
The information available to the controller at time t , represented by the history of actions
and observations (as well as the distribution pi0 over the initial state), denoted by ht =
(pi0;u0;y1;u1;y2; : : : ;ut 1;yt ), can be summarized by a probability mass function over the
state-space S, termed an information state or belief pit 2 ∆(S) ([Åström, ], [Kumar
& Varaiya, ]). The i’th component of belief pi 2 ∆(S) is the conditional probability
that the system is in state si 2 S given a history of ht , that is, pii = P (St = si j Ht = ht ).
Given new information, consisting of the current action ut and the observation yt+1, the
belief is updated according to the recursive function τ : ∆(S)  U  Y ! ∆(S) as pit+1 =

τ (pit ;ut ;yt+1) = (τ1(pit ;ut ;yt+1); : : : ;τn (pit ;ut ;yt+1)) where each τj (pi ;u;yk ) is given by
τj (pi ;u;yk ) =
Pn
i=1 piip
u
ijrjk
σ (pi ;u;yk )
(.)
where
σ (pi ;u;yk ) =
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
piip
u
ijrjk : (.)
For later convenience, define σ (pi ;u) 2 ∆(Y ) as a probability mass function consisting of
elements σ (pi ;u;yk ) over all yk 2 Y for a fixed (pi ;u), and ri 2 ∆(Y ) as a probability mass
function consisting of elements rik over all yk 2 Y .
The objective of the controller is to specify a control action at each time in order to
minimize the expected discounted cost over the time horizon, given by
E
266664
T 1X
t=1
ρtc (st ;ut ) + ρ
Tc (sT )
377775
where ρ 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The rule designating this choice is termed a control
policy, denoted by д = (д1;д2; : : : ;дT ), where each дt is a function mapping an element of
the probability simplex over S, denoted by ∆(S), to a control action in U . The optimal
control policy, denoted by д, is the control policy that achieves the minimum expected
total discounted cost.
The optimal policy can be characterized by the value function. Following [Porteus, ],
[White, ], and [Lovejoy, ], define the function η : ∆(S) U B(S) ! R as
η(pi ;u;V ) =
nX
i=1
piic (si ;u) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u;yk )V (τ (pi ;u;yk )) (.)
whereB(S) be the set of bounded, real functions on ∆(S). The value function, denoted by

V t , maps each belief pi 2 ∆(S) to a value representing the best that one can do from the
given belief. Using the definition of h, the value function at any time t is given by
V t (pi ) = min
u2U
 
η(pi ;u;V t+1)

:
Similarly, the optimal control policy д = (д1;д2; : : : ;дT ), dictating the optimal control
action at each time t , is given by
дt (pi ) = argmin
u2U
 
η(pi ;u;V t+1)

: (.)
It is assumed that the states inS are partially ordered by<, forming the partially ordered
set (poset) (S;<). Two states s; s0 2 S are said to be unorderable, denoted by s k s0, with
respect to the partial order < if neither s < s0 nor s0 < s . Furthermore, it is assumed that
the observation space Y is partially ordered by <Y , forming the poset (Y;<Y ), where
unorderable observations y;y0 2 Y are denoted by y kY y0. Lastly, assume that the action
spaceU is totally ordered by , such that u1  u0. Without loss of generality, assume that
states and observations are indexed according to their respective partial orders, that is, if
si < sj (yk <Y yl ) then we index si and sj (yk and yl ) such that i  j (k  l ).
.. Preliminary Definitions
The structural results we are interested in obtaining in this paper require one to be able
to compare beliefs, that is, to say when one belief pi is larger than another belief pi 0. This
necessitates the use of stochastic orders. Two such stochastic orders that will be useful
for later discussion are first-order stochastic dominance and the monotone likelihood ratio
order, defined below.
Definition .. (First-order Stochastic Dominance). Given elements pi ;pi 0 2 ∆(S), pi is said

to be greater than pi 0 with respect to first order stochastic dominance (FOSD), wrien pi <s pi 0,
if Pji pij  Pji pi 0j for all i = 1; : : : ;n.
Definition .. (Monotone Likelihood Ratio). Given elements pi ;pi 0 2 ∆(S), pi is said to
be greater than pi 0 with respect to the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR), wrien pi <r pi 0, if
piipi
0
j  pijpi 0i for every i  j.
Themonotone likelihood ratio is a stronger partial order than first-order stochastic dom-
inance, in the sense that if pi <r pi 0 then pi <s pi 0 (shown in [Whitt, ]). The above
definitions apply in the case where the underlying state-space S is totally ordered, that
is, for any two si ; sj 2 S, one can write either si  sj or si  sj . Since the state-space
(and observation-space) is assumed to be partially ordered in our model, we cannot directly
make use of the above definitions.
First-order stochastic dominance has been generalized to the case where the underly-
ing space is partially ordered. Let IK denote the indicator vector, containing a one for all
elements in the set K and a zero otherwise. The definition below, which we refer to as
generalized first-order stochastic dominance (GFOSD), is courtesy of [White, ].
Definition .. (Generalized First-order Stochastic Dominance). Given elements pi ;pi 0 2
∆(S), pi is said to be greater than pi 0 with respect to generalized first order stochastic dom-
inance (GFOSD), wrien pi <дs pi 0, if pi IK  pi 0IK for all K 2 K = fK  S j si 2 K ; sj <
si =) sj 2 K g.
It is worth noting that GFOSD reduces to FOSD (Definition ..) in the case where
the underlying space is totally ordered; the set K reduces to contain sets of the form
fs1; : : : ; sng,fs2; : : : ; sng, : : : , fsng (since all states are comparable).
Useful characterizations exist for both FOSD and GFOSD. A common characterization
for FOSD, courtesy of [Stoyan & Daley, ], is as follows: pi is said dominate pi 0 with
respect to <s if and only if Pi pii f (si )  Pi pi 0i f (si ) for all increasing functions f : S ! R.

An analogous characterization for GFOSD is courtesy of [Kamae et al., ]. Let us first
define the notion of<-increasing functions: a function f : S ! R is said to be<-increasing
if for any si ; sj 2 S such that si < sj we have that f (si )  f (sj ). The characterization of
GFOSD, restated in terms of the notation of our paper, is summarized by the following
lemma.
Lemma .. ([Kamae et al., ]). Given elements pi ;pi 0 2 ∆(S), pi is said to dominate pi 0
with respect to <дs if and only if Pi pii f (si )  Pi pi 0i f (si ) for all <-increasing functions f .
.. Generalization of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Order to Partially
Ordered Spaces
As mentioned earlier, unlike FOSD, the (stronger) MLR order survives conditioning upon
new information (see Section  of [Lovejoy, ]). This property allows for more natural
conditions to ensure monotone optimal policies. One issue is that the definition of MLR
assumes that the underlying space is totally ordered, an assumption that does not hold in
our model. As a result, we propose a generalized definition of the MLR order for the case
where the underlying space is partially ordered.
Definition .. (Generalized Monotone Likelihood Ratio). Given elements pi ;pi 0 2 ∆(S), pi
is said to be greater than pi 0with respect to the generalizedmonotone likelihood ratio (GMLR),
wrien pi <дr pi 0, if
piipi
0
j  pijpi 0i for si < sj
piipi
0
j = pijpi
0
i for si k sj :
Notice that if S were totally ordered, there would be no si ; sj 2 S such that si k sj ,
resulting in <дr reducing to <r (Definition ..). Furthermore, analogous to the totally

ordered case where pi <r pi 0 implies pi <s pi 0, the GMLR order is stronger than GFOSD, a
property which is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma ... If pi <дr pi 0 then pi <дs pi 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.. 
An important step in establishing the desired threshold properties is characterizing the
class of matrices that preserve the GMLR order, that is, given pi <дr pi 0, finding the class
of matrices P such that piP <дr pi 0P . In the case where the underlying space is totally
ordered, it is known that the MLR order is preserved by a class of matrices termed totally
positive of order  (TP2), that is, if pi <r pi 0 and P is a stochastic, TP2 matrix then piP <r pi 0P
(see [Karlin, , Karlin & Rinott, ]). We define a generalized notion of TP2 matrices
(in Definition ..) for the case where the underlying space is partially ordered, which we
term generalized totally positive of order 2 (GTP2), and show (in Proposition ) that stochastic
matrices of this type are sufficient for preserving the GMLR order.
Definition .. (Generalized Totally Positive of Order 2). A matrix P 2 Rnn is said to be
generalized totally positive of order 2 (GTP2) if for every sk < sl
pl jpki   pkjpli  0 for si < sj
pl jpki   pkjpli = 0 for si k sj
Proposition . If pi <дr pi 0 and P is a stochastic, GTP2 matrix then piP <дr pi 0P .
Proof. See Appendix D.. 
.. Main Result: Sufficient Conditions for Optimal reshold Policies
Establishing threshold properties of optimal policies involve deriving the appropriate con-
ditions on the state dynamics, observation dynamics, and structure of the instantaneous

and terminal cost functions. The main result, stated below in Theorem .., provides suffi-
cient conditions for optimal policies to be monotone in the belief with respect to the GMLR
order.
eorem ... If pi <дr pi 0 and the following conditions hold
(a) c (s ) is increasing in s on (S;<)
(b) c (s;u) is increasing in s on (S;<) for each u 2 U
(c) c (s;u1)   c (s;u0) is decreasing in s on (S;<)
(d) Pu is GTP2 for each u 2 U
(e) rikrjl = rjkril if either si k sj and yk <Y yl , or si < sj and yk kY yl
() ri <дr rj for all si < sj in S
then дt (pi )  дt (pi 0) for all t .
The remainder of Section . will be dedicated to proving the above theorem. The results
proceed by demonstrating, in Section .., that conditions (a), (b), and (d) – () ensure that
the value functions are increasing in the belief with respect to the GMLR order, that is,
the value functions are increasing on the poset (∆(S);<дr ). This result is formally stated in
Lemma ... Next, an additional condition, (c), on the instantaneous cost function (decreas-
ing differences), along with a result from [Topkis, ], ensures that the optimal policy is
also monotone on the poset (∆(S);<дr ). The section concludes in Section .. with the
proof of Theorem ...
... Monotonicity of the Value Functions
Establishing monotonicity of the value functions on the poset (∆(S);<дr ), that is, showing
that V t (pi )  V t (pi 0) for any pi <дr pi 0, requires first establishing some properties of the

information dynamics. Specifically, the lemmas below (Lemmas .. and ..) character-
ize monotonicity properties of the belief update function τ in both the observation and the
belief. Lemma .. introduces an assumption on the observation process, in turn establish-
ing equivalence between monotonicity of the belief update in y on the observation poset
(Y;<Y ), for a fixed belief and action, and monotonicity of the observation pm’s ri 2 ∆(Y )
in si . Lemma .. shows equivalence between monotonicity of the belief update in pi on
the poset (∆(S);<дr ), for a fixed action and observation, and preservation of the order be-
tween MLR-orderable beliefs. Lemmas .. and .. are the partially ordered analogues
to Lemma ., parts () and (), of the totally ordered setting found in [Lovejoy, ].
Lemma ... Assume that rikrjl = rjkril if either si k sj in S and yk <Y yl in Y , or si < sj
in S and yk kY yl in Y . en for any pi 2 ∆(S) and u 2 U ,
τ (pi ;u;yk ) <дr τ (pi ;u;yl )
for all yk <Y yl in Y if and only if ri <дr rj for all si < sj in S.
Proof. See Appendix D.. 
Lemma ... For any u 2 U and yk 2 Y ,
τ (pi ;u;yk ) <дr τ (pi 0;u;yk )
for all pi <дr pi 0 in ∆(S) if and only if piP <дr pi 0P for all pi <дr pi 0 in ∆(S).
Proof. See Appendix D.. 
Before showingmonotonicity of the value function, the following result regarding stochas-
tic ordering of the pm’sσ (pi ;u) 2 ∆(Y ), pi 2 ∆(S);u 2 U will be useful. This result, shown
in Lemma .. below, follows from the conditions that Pu is GTP2 for each u 2 U and the
pm’s ri 2 ∆(Y ) are increasing on (∆(Y );<дr ) in si on (S;<).

Lemma ... If pi <дr pi 0 and the following conditions hold
. Pu is GTP2 for each u 2 U
. ri <дr rj for all si < sj in S
then σ (pi ;u) <дs σ (pi 0;u) for each u 2 U .
Proof. See Appendix D.. 
Using Lemmas .. through .. and imposing monotonicity conditions on the instan-
taneous and terminal cost functions enable one to show that the optimal value function is
increasing on the poset (∆(S);<дr ).
Lemma ... Let pi <дr pi 0 and assume the following conditions hold
. c (s ) is increasing in s on (S;<)
. c (s;u) is increasing in s on (S;<) for each u 2 U
. Pu is GTP2 for each u 2 U
. rikrjl = rjkril if either si k sj and yk <Y yl , or si < sj and yk kY yl
. ri <дr rj for all si < sj in S
then V t (pi )  V t (pi 0) for all t .
Proof. See Appendix D.. 
... Proof of the Main Result
Recall the function η : ∆(S) U B(S) ! R of Eq. (.) and consider Lemma .. below,
a special case of Lemma . from [Topkis, ], restated using the notation of our model.

Lemma .. ([Topkis, ]). If η(pi ;u;V t+1) has decreasing differences in (pi ;u) on the space
(∆(S);<дr ) U , then there exists a function дt (pi ) = argminu2U

η(pi ;u;V t+1)

that is
nondecreasing in pi on (∆(S);<дr ).
Under condition (c) of Theorem .., Lemma .. allows us to translate monotonicity
of the value function into monotonicity of optimal policies. The proof of Theorem .. is
now possible.
Proof of eorem ... First, we show that η(pi ;u;V t+1) has decreasing differences in (pi ;u)
on (∆(S);<дr )U , that is, η(pi ;u1;V t+1) η(pi ;u0;V t+1) is decreasing on (∆(S);<дr ). Then,
application of Lemma .. proves the result. Recall that τ (pi ;u1;yk ) = v1 for any pi 2 ∆(S),
yk 2 Y , that is, the reset action u1 causes the system state to transition to s1 with certainty.
Using this fact, along with the definition of η, see Eq. (.), we can write the following
η(pi ;u1;V

t+1)   η(pi ;u0;V t+1)
=
nX
i=1
pii (c (si ;u1)   c (si ;u0)) + ρ *,V t+1(v1)  
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u0;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi ;u0;yk ))
+- :
Thus, for pi <дr pi 0, we wish to show
nX
i=1
pii (c (si ;u1)   c (si ;u0)) + ρ *,V t+1(v1)  
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u0;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi ;u0;yk ))
+-

nX
i=1
pi 0i (c (si ;u1)   c (si ;u0)) + ρ *,V t+1(v1)  
mX
k=1
σ (pi 0;u0;yk )V t+1(τ (pi
0;u0;yk ))+- : (.)
By condition (c) of Theorem .., c (si ;u1)   c (si ;u0) is decreasing in si on (S;<). Conse-
quently, since pi <дs pi 0, application of Lemma .. ensures thatPni=1 pii (c (si ;u1)   c (si ;u0))
 Pni=1 pi 0i (c (si ;u1)   c (si ;u0)). Now, to ensure the relationship in Eq. (.) holds, we need

to show that
mX
v=1
σ (pi 0;u0;yk )V t+1(τ (pi
0;u0;yk )) 
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u0;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi ;u0;yk )) (.)
Eq. (.) follows directly from the arguments found in the proof of Lemma .. (see the
arguments for establising the inequalities in Eqs. (D.) and (D.)). Specifically, notice that
by conditions (a), (b), and (d) – (), we have thatV t+1(pi )  V t+1(pi 0) for pi <дr pi 0 by Lemma
... Furthermore, by conditions (d) – (), and Lemmas .., .., and .., monotonicity
of the value function ensures that
mX
k=1
σ (pi 0;u0;yk )V t+1(τ (pi
0;u0;yk )) 
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u0;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi
0;u0;yk )): (.)
Additionally, by condition (d), Lemma .., and monotonicity of the value function, we
have
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi
0;u;yk )) 
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi ;u;yk )) (.)
Eq. (.) follows by the transitivity of Eqs. (.) and (.), and thus η(pi ;u;V t+1) has decreas-
ing differences in (pi ;u) on (∆(S);<дr )  U . Application of Lemma .. ensures that the
optimal policy дt (pi ) = argminu2U

η(pi ;u;V t+1)

is increasing in pi on (∆(S);<дr ). 
.. Visualizing the GMLR Order
The conditions for orderability under GMLR may raise questions as to the existence of
orderable beliefs. For each pair of states, a halfspace in the probability simplex is induced
if the states are orderable whereas a hyperplane is induced if the states are unorderable. In
order to gain some intuition for the set of comparable beliefs under the GMLR order, it is

useful to visualize the order for a given state-space ordering.
Consider a state-space consisting of four states S = fs1; s2; s3; s4g with the ordering s3 <
s1, s3 < s2, s4 < s2, s4 < s1, s1 k s2, and s3 k s4. For the given state-space ordering, Fig. .
constructs the set of comparable beliefs pi 0, for the given belief pi = (0:3; 0:2; 0:1; 0:4), such
that pi <дr pi 0.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 7.1: Construction of orderable beliefs for a given state-space ordering. Halfspaces corresponding to
orderable states are (b) pi3pi 01  pi1pi 03 arising from s3 < s1 with intersect v13 (pi ) =

1   pi1pi1+pi3 ; 0;
pi1
pi1+pi3
; 0

, (c)
pi3pi
0
2  pi2pi 03 from s3 < s2 with v23 (pi ) =

0; pi2pi2+pi3 ; 1  
pi2
pi2+pi3
; 0

, (d) pi4pi 02  pi2pi 04 from s4 < s2 with v24 (pi ) =
0; pi2pi2+pi4 ; 0; 1  
pi2
pi2+pi4

, (e) pi4pi 01  pi1pi 04 from s4 < s1 with v14 (pi ) =

pi1
pi1+pi4
; 0; 0; 1   pi1pi1+pi4

. Hyperplanes
corresponding to unorderable states are (f) pi2pi 01 = pi1pi 02 from s1 k s2 with v12 (pi ) =

1   pi2pi1+pi2 ;
pi2
pi1+pi2
; 0; 0

,
and (g) pi4pi 03 = pi3pi 04 from s3 k s4 with v34 (pi ) =

0; 0; pi3pi3+pi4 ; 1  
pi3
pi3+pi4

. The resulting set of comparable
beliefs pi <дr pi 0 is given by the line in (h).
One can perhaps imagine a state-space ordering that results in no beliefs that are com-
parable to a given belief pi . For instance, if there are many unorderable pairs of states, with
each one inducing a hyperplane in the simplex, the resulting intersection of hyperplanes
could result in the single belief pi . We conjecture that if there are at most k   1 pairs of

unorderable states, where k is the dimension of the probability simplex (e.g. k = 3 in the
above example), then the resulting set of beliefs is non-trivial (in the sense that ∆(S) n fpi g
is nonempty).
.. Discussion & Conclusion
We have derived conditions to ensure monotone optimal policies in the case where the
underlying state-space is partially ordered. While an intuitive property, establishing the
optimality of monotone policies is non-trivial, primarily due to the requirement to select
an appropriate partial order on the belief space. In this chapter, we have introduced a new
partial order, termed the GMLR order, that is appropriate for comparing beliefs when not all
of the underlying states are orderable. Furthermore, we have introduced a class of matrices,
GTP2, that preserve the GMLR order.
The conditions presented in our work are natural and are qualitatively similar to those
of [Lovejoy, ]. Conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem .. require that the instantaneous
and terminal costs are increasing as the state degrades. Condition (c) states that the cost
of doing nothing increases on (S;<) more quickly than the cost of resetting. Condition (d)
is with respect to the state dynamics, requiring that transitions to worse states are more
likely as the state degrades. Condition (e), arising from the partial ordering of the state and
observation spaces, is new and imposes conditions on the observation probabilities. While
we do not have a clear intuition for this requirement, it can be interpreted as a type of
(stochastic) indifference between alternatives (either observations or states) that we can’t
compare. Finally, condition () means that we are more likely to see worse signals from the
environment as the underlying state degrades.

C 
Summary & Directions for
Further Resear
This dissertation has investigated three questions related to decision-making under uncer-
tainty in cyber-physical systems. Specifically, the work has addressed the following ques-
tions: ) In the context of power systems and electricity markets, how can one design
algorithms that guide self-interested agents to a socially optimal and physically feasible
outcome, subject to the fact that agents possess localized information of the system and re-
act to local signals? ) When a system is under attack from a malicious agent, what models
are appropriate for performing real-time and scalable threat assessment and response selec-
tion when we only have partial information about the attacker’s intent and capabilities? )
Under what conditions do optimal policies of POMDPs possess desirable structure (specifi-
cally, monotonicity in the belie)? The discussion that follows reiterates the key points and
contributions involved in answering each of these questions, as well as providing a critique
of the results and suggestions for further research.

Decentralized Operation of Power Systems and Markets
The first question, addressed in Chapters  and , involves the development of models that
capture the salient physical features of the electrical grid and algorithms that permit agents
to reach a socially optimal outcome subject to their informational constraints. A defining
feature of the proposed models is the ability to take into account power losses (via the mod-
ified DC approximation, see Section .) without giving up desirable properties (namely
convexity) that enable one to guarantee convergence. The algorithms that guide agents to
a socially optimal outcome are iterative in nature and involve the exchange of messages. In
Chapter , these messages are the operating point directly (specifically, the voltage phase
angles). Using the operating point as messages allows agents to localize their externality ef-
fects, resulting in a completely decentralized algorithm that efficiently guides agents to the
optimal outcome. In Chapter , a market operator sends price signals to the agents (Dist-
Cos, GenCos, and TransCos) who reply with their optimizers (for a given price, TransCos
undergo a message-exchange process similar to that of Chapter ). Through appropriate
price updating, agents are guided to an outcome that maximizes their financial surpluses
(competitive equilibrium) which is shown to be socially optimal.
The models of chapters  and  can be extended in various ways. While the agents are
self-interested, they are not strategic, in the sense that they do not need to be incentivized
to follow the rules of the algorithm (i.e. they do not try to game the system). Revisiting the
design of these algorithms in the presence of strategic behavior represents an interesting
and challenging research question. Additional extensions to the models include the con-
sideration of a multi-period setting with temporal constraints (e.g. generation ramp limits,
load shifting) and the consideration of stochastic generation and demand.

Dynamic Security of Cyber-Physical Systems
The second question, addressed in Chapter , involves the development of a formal, state-
based sequential decision model. By embedding a state space on the dependency graph, the
model is able to capture the complex nature of the attacker’s progression. Furthermore, by
considering multiple attacker types, the model describes the defender’s uncertainty over
the true strategy of the attacker. Using the received security alerts, the defender maintains
a belief over both the capabilities/progression of the attacker (security state) and its strat-
egy (attacker type). While realistic instances of the model can be very large, the use of a
sampling-based approach avoids the state-space explosion problem and permits efficient
computation of defense policies.
The nature of the computed defense policies hints at rules for secure system design. In
particular, an interesting research direction is to investigate if it is possible to design a
cyber network such that its dependency graph possesses properties that lead to efficient
defense. For instance, secure systems should possess dependency graphs that have many
layers of exploits between entry points (initial exploits) and critical system elements (goal
conditions), requiring that the attacker perform many stages of exploits to reach its goal(s).
Such dependency graphs should also have a small number of initial exploits, minimizing the
number of entry points that the attacker can use to launch an attack. Furthermore, to ease
selection of defense actions, it is desirable for dependency graphs to possess bottlenecks
for the attacker, that is, many attack pathways that all pass through a small number of
exploits. Such a property will allow for the defense policy to prescribe defense actions
that effectively block many pathways while minimizing the negative impact to availability.
In the context of cyber-physical systems, physical functionality of the system should be
spread out across the dependency graph (i.e. one should not be able to exert system-wide
control from a single computer). While this may decrease the functionality of the system
for trusted users, it limits how much damage an attacker can inflict on the physical system

from a given goal condition. Additionally, the defender’s belief over the security state will
be more informative for inferring likely future physical contingencies, permitting more
effective defense of the system.
One can use the dynamic security model of Chapter  as a basis for addressing zero-day
exploits. Recall that the model assumed knowledge of all exploits that the attacker could
use to reach its goal(s). This assumption may not always hold, especially in the case of
sophisticated modern-day attacks (such as Stuxnet, see Section ..). By allowing the de-
fender to possess uncertainty over the structure of the dependency graph, zero-day exploits
can be viewed as edges that the defender does not know exist. The problem of defending
the system would then involve learning the structure of the underlying dependency graph
in addition to selecting defense actions.
Structural Properties of Optimal Policies for POMDPs
The third question is addressed in Chapter  under the assumption that the underlying
state space is only partially ordered. In this setting, a generalized version of the monotone
likelihood ratio (termed the GMLR order, see Definition ..) and an associated class of
order-preserving matrices (termed GTP2, see Definition ..) are introduced. Conditions
are derived that ensure monotone optimal policies, with respect to the GMLR order, in a
two-action POMDP setting.
While the conditions of Theorem .. are quite natural, applying them to the dynamic
security model of Chapter  presents difficulties. To see this, recall the stylized version of
the security model described in Section ... In order to apply Theorem .., one must
first show that the transition matrices are GTP2. The conditions on the security model’s
parameters (probabilities of attack and success) in order to satisfy the GTP2 property turn
out to be very strict due to the additional requirement that the matrix is upper-triangular
(arising from the monotonicity assumption on the attacker’s behavior, Section .). The

conditions on the observation dynamics are similarly difficult to satisfy in the context of
the security model.
Nevertheless, it is straightforward to construct POMDP instances that satisfy the condi-
tions ofTheorem ... In these settings, the results allow one to prune the space of optimal
policies and can thus be useful for designing efficient policy search algorithms. If one can
determine the optimal action for a sample belief then one say something about the optimal
action in beliefs that are comparable to the sample belief. Repeating this process for multi-
ple sample beliefs is informative for knowing the optimal action in regions of the probability
simplex, aiding the search for an optimal policy.
To further increase the applicability of the results, it would be useful to derive analogous
conditions for settings with more than two actions. This extension is non-trivial, primarily
due to the difficulty of ensuring monotonicity properties of the dynamic programming re-
cursion. Furthermore, in the case where not all actions are orderable, one would need to
determine how to partially order the action space.
A Closing Remark
The frequency of breaches in recent months has demonstrated that security events are on
the rise. As our societies become more interconnected and reliant upon technology, these
security events will start to have more disruptive impacts on our lives. Fortunately, as of
now, our society has not been subject to attacks that have impacted our critical infrastruc-
ture. Ensuring that this remains the case will require a persistent and coordinated effort
from industry, government, and academia.

A A
Appendix: A Decentralized Multi-Area
Optimal Power Flow Algorithm
with Power Losses
A.. Benmark of the modified DC approximation
We demonstrate the accuracy of the modified DC approximation by carrying out load flow
analyses under the AC, DC, and modified DC approximations on thirteen test systems with
network sizes ranging from  buses to  buses.* The computational efficiency of each
load flow analysis under the three approximations (AC, DC, and modified DC) is also com-
pared. A Dell PowerEdge R equipped with four AMD Opteron  processors (each
-core, .GHz,  x KB L cache, MB L cache) and GB of RAM was used as the
computing platform for the simulations. Load flow analyses were carried-out in MATLAB.
*Case data obtained from IEEE and Matpower [Zimmerman et al., ].

To provide some perspective on the modified DC power flow approximation, we first re-
call the classical DC approximation. Like the modified DC approximation, the DC approxi-
mation sets all voltages to  p.u. but uses the small angle approximations cos(θn   θm )  1
and sin(θn   θm)  θn   θm resulting in a linear expression in the voltage angles, denoted
by д¯(θnm) = Bnm (θn   θm ). The DC approximation is frequently chosen over the nonlinear
AC equation, see Eq. (.), for a multitude of reasons [Stott et al., ]: it yields unique
solutions, it lends itself to simple and efficient (non-iterative) solution methods, the com-
putation of a solution requires minimal network data, and its linear nature fits well with
market operation. On the other hand, the main concerns of the DC power flow approxima-
tion are the potential inaccuracy of the resulting phase angles and power flows as well as
the fact that it ignores real power losses (this follows from the symmetry of the equation,
д¯(θnm ) =  д¯(θmn)).
The modified DC approximation attempts to solve the concerns of the DC approximation
while yielding a faster solution method than that of the AC power flow. The main value of
modified DC approximation over the classical DC approximation comes from two factors:
) the increased accuracy of the computed phase angles and resulting power flows; ) the
inclusion of real power losses. This improved approximation results from preserving some
of the nonlinearity of the AC equation. Due to this nonlinearity, an iterative method (New-
ton’s method) is needed in order to obtain a solution to the power flow equations (outlined
below).
Load Flow – Modified DC Approximation
Step  – Initialization
Initialize: Set t = 0, 0 = 0 (flat start) and choose stopping threshold ε > 0.
Compute initial mismatch: ∆P(0) =

f1 (
0)   I1; : : : ; fnb (0)   Inb

where fn () = Pm2Nb д(θnm )
and In is the net real power injection at bus i .
Step  – Update

Update Jacobian: [J(t )]i j =
f
@∆P()
@
=t g i j =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
P
k 2R¯i (Bik +Gikθ
t
ik ) if j = i
 Bi j  Gi jθ ti j if j 2 R¯i
0 if j < R¯i
where
θ tik = θ
t
i   θ tk .
Compute mismatch: ∆P(t ) =

f1 (
t )   I1; : : : ; fnb (t )   Inb

Update voltage angle: t+1 = t   J 1 (t )∆P(t )
Step  – Termination
If j j∆P(t ) j j2 < ε , terminate; else, increment counter, t  t + 1, and return to step .
The accuracy and efficiency of the modified DC approximation when tested on the thir-
teen test systems is highlighted in Tables A. – A.. Table A. presents the power flow
and phase angle errors.† In all cases, the modified DC approximation yielded a lower total
power flow error than the DC approximation (computed by summing, over all lines, the
modulus of the power flow errors with respect to the AC load flow solution). Overall, the
modified DC approximation resulted in significant gains in accuracy, especially for large
systems. Power flow losses under the modified DC approximation are very close to those
obtained in the AC load flow solution, as seen in Table A.. In terms of efficiency, the mod-
ified DC approximation exhibited a speedup of about three times compared to the AC load
flow, sometimes nearly reaching a four-fold speedup, as seen in Table A.. The reason for
this is clear; the modified DC approximation only considers real power flows and thus the
Jacobian in the load flow algorithm contains one quarter of the number of elements com-
pared to in the full AC load flow algorithm. As a result, it is less of a computational load to
execute the load flow under the modified DC approximation.
As seen in the benchmark tests, the modified DC approximation offers a good trade-
off between speed (the approximation results in significant speed-up compared to the AC
†The power flow equations are not antisymmetric thus errors are presented for both the forward and
reverse flow directions.
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
case (nb ) total losses relative error
AC mDC
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
 () . . .
Table A.2: Total real power losses (pu) and relative error (infinity norm) of the loss vector obtained from the
modified DC approximation compared to the AC solution.
case (nb ) DC AC mDC speedup
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .- .- .
 () .- .– .- .
 () .- . . .
 () .- . . .
 () .- . . .
 () . . . .
 () . . . .
Table A.3: Execution time (seconds) of the DC, AC, and modified DC load flow methods. The speedup factor
of the modified DC approximation, compared to the AC method, is also included.

method) and accuracy. The modified DC approximation solves many of the concerns of the
DC approximation, such as accuracy of the phase angles and resulting flows and provides
a very good approximation of power losses (even in large systems).
A.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. First, consider a change of variables from angles, Ra , to differences of angles Ra =
AaRa , where Aa 2 R(
P
n2Nab
jR¯n j)( jRa j 1) . We define A¯a 2 R(
P
n2Nab
jR¯n j)jRa j as follows
A¯a=
266666666666664
A¯1a
A¯2a
:::
A¯
nab
a
377777777777775
; where A¯na=
266666666666664
v>n  v>[R¯n]1
v>n  v>[R¯n]2
:::
v>n  v>[R¯n] j R¯n j
377777777777775
;
where vn 2 RjRa j is the standard basis vector (zeros with a one in element n). Matrix Aa
is formed by removing the column of A¯a corresponding to the slack bus index in Ra \ N sb
(since the slack angle is fixed).
We now prove a result concerning the rank of the matricesAa , in Lemma A.., below.
Lemma A... e matrix Aa has full rank, that is, rank(Aa ) = jRa j   1.
Proof. Define Ba := A>a Aa 2 R( jRa j 1)( jRa j 1) as
[Ba]ij =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2jR¯i j if j = i
 2 if j 2 R¯i
0 if j < R¯i
:
Matrix Ba has some special structure. First, notice that Ba is diagonally dominant. Fur-
thermore, since we have removed the column in A¯a corresponding to the slack bus, each

bus i that is immediately connected to the slack bus corresponds to a row i which satisfies[Ba]ii  = [Ba]ii > Pj [Ba]ij  (strict diagonal dominance). As a result, matrix Ba falls within
the class of irreducibly diagonally dominant matrices, known to be non-singular (Theorem
.. of [Horn & Johnson, ]). By the rank relation rank(Aa ) = rank(Ba ) = jRa j   1
(Theorem .. of [Mirsky, ] (p.)), Aa is full rank. 
Using the result of Lemma A.. we proceed to complete the proof of the Lemma. Define
the composition Ca = Fa  Aa , so that Ca (Ra ) = Fa (AaRa ) = Fa (Ra ). We first show the
strong convexity of Fa (Ra ) in Ra . We compute the Hessian of Fa (Ra ) as
r2Ra Fa (Ra ) := Ma (Ra ) + Da (Ra ): (A.)
The matrix Ma (Ra ) = diag(M1a (R1 ); : : : ;M
nab
a (Rnab )) is block-diagonal and symmetric
and Da (Ra ) = diag(D1a (R1 ); : : : ;D
nab
a (Rnab )) is diagonal where Rn (a subvector of Ra )
is the neighboring angle differences with respect to bus n. Submatrices Mna (Rn ) and
Dna (Ri ), n 2 N ab , are
Mna (Rn ) := c
00
n

fˆn (Rn )

mna (Rn )m
n
a (Rn )
>
Dna (Ra ) := c0n

fˆn (Rn )
 jR¯n jX
m=1
G[Rn ]mvmv
>
m
where the column vector mna (Rn ) is defined as
mna (Rn ) :=

B[Rn ]1 +G[Rn ]1[Rn ]1; : : : ;B[Rn ] j R¯n j +G[Rn ] j R¯n j[Rn ]jR¯n j

2 RjR¯n j :
We use fˆn : RjR¯n j ! R to denote the injected power as a function of bus n’s neighboring
angle differences and B[Rn ]m ;G[Rn ]m > 0 to denote susceptance and conductance, respec-
tively, of the line corresponding to the angle difference [Rn ]m. Each Mna (Rn ), n 2 N ab ,

is positive semi-definite since c00n

fˆn (Rn )

 0 by assumption , thus Ma (Ra ) is posi-
tive semi-definite. Each Dna (Rn ) is positive definite due to the fact that Gnm > 0 for all
fn;mg 2 El and c0n

fˆn (Rn )

> 0 by assumption , therefore, Da (Ra )  0. Thus, by
(A.), r2
Ra
Fa (Ra )  0 on ΦRa and hence Fa (Ra ) is strongly convex in Ra . Recall that
Ca = Fa  Aa . Using the strong convexity of Fa (Ra ) in Ra and the fact that Aa is full
rank, we have, for all Ra 2 ΘRa ,
r2RaCa (Ra ) = A>a r2Ra Fa (Ra )Aa  0
and thus Ca (Ra ) is strongly convex in Ra . 

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B.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. Let v = i . The Hessian of ΨiTC (v;), see Eq. (.), with respect to v is given by
r2vvΨiTC

v;

=  12r2vv
 P
(n;m)2~Eil
(λn + λm )д˜(vnm)

, where the first order terms do not
enter into the expression. Define ι = N iTC as the (ordered) set of bus indices of TransCo i

and define
Ajk =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 
X
fj;l g2Eil
(λι j + λιl )Gι j ιl if j = k
 (λι j + λιk )Gι j ιk if fj;k g 2 Eil
0 if fj;k g < Ei
l
for each j;k = 1; : : : ; jι j = jN iTC j. By assumption , there exists an index s 2 ι that cor-
responds to a slack bus. The Hessian r2ΨiTC is defined as matrix A with the s th row and
column removed. Consequently, r2ΨiTC belongs to the class of irreducibly diagonally dom-
inant matrices, known to be non-singular (see Theorem .. of [Horn & Johnson, ]).
To see this, note that the Hessian is diagonally dominant for all rows. Additionally, it is
strictly diagonally dominant in rows that correspond to buses that are immediately con-
nected to a slack bus. By assumption , the diagonal elements of the Hessian are negative
and by Prop. .. of [Cottle et al., ], r2ΨiTC  0. 
B.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. The Hessian of the Lagrangian, denoted by r2xxL, is a square, block-diagonal matrix
of dimension Pi2DC jN iDCe j + Pi2GC jN iGC j + jNb n N sb j. It consists of three blocks, U, C,
and M, where U and C are diagonal matrices consisting of elements (uin)00 (corresponding
to DistCo units) and  (cin)00 (corresponding to GenCo units), respectively. By assumption
, we have U;C  0. Similar to the proof of Lemma .., matrixM can be shown to be an
irreducibly diagonally dominant matrix with a negative diagonal and thus, again by Prop.
.. of [Cottle et al., ],M  0. Since r2xxL is block-diagonal with each block negative
definite, we conclude r2xxL  0. 

B.. Proof of eorem ..
Proof. Consider Problem (Q), defined as
max
!2ΩRW
fG (!) :r(!)= (r1(!); : : : ; rM (!))=0g : (Q)
Also, consider the following definition.
Definition B.. (Global !-max, -min saddle point [Morgan, ]). A point (!ˆ; ˆ ) is a
global !-max, -min saddle point for the Lagrangian M (!; ) = G (!)   >r(!) if and
only ifM (!; ˆ )  M (!ˆ; ˆ )  M (!ˆ; ) 8! 2 Ω,  2 RM .
The proof proceeds in two steps: (i) We prove a general result demonstrating that if
(!ˆ; ˆ ) is a global !-max, -min saddle point for the Lagrangian M then !ˆ is the global
optimum for the problem (Q) (similar to the proof found in [Morgan, ]); (ii) We show
that the pricing process generates a global x-max, -min saddle point for the Lagrangian
L of Problem (P).
Part (i): Assuming that (!ˆ; ˆ ) is a global !-max, -min saddle point, we haveM (!ˆ; ˆ ) 
M (!ˆ; ) for all  . Thus
G (!ˆ)  
MX
m=1
ˆmrm (!ˆ)  G (!ˆ)  
MX
m=1
mrm (!ˆ): (B.)
Let there exist an indexm0 such that rm0 (!ˆ) > 0, then we can choose νm0  0 such that Eq.
(B.) is violated. Similarly, let there exist an indexm00 such that rm00 (!ˆ) < 0, we can violate
Eq. (B.) by choosing νm00  0. Thus rm (!ˆ) = 0 for all m and therefore !ˆ is feasible for
Problem (Q).
Since (!ˆ; ˆ ) is a global !-max, -min saddle point, we also haveM (!; ˆ )  M (!ˆ; ˆ )
for all ! 2 Ω. Thus G (!)   PMm=1 ˆmrm (!)  G (!ˆ)   PMm=1 ˆmrm (!ˆ). Since r(!) = 0 for

every feasible!, we have thatG (!)  G (!ˆ) everywhere on f! jr(!) = 0;! 2 Ωg and thus
!ˆ is optimal for Problem (Q).
Part (ii): Let x = x() = argmaxx2X L (x;), where  is the converged price vector
obtained from the pricing process (Eq. .). The profile x is returned from the agents
when provided with the price  (via the optimizations in Section ..). By assumption 
and Corollary .., x is unique. Notice that (x;) is a competitive equilibrium by Def.
... Also, due to the concavity of L (Lemma ..), φ () = L (x;)  L (x;) for
all x 2 X. We know that rφ () j= = 0 and thus, by Eq. (.), h(x()) = h(x) = 0.
Consequently, L (x;) =W (x)   ()>h(x) =W (x) =W (x)   >h(x) = L (x;)
for all . In summary L (x;)  L (x;) = L (x;) for all x 2 X;  and thus (x;)
is a global x-max, -min saddle point for the Lagrangian L (x;).
From parts (i) and (ii), we conclude that the pricing process generates the pair (x;)
where x is a globally optimal solution to Problem (P). 

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C.. Defender’s Belief State Update
The timing diagram in Fig. C. will be useful for the arguments of this section.
a!ack
Figure C.1: Event and update timing for the dynamic security model.

The belief update of Eq. (.) is derived as follows
pi jmt+1 = P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Yt+1 = yk ;Πt = pit )
=
P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
 P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
P (Yt+1 = yk j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
pujm (pit )r
u
jk
(pit )
σ (pit ;yk ;u)
The derivations for Eqs. (.) – (.) are now presented. Eq. (.) is obtained via
pujm (pit ) = P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm; St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
 P (St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
 P (St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (St+1 = sj j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
 P (Φt+1 = ϕm j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
 P (St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
pi ilt p
u
ijlqlm :

Eq. (.) is obtained via
rujk (pit ) = P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (Yt+1 = yk ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl j St+1 = sj ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
 P (St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
 P (St = si ;Φt = ϕl j Πt = pit )
=
X
si2S;ϕl 2Φ
pi ilt r
u
ijkl :
Finally, Eq (.) is derived as follows
σ (pit ;yk ;u) = P (Yt+1 = yk j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
sj2S;ϕm2Φ
P (Yt+1 = yk ; St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
sj2S;ϕm2Φ
P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
 P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
sj2S;ϕm2Φ
P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ;Ut = u;Πt = pit )
 P (St+1 = sj ;Φt+1 = ϕm j Ut = u;Πt = pit )
=
X
sj2S;ϕm2Φ
rujk (pit )p
u
jm (pit ):
In order to define the transition probability, pu
ijl
, consider the set of transition events,
denoted by F (si ; sj ;ϕl ;u), denoting the set of exploit events that could have caused the
transition between si and sj under action u and type ϕl . Each event in v 2 F (si ; sj ;ϕl ;u)

is a binary assignment (either successful or not successful) to each of the available exploits
that are not blocked by the current defense action, E (si ) n B (u). The transition probability
is
puijl =
X
v2F (si ;sj ;ϕl ;u)
*.,
Y
em2v1
αem (ϕl )βem (ϕl ) 
Y
em2v0

1   αem (ϕl )βem (ϕl )
+/- (C.)
where we have used the fact that the events in F (si ; sj ;ϕl ;u) are disjoint. The set v1 (resp.
v0) denotes the collection of exploits in v that must succeed (resp. must not succeed).
The observation probability ru
ijkl
is now defined. Introducing a variable Et representing
the set of exploits attempted by the attacker from state St , the probability ruijkl is
ruijkl = P (Yt+1 = yk j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
=
X
Ea2P (E (si ))
P (Yt+1 = ym;Et = Ea j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
=
X
Ea2P (E (si ))
P (Yt+1 = ym j Et = Ea; St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
 P (Et = Ea j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
=
X
Ea2P (E (si ))
P (Yt+1 = ym j Et = Ea;Φt = ϕl )
 P (Et = Ea j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u) (C.)
where we have used the fact that the event fYt+1 = ymg is independent of the event fSt+1 =
sj ; St = si ;Ut = ug given the exploit attempt event fEt = Eag. The probability of seeing a
given observation vector given a set of exploit attempts, P (Yt+1 = ym j Et = Ea;Φt = ϕl ), is
defined as
P (Yt+1 = ym j Et = Ea;Φt = ϕl ) =
Y
j2A
P (Y jt+1 = y
j
m j Et = Ea;Φt = ϕl )

where separability of the above terms follows from the fact that the elements of the obser-
vation vector are conditionally independent given the exploit attempt. Defining E (zj ) as
the set of exploits that can trigger alert zj , that is, E (zj ) = fei 2 E j zj 2 Z (ei )g, each term
in the above product is
P (Y jt+1 = y
j
m j Et = Ea ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

1   ζj (ϕl )
 Y
ei2Ea\E (zj )

1   δij (ϕl )

if yjm = 0
1  

1   ζj (ϕl )
 Y
ei2Ea\E (zj )

1   δij (ϕl )

if yjm = 1
:
The probability of exploit attempts given a transition from si to sj under action u and type
ϕl , P (Et = Ea j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u), is
P (Et = Ea j St+1 = sj ; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
=
P (St+1 = sj j Et = Ea; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)P (Et = Ea j St = si ;Φt = ϕl )
P (St+1 = sj j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u) :
To define the probability P (St+1 = sj j Et = Ea; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u), let the set
F (si ; sj ;ϕl ;u; Ea ) denote the collection of attempted exploit events that could have resulted
in a transition to state sj given that exploits Ea were attempted in state si under actionu and
type ϕl . Each event v 2 F (si ; sj ;ϕl ;u; Ea ) is a binary assignment (either successful or not
successful) to each of the available exploits that are attempted and not currently blocked,
(Ea \ E (si )) n B (u). The probability is then given by
P (St+1 = sj j Et = Ea; St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u)
=
X
v2F (si ;sj ;ϕl ;u;Ea )
*.,
Y
el 2v1
βel (ϕl ) 
Y
el 2v0

1   βel (ϕl )
+/- :
The probability of exploits Ea being attempted given the current security state si , P (Et =

Ea j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ), is
P (Et = Ea j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ) =
Y
el 2Ea\E (si )
αel (ϕl ) 
Y
el 2E (si )nEa

1   αel (ϕl )

and P (St+1 = sj j St = si ;Φt = ϕl ;Ut = u) is the transition probability given by puijl .

A D
Appendix: On Monotonicity Properties of
Optimal Policies for POMDPs on
Partially Ordered Spaces
D.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. Let pi <дr pi 0, so piipi 0j  pijpi 0i if si < sj and piipi 0j = pijpi 0i if si k sj . Recall the definition
of generalized first-order stochastic dominance (Definition ..). For each K 2 K , define
K¯ = S n K . As a result of the definition of the set K , and the fact that pi <дr pi 0, for each
(i; j ) 2 K  K¯ there exists either an expression piipi 0j  pijpi 0i if si < sj or piipi 0j = pijpi 0i if si k sj .
For a given K , K¯ pair, sum the corresponding expressions over all (i; j ) 2 K  K¯ , yielding
X
(i;j )2KK¯
piipi
0
j 
X
(i;j )2KK¯
pijpi
0
i

due to the fact that pi <дr pi 0. The above inequality can be factored into the form pi IKpi 0IK¯
 pi IK¯pi 0IK . Now,
pi IKpi
0IK¯  pi IK¯pi 0IK
 (pi IK )(1   pi 0IK )  (1   pi IK ) (pi 0IK )
 pi IK   pi IKpi 0IK  pi 0IK   pi IKpi 0IK
 pi IK  pi 0IK
for each K 2 K , thus pi <дs pi 0. 
D.. Proof of Proposition 
Proof. Let P be GTP2 and pi <дr pi 0. Denoting P;i as the i’th column of matrix P , we wish
to show that piP;ipi 0P;j  piP;jpi 0P;i for si  sj and piP;ipi 0P;j = piP;jpi 0P;i for si k sj .
Equivalently, defining qij (pi ;pi 0) = piP;ipi 0P;j   piP;jpi 0P;i , we wish to show that
qij (pi ;pi
0)  0 for si  sj
qij (pi ;pi
0) = 0 for si k sj :
Observe that
qij (pi ;pi
0) = piP;ipi 0P;j   piP;jpi 0P;i
= pi (P;iP>;j   P;jP>;i )pi 0>:
Define Aij = P;iP>;j   P;jP>;i and notice that Aij is skew-symmetric, that is, (Aij )> =  Aij .
The (k; l )’th element of matrix Aij , denoted by aij
kl
, is given by aij
kl
= pl jpki   pkjpli where

aij
kl
= 0 for k = l . The function qij (pi ;pi 0) = piAijpi 0> can then be written as
piAijpi 0> =
nX
l=1
nX
k=l+1
(pl jpki   pkjpli )(pikpi 0l   pilpi 0k ): (D.)
Recall our objective of showing that piAijpi 0>  0 for si  sj and piAijpi 0> = 0 for si k sj .
First, consider the case where si < sj . If sk < sl , then by pi <дr pi 0, pikpi 0l   pilpi 0k  0, and
since P is assumed to be GTP2, we have that pl jpki  pkjpli  0, and the corresponding term
in the sum is positive (see Eq. (D.)). Otherwise, if sk k sl then pikpi 0l   pilpi 0k = 0 and the
corresponding term in the sum is zero, regardless of the sign of pl jpki  pkjpli . Consequently
piAijpi 0>  0 when si < sj . Second, consider the case where si k sj . As in the first case,
if sk < sl then pikpi 0l   pilpi 0k  0, but now since si k sj , we have that pl jpki   pkjpli = 0
since P is GTP2, resulting in the corresponding term in the sum to be zero. If sk k sl then
pikpi
0
l
  pilpi 0k = 0 and the corresponding term in the sum is zero, regardless of the sign of
pl jpki   pkjpli . Consequently piAijpi 0> = 0 when si k sj . 
D.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. For any pi 2 ∆(S), u 2 U , and yk ;yl 2 Y such that yk <Y yl , τ (pi ;u;yk ) <дr
τ (pi ;u;yl ) if and only if (by Definition ..)
τi (pi ;u;yk )τj (pi ;u;yl )  τj (pi ;u;yk )τi (pi ;u;yl ) for si < sj
τi (pi ;u;yk )τj (pi ;u;yl ) = τj (pi ;u;yk )τi (pi ;u;yl ) for si k sj
for all yk <Y yl . Using the definition of τi (pi ;u;y), Eq. (.), we can expand the above
expressions to obtain

 
rik
Pn
a=1 piap
u
ai
σ (pi ;u;yk )
! *,
rjl
Pn
a=1 piap
u
aj
σ (pi ;u;yl )
+-  *,
rjk
Pn
a=1 piap
u
aj
σ (pi ;u;yk )
+-
 
ril
Pn
a=1 piap
u
ai
σ (pi ;u;yl )
!
for si < sj 
riv
Pn
a=1 piap
u
ai
σ (pi ;u;yk )
! *,
rjl
Pn
a=1 piap
u
aj
σ (pi ;u;yl )
+- = *,
rjk
Pn
a=1 piap
u
aj
σ (pi ;u;yk )
+-
 
ril
Pn
a=1 piap
u
ai
σ (pi ;u;yl )
!
for si k sj
for all yk <Y yl . Multiplying both sides of the expressions by σ (pi ;u;yk )σ (pi ;u;yl ), defined
in Eq. (.), we obtain
*,rik
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- *,rjl
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+-  *,rjk
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+- *,ril
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- for si < sj*,rik
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- *,rjl
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+- = *,rjk
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+- *,ril
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- for si k sj
for all yk <Y yl . Rearranging, the expressions can be equivalently written as
(rikrjl   rjkril ) *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+-  0 for si < sj
(rikrjl   rjkril ) *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+- = 0 for si k sj
for all yk <Y yl . The above expressions are true if and only if
rikrjl  rjkril for si < sj
rikrjl = rjkril for si k sj

for all yk <Y yl . By assumption, we have that rikrjl = rjkril if either si k sj and yk <Y yl or
si < sj and yk kY yl , so the above is equivalent to
rikrjl  rjkril for yk <Y yl
rikrjl = rjkril for yk kY yl
for all si < sj , which is ri <дr rj for si < sj . 
D.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. We need to show that the information state update preserves the generalized MLR
order (for a fixed action and observation) if and only if the transition matrix preserves
generalized MLR order. For any u 2 U , yv 2 Y , and pi ;pi 0 2 ∆(S) such that pi <дr pi 0,
τ (pi ;u;yk ) <дr τ (pi 0;u;yk ) if and only if
τi (pi ;u;yk )τj (pi
0;u;yk )  τj (pi ;u;yk )τi (pi 0;u;yk ) for all si < sj
τi (pi ;u;yk )τj (pi
0;u;yk ) = τj (pi ;u;yk )τi (pi 0;u;yk ) for all si k sj
for pi <дr pi 0. The above can be shown to be equivalent to
rikrjk *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- *,
nX
a=1
pi 0apuaj+-  rjkrik *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+- *,
nX
a=1
pi 0apuai+- for si < sj
rikrjk *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
ai
+- *,
nX
a=1
pi 0apuaj+- = rjkrik *,
nX
a=1
piap
u
aj
+- *,
nX
a=1
pi 0apuai+- for si k sj

for pi <дr pi 0. Let Pu;i denote the i’th column of Pu . Dividing both sides of both expressions
by rikrjk (note that rik ; rjk > 0 by assumption) yields
piPu;ipi
0Pu;j  piPu;jpi 0Pu;i for si < sj
piPu;ipi
0Pu;j = piP
u
;jpi
0Pu;i for si k sj
for pi <дr pi 0, which is equivalent to piPu <дr pi 0Pu for pi <дr pi 0. 
D.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. Let Pui; denote the i’th row of matrix Pu . By assumption ,
Pui; <дs Puj;
for si < sj . This can be seen by recognizing that, for any si < sj , the degenerate beliefs
vi ;vj 2 ∆(S) (where vi is a pmf with all mass on element i) satisfy vi <дr vj and noticing
that viPu = Pui; <дr Puj; = vjPu by Proposition  and thus Pui; <дs Puj; by Lemma ... By
assumption , ri <дr rj for all si < sj and thus ri <дs rj for all si < sj by Lemma ... That
is
riI J  rjI J
for all J 2 J = fJ  Y j yl 2 J ;yk <Y yl =) yk 2 J g. Using the aforementioned
Lemma .. of stochastic dominance on a partially ordered set, we have thatPnj=1 puijrjI J is
increasing in i on (S;<) for all J 2 J . Now, since pi <дr pi 0 by assumption, pi <дs pi 0 by

Lemma .., and again by Lemma .. we have
nX
i=1
pii
nX
j=1
puijrjI J 
nX
i=1
pi 0i
nX
j=1
puijrjI J
for all J 2 J . Recall σ (pi ;u;yk ) = Pni=1 pii Pnj=1 puijrjk , so the above inequality is equivalent
to σ (pi ;u) <дs σ (pi 0;u). 
D.. Proof of Lemma ..
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. By assumption pi <дr pi 0 and thus, by Lemma ..,
pi <дs pi 0. Under the assumption that c (s ) is increasing in s on (S;<), Lemma .. yields
V T (pi ) =
nX
i=1
piic (si ) 
nX
i=1
pi 0i c (si ) = V

T (pi
0):
Now, assume thatV t+1(pi ) is increasing on (∆(S);<дr ), that is,V t+1(pi )  V t+1(pi 0) for pi <дr
pi 0 (induction hypothesis). Also, let action u0 be optimal in pi 0, that is u0 = дt (pi 0), so
V t (pi 0) =
nX
i=1
pi 0i c (si ;u
0) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi 0;u0;yk )V t+1(τ (pi
0;u0;yk ))

nX
i=1
pi 0i c (si ;u) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi 0;u;yk )V t+1(τ (pi
0;u;yk ))
where u = дt (pi ). By Lemma .. and assumptions  and , τ (pi ;u;y) is increasing in y on
(Y;<Y ) for any pi 2 ∆(S), u 2 U , and by the induction hypothesis,V t+1(τ (pi 0;u;y)) is also

increasing in y on (Y;<Y ). Now by Lemmas .. and .., we have that
nX
i=1
pi 0i c (si ;u) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi 0;u;yk )V t+1(τ (pi
0;u;yk ))

nX
i=1
pi 0i c (si ;u) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi
0;u;yk )): (D.)
Next, note that since pi <дs pi 0 and by assumption ,Pni=1 pi 0i c (si ;u)  Pni=1 piic (si ;u), follows
by Lemma ... Furthermore, by Lemma .. and assumption , τ (pi ;u;y) is increasing in
pi on (∆(S);<дr ) for any u 2 U , yk 2 Y , and using the induction hypothesis, we have
nX
i=1
pi 0i c (si ;u) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi
0;u;yk ))

nX
i=1
piic (si ;u) + ρ
mX
k=1
σ (pi ;u;yk )V

t+1(τ (pi ;u;yk )) = V

t (pi ): (D.)
The result holds by induction. 

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